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ABSTRACT 
In many places in the Western world where music therapy occurs, improvisation is a 
significant and widespread practice in clinical work. The question of the nature of 
improvisation in music therapy is the topic of this enquiry, with particular reference to 
musical ontology and aesthetics. 
I examine how a consideration of ontology enables a distinction to be drawn between 
the music made within the clinical setting, known as clinical improvisation, and music 
that is made elsewhere. The context for this enquiry is the music therapy practice of the 
UK. Through an examination of the recent history of this practice, I establish two 
distinct approaches to clinical improvisation in the UK, music-centred and 
psychodynamic. I show how there are different ontologies of music „at work‟ between 
these two approaches. I also demonstrate how these distinctions manifest in the question 
of the location of the therapeutic effect: is it in the music or the therapeutic relationship? 
Finally, I examine the nature of clinical improvisation in relation to performance. I 
explain how a consideration of distinct ontologies of music within clinical improvisation 
indicates a further distinction between the music of music therapy and art improvisation 
that is made elsewhere. 
2 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... 6 
Declaration ........................................................................................................................ 7 
Statement of Copyright.................................................................................................... 7 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 8 
PART I THE CONTEXT OF CLINICAL IMPROVISATION 11 
Chapter 1 The Music of Music Therapy: An Introduction 12 
Initial Contexts 16 
Music Therapy and Clinical Improvisation 19 
What is Clinical Improvisation? 20 
What is Music Therapy? 23 
Two Approaches to Clinical Improvisation 27 
From Clinical Practice Towards a Philosophical Enquiry 29 
Comparative Musical Ontology 30 
Aesthetics as a Topic of Enquiry for Music Therapy 32 
The Focus of Aesthetic Enquiry 34 
Conclusion to Chapter One and Summary of  the Enquiry 38 
Chapter 2 The Emergence of Clinical Improvisation 42 
Towards a Contemporary Music Therapy Profession: Influences and 
Precedents 43 
The Cambridgeshire Report: Therapeutic Music Education 44 
Influencing Therapeutic Attitudes to Music 46 
The Influence of the Avant-Garde: Free Improvisation and Aleatoric 
Music 48 
Alfred Nieman and Improvisation 52 
Pioneering the Music of Music Therapy 55 
Juliette Alvin 57 
Alvin’s Music Therapy Approach 61 
Towards Psychodynamic Music Therapy 64 
3 
Mary Priestley and a Psychodynamic Approach 68 
Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins and a Music-Centred Approach 72 
Towards a Music-Centred Approach 75 
Conclusion 79 
Chapter 3 Ontological Method and the Music of Music Therapy 82 
The Role of Musical Ontology as Method 84 
Approaches to Musical Ontology 84 
Higher-Order Ontology 87 
The Purpose of Higher-Order Ontology: Evaluation and 
Misunderstandings 88 
Rock Music: A Case Study for Comparative Higher-Order Ontology 90 
Terminology 91 
More Terminology: Thick and Thin Works in Performance 92 
Illustrating Higher-Order Ontology: Rock Music and Performance 93 
The Limits of Higher-Order Ontology? 97 
Establishing a Definition for Clinical Improvisation 101 
Clinical Improvisation and Ontological Confusion 103 
Towards a Distinction: Brown and Pavlicevic‟s Phenomenology of 
Clinical Improvisation 106 
Empirical Research 109 
Discussion and Conclusion 111 
Towards Ontology 114 
PART II THE DIVERSITY OF CLINICAL IMPROVISATION 116 
Chapter 4 Clinical Improvisation as Process and Product 117 
Improvisation: A Diverse Theory and Practice 119 
Time and Place 120 
Value 123 
Musical Ontology and Improvisation 124 
Work and Non-Work 125 
Towards Diversity 127 
Musical Ontologies: Connecting Domains 129 
Two Ontological Routes 132 
4 
Process and Product in Clinical Improvisation 134 
Revisiting the Historical Perspective 136 
Paul Nordoff: Improvising Musical Works 137 
Alfred Nieman and Free Improvisation 143 
Conclusion 146 
Chapter 5 Two Approaches: The ‘Aesthetic’ and the ‘Relational’ in 
Clinical Improvisation 150 
Linking Two Accounts of Ontology 151 
A Continuum of Musical Forms and Structures 156 
The ‘Relational’ in Psychodynamic Clinical Improvisation: The 
Thinking of the Therapist 158 
The Psychodynamic Approach and „Unconscious Relating‟ 159 
The Music-Centred Approach and „Aesthetic Wholeness‟ 164 
Music as a Unified Concept in Music-Centred Music Therapy 165 
Musicology: Putting Music at the Centre of Clinical Improvisation 167 
The Problem of Musical Analysis as Therapeutic Analysis 169 
Diverse Intuitions 175 
Ken Aigen and the Notion of Continuity 176 
Conclusion 179 
PART III THE ONTOLOGY OF CLINICAL IMPROVISATION 182 
Chapter 6 Hanslick, Music and Emotion 183 
Streeter‟s Critique 186 
The Role of Emotion in the Music of Music Therapy 190 
Formalism and Clinical Improvisation 192 
Motion and Emotion 194 
Motion in Music as a Theory for Music Therapy 196 
Conclusion 200 
Chapter 7 Clinical Improvisation and Performance 203 
„Playing‟ Music and „Performing‟ Music 205 
The Practice of Performance in Clinical Work 208 
Performance as the Tool Music Therapists Forgot? 210 
5 
Challenging the „Mainstream‟: The Consensus Approach 212 
Towards Ontology Through Humour 213 
Performing Clinical Improvisation 216 
Making Music, Making Artworks 218 
Making Music, Making Relationships 220 
Conclusion 221 
Chapter 8 The Music of Music Therapy as Art 224 
Performing the Self 225 
A Distinction from Theatre: The Actor on the Stage and the Actor on 
the Bus 228 
Sites in Music Therapy 230 
Site-Specific Art 235 
Psychodynamic Music Therapy as Site-Specific Art 236 
Conclusion 239 
Beyond the research: towards a notion of clinical improvisation as 
music for a purpose 245 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 250 
Websites, Databases and Specialist Internet Sources Consulted (selected) ............ 261 
6 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Bohlman‟s Metaphysical Routes  ............................................................ 131 
Figure 2: A Continuum of Musical Forms and Structures ...................................... 158 
7 
DECLARATION 
No part of this thesis has previously been submitted for any degree in this or any other 
university, and no part of it has previously been published. 
 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
in any format, including electronic and the internet, without the author‟s prior written 
consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged properly. 
 
8 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I thank Professor Max Paddison for his sustained and insightful 
interest in my project and for the generosity of his supervision and teaching. 
I also thank Dr Andy Hamilton in the Philosophy Department for his interest and 
input in the early stages of the project. 
I want to express my appreciation of the rich and stimulating environment created by 
the staff and postgraduate community of the Music Department in Durham, and the 
enjoyment I have gained from teaching my subject and taking part in many seminars and 
conferences. In particular, I thank Professor Michael Spitzer for his support and interest 
in my work. 
I thank the AHRC for the award of a PhD Studentship 2008–2010. I also thank the 
former School of Human and Life Sciences at Roehampton University for funding in the 
early stages of the project and for a research grant towards books and a laptop computer. 
At Roehampton University, I thank Michael Barham, Dean of Human and Life 
Sciences, and Dr Diane Bray, Head of Psychology, for allowing me to take periods of 
leave from my post. I thank my immediate colleagues in Music Therapy, Lisa Margetts, 
Diana Wheelan , Veronica Austin, and Tessa Watson who have covered my work during  
periods of leave. I thank Caroline Flynn for her pragmatic approach to administration 
particularly during periods when I was frequently travelling between Durham and 
London.  
Teaching is a huge privilege and source of ideas: I thank all the students studying 
music therapy at the Universities of Roehampton and Durham who time after time, 
9 
uncannily, have posed the very question I work on in this enquiry, in new and interesting 
ways. 
Neil Webster, Head of Music at The London Contemporary Dance School, gave 
generously of his time in the form of many discussions and two interviews covering 
some of the central themes of this project and enabling me to observe his work as an 
improviser. Also, I thank the organist and music therapist John Strange who also gave an 
interview, including an extensive discussion of the music of Paul Nordoff. Both sets of 
interviews enabled me to gain a deeper insight into the nature of improvisation in music 
therapy and informed this project on many levels. I owe the original impetus to explore 
these forms of improvisation to the series of stimulating conversations that I have 
enjoyed throughout the research with Maggie Patey. 
I thank the many colleagues and friends in the wider arts and psychotherapy 
community who have expressed interest in my project, read (or offered to read) chapters, 
given me helpful feedback and kept in touch at crucial moments. These include Alison 
Barrington, Chris Brown, Sarah Clarke, Elke Dutton, Pauline Etkin, Jane Garner, Jo 
Joyce, Helen Loth, Wendy Magee, Lynn Malloy, Dominic Natoli, Helen Odell-Miller, 
Patricia O‟Sullivan, Mercédès Pavlicevic, John Strange, Elaine Streeter, Sarah Tucker 
and Tessa Watson. I thank the late Sandra Brown for introducing me to the work of 
Thomas Ogden. I also thank Lucy Browne for her help with using the Times Online 
Archive, Jo Joyce for her help with the bibliography and Sarah Townsend-Elliot for 
typesetting Figure 2.  
On a personal note, the past six years have also been eventful outside of the research. 
During the early stages of the project, Helen Patey and I celebrated our civil partnership. 
10 
Helen‟s illness, which she fought hard and lost over the ensuing couple of years, 
provided another extreme of life experience. 
I am grateful to both our families and friends who have given all manner of support 
during these years enabling me to complete the project. Special mention must go to the 
Townsend-Elliot family who regularly looked after my cat and home in London, 
enabling me to spend extended periods in Durham. Janet Graham and Phillip Deane 
have provided warm and stimulating hospitality in County Durham. My Mother and her 
partner Francis have also provided a place to stay, in Devon, together with their constant 
interest and caring attention. My in-laws Katey, Nigel, Chrissie and Fred provided 
ongoing familial support, and much more. SF has listened and provided me with 
unerring wisdom and fortitude. I thank everyone for the many „extra miles‟. 
A final note of thanks to Helen, whose close companionship I miss beyond belief, 
and without whom I would never have begun this project nor had the willpower to finish 
it. I dedicate this thesis in her memory. 
11 
PART I 
THE CONTEXT OF CLINICAL 
IMPROVISATION 
12 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Music of Music Therapy: An Introduction 
In Western thinking, music‟s established and secure place in the world of the arts has 
proved difficult for music therapists, for whom music exists in the world of healing ... 
there is a converging question: where and how do music-as-art and music-as-therapy 
meet, if at all? 
MERCÉDÈS PAVLICEVIC, 1995
1
 
 
In a sense, the difficulty of our attempt to use music as a communicative medium is 
compounded because it is also an attempt to wrest music from an assumed sole 
existence as „art‟. This is perhaps a philosophical conundrum that follows music 
therapists throughout their career.  
KAY SOBEY AND JOHN WOODCOCK, 1999
2
 
 
Are therapeutic improvisations comparable to present day works of art? 
COLIN ANDREW LEE, 1990
3
 
                                                 
1
 
 M. Pavlicevic, „Music and emotion: Aspects of music therapy research‟, in A. Gilroy and C. Lee 
(eds.), Art and music therapy and research (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p.51. 
2
 
 K. Sobey and J. Woodcock, „Psychodynamic music therapy‟, in A. Cattanach (ed.), Process in the arts 
therapies (London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999), pp.137–138. 
3
 
 C. Lee, „Structural analysis of post-tonal therapeutic improvisatory music‟, Journal of British Music 
Therapy 4 (1990), p.11.  
2
 
 K. Sobey and J. Woodcock, „Psychodynamic music therapy‟, in A. Cattanach (ed.), Process in the arts 
therapies (London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999), pp.137–138. 
3
 
 C. Lee, „Structural analysis of post-tonal therapeutic improvisatory music‟, Journal of British Music 
Therapy 4 (1990), p.11.  
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When music therapists make music in a music therapy session, with a client, adult or 
child, what kind of music are they making, and is it any different from the „art‟ music 
made elsewhere? This enquiry is concerned with the question of „what is the music of 
music therapy?‟ I pose this question with philosophical emphasis, as a dilemma of 
„comparative musical ontology‟.4 I draw a distinction between clinical improvisation 
and art improvisation and use this distinction to examine the kinds of clinical music-
making practised in two contemporary music therapy approaches in the UK. In doing 
so, I take the aesthetic considerations of (i) music and emotion and (ii) performance as 
revealing the distinctiveness of ontology found in the music of music therapy. 
The impetus for the enquiry is threefold. First, it has arisen out of an observation 
within clinical practice that the purpose of music therapy is frequently misunderstood by 
clients and professional colleagues alike. It is my contention that the source of this 
misunderstanding lies with how the music as a medium within therapy is conceptualized. 
For example, if a colleague refers a client to music therapy on the understanding that the 
improvised music within sessions is made „for its own sake‟, separate from a notion of 
the therapeutic relationship as contained within the music, then it is likely that they will 
have misunderstood the nature of the music therapy intervention overall.  
Second, the enquiry has arisen out of an observation that the status of the music is 
not always clear; are clients creating „pieces of music‟ or „artworks‟ within sessions, in 
the way that they might, for example, during community workshop sessions or other 
music-making settings? Similarly, I have observed that where music therapists 
                                                 
4
 
 A. Kania, „New waves in musical ontology‟, in K. Stock and K. Thomson-Jones (eds.), New waves in 
aesthetics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.20–40. The term „art improvisation‟ provides 
a working distinction between clinical improvisation and improvisation for its own sake. 
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improvise music together, for example as part of a practical workshop at a study day, it 
is not clear whether their music is clinical improvisation or free improvisation made for 
its own sake. This dilemma shares some common ground with other art therapy 
disciplines, for example the question of whether or not to „exhibit‟ the paintings made by 
clients in art therapy.
5
  
The third impetus is the observation that in music therapy literature, particularly 
where there are contentions of theory or practice, it is generally assumed that there is 
only one concept of music to be considered, and the concept of music under 
consideration is commonly assumed to be a unified one and rarely considered 
otherwise.
6
 At various stages of this enquiry I highlight the implications and inter-
connectedness of all these dilemmas, how they are manifested and how they inform an 
understanding of music ontology within music therapy. 
Throughout the enquiry I refer to the work of Gary Ansdell, a British music therapist 
and theorist, who has presented what are considered as significant challenges to the 
notion of clinical improvisation as a distinct form of music-making. At the centre of the 
enquiry, I examine the question posed by the American music therapist Kenneth Aigen, 
who asks whether „musical experiences in clinical contexts can be continuous with non-
clinical musical experiences‟.7 
                                                 
5
 
 
This observation is made based on many extended discussions with art therapy colleagues regarding 
the question of the nature of paintings painted within sessions and then placed upon the wall of the art 
therapy room. 
6
 
 
This is not an issue unique to music therapy. A similar observation has been made by philosopher 
Stephen Davies with regard to accounts of musical ontology (within analytical aesthetics) „which tend 
to assume musical pieces are of a single type‟. See: S. Davies, Musical works and performances 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p.7.  
7
 
 K. Aigen, „In defense of beauty: A role for the aesthetic in music therapy theory‟, Nordic Journal of 
Music Therapy 16 (2007), pp.112–128. 
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In summary, this is an enquiry into the ideas and concepts surrounding a musical 
practice, namely the improvised music that takes place in therapy known in the UK as 
clinical improvisation.
8
 Whilst the orientation is philosophical and comprises an 
ontological examination of clinical improvisation, a significant portion of the central 
discussion relates to the history of music therapy practice derived directly from the 
clinical experience of the writers whose work I examine. The research problems 
addressed in the enquiry are as follows: 
 
1 I seek to identify an ontological difference between clinical improvisation, which 
takes place within a clinical setting such as a school or hospital, and art improvisation, 
which takes place in other settings such as venues for musical performance. 
2 I explore the notion that there are different ontologies of music „at work‟ in two 
different approaches to clinical improvisation. These two approaches I will refer to 
as „psychodynamic music therapy‟ and „music-centred music therapy‟.9 
 
Overall, I seek to provide an account of what I contend is an ontological distinctiveness of 
clinical improvisation in relation to art improvisation and, in so doing, demonstrate a 
further distinction between „psychodynamic‟ and „music-centred‟ clinical improvisation. 
Whilst there may be diverse musical practices in the day to day repertoire of any 
                                                 
8
 
 Clinical improvisation has been defined as „musical improvisation with a specific therapeutic meaning 
and purpose in an environment facilitating response and interaction.‟ See: K. Abram, S. Caird and M. 
Mure et al., A handbook of terms commonly in use in music therapy (Cambridge: Association of 
Professional Music Therapists, 1985), p.5. 
 
9
 
 
See: K. Aigen, Music centered music therapy (Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers, 2005) and S. Hadley, 
„Theoretical bases of analytical music therapy‟, in J. T. Eschen (ed.), Analytical music therapy (London: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002), pp.34–48. These terms, psychodynamic and music-centred, are, 
however, in general use within the music therapy literature, and the meaning of each will be explored in 
depth throughout the enquiry. Where it is practical, I will simply refer to the „two approaches‟.  
16 
individual music therapist, which may or may not be specifically identifiable as 
psychodynamic or music-centred,  in this thesis I show that ultimately there is profound 
philosophical meaning to be elicited in the making of this distinction in abstracto. What 
is clinical improvisation? What research approach will be taken in this enquiry? For the 
remainder of this chapter, I provide an answer to these two questions in the form of an 
introduction to the enquiry as a whole. I provide an initial context for the research and a 
background to the musical practice of clinical improvisation. I then examine the 
philosophical methodology that has provided a framework and direction to the project, 
before making a link between questions of aesthetics and ontology, in particular the 
comparative musical ontology proposed by Andrew Kania and the clinical practice of 
music therapy. Finally, I provide a summary of what is to come in subsequent chapters. 
Initial Contexts 
The context to this enquiry is the complex debate within the UK music therapy profession 
during the past fifteen years regarding the question of best practice.
10
 Two key positions will 
emerge many times throughout the enquiry in the form of two approaches to clinical 
improvisation: psychodynamic and music-centred. Put simply, the debate has occupied 
territory between therapists whose practice on the one hand is informed by theories and 
practice of psychoanalysis, known as psychodynamic or „psychoanalytical informed‟ music 
                                                 
10
 
 
For an introduction to the debate between the two approaches to clinical practice, see: E. Streeter, 
„Finding a balance between psychological thinking and musical awareness in music therapy theory – a 
psychoanalytic perspective‟, British Journal of Music Therapy, 13, No.1 (1999), pp.5–20. Streeter‟s 
work will be considered in Chapter Six. 
17 
therapy,
11
 and on the other hand informed by theories and practice of music, known as 
music-centred music therapy.
12
 The tension between these two positions is in part political 
(What is the meaning of becoming a profession and receiving recognition through state 
registration? Should any one model of practice predominate within this?), part ethical (What 
should a music therapist do? Which practice is the most therapeutic? Which practice is the 
most musical? Which practice is safe?) and part theoretical (Can non-musical theories 
inform a musical practice? Can musical theories inform a therapeutic practice?).
13
 
The key development and stimulus in this debate has been the emergence of a music 
therapy literature proposing or describing what has come to be known as „community 
music therapy‟.14 Here, clinicians and researchers have addressed all of these questions in-
depth and in doing so opened up some important considerations for everyday clinical 
work. This is particularly with regard to the physical and emotional boundaries of therapy, 
                                                 
11
 
 
The theory and practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in its contemporary forms. Psychodynamic 
music therapy in recent years has been particularly influenced by the British Object Relations school, 
including the work of Donald Winnicott and John Bowlby, together with the influences of humanist 
forms of psychotherapy and counselling such as Irvin Yalom and the person-centred approaches 
originally developed by Carl Rogers. For a summary of influences, which includes a transatlantic 
perspective, see S. Hadley, „Psychodynamic music therapy: An overview‟, in S. Hadley (ed.), 
Psychodynamic music therapy: Case studies (Gilsum, NH: Barcelona Publishers, 2003), pp.1–20. 
12
 
 
Some of the underlying assumptions about music in this practice are derived from the 
anthroposophical influences of Rudolf Steiner in the Nordoff-Robbins approach. See: C. Robbins and 
C. Robbins, Healing heritage: Paul Nordoff exploring the tonal language of music (Gilsum, NH: 
Barcelona Publishers, 1998). More recently, this approach has also drawn from literature of 
musicology and sociology. Both approaches derive theory about practice from empirical psychology, 
in particular the work of Daniel Stern and Colwyn Trevarthen. For a summary see: J. Z. Robarts, 
„Music therapy and children with autism‟, in C. Trevarthen, K. Aitken, D. Papoudi and J. Z. Robarts 
(eds.), Children with autism: Diagnosis and interventions to meet their needs (London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1998), pp.172–202. 
13
 
 
For a summary and discussion of this debate, particularly with regard to its significance in the recent 
development of the music therapy profession, see: A. Barrington, „Music therapy: A study in 
professionalisation‟, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham (2005), pp.35–62. See also: A. 
Barrington, „Challenging the profession‟, British Journal of Music Therapy 22, No.2 (2008), pp.65–72.  
14
 
 G. Ansdell, „Community music therapy and the winds of change‟, Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy 
(North America 2, March 2002), pp. 18–19. Available at: 
https://normt.uib.no/index.php/voices/article/view/83/65. Accessed 4 November 2011. 
18 
which had hitherto developed under the influence of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Under 
this new designation of community music therapy, music therapists began to write about 
expanding their work outside of the perceived boundaries. For example, they have 
questioned the hitherto assumed necessity for a private space in which to work with clients 
and the need for the therapeutic relationship to remain exclusive to the therapy session. 
Alternative ways of working have been described, with the idea of resisting „one-size-fits-
all models (of any kind)‟.15 Some of the debate has been grounded in the idea, influenced 
by phenomenology, that „music therapy always takes place in context ... [that] after a 
period when music therapy has been modelled on the private needs of the psychological 
individual, music therapists seem again to be following where music also naturally leads – 
towards creating community and a cultural home‟.16 
This is the recent professional context out of which the present enquiry has arisen. 
However, whilst attention has been paid to „best practice‟, less attention, it can be said, has 
been paid to the nature of the music-making employed in that same practice, what kind of 
music it is and whether or not there is more than one concept of that same music.
17
 This 
enquiry opens, therefore, with an examination of the emergence of that music and the 
diversity of music-making present from the start of the contemporary practice. 
Furthermore, clinical improvisation, by its very nature, is not a widely disseminated 
instance of music-making. For example, this specialized form of music-making is not 
                                                 
15
 
 
For an initial summary of these issues from a community music therapy perspective, see: M. 
Pavlicevic and G. Ansdell, Community music therapy (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2004), 
pp.15–31. 
16
 Ibid., p.17. 
17
 
 
Exceptions to this include G. Ansdell, Music for life: Aspects of creative music therapy with adult 
clients (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1995) and M. Pavlicevic, Music therapy in context: 
Music, meaning and relationship (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1997). I refer to the work of 
both these authors throughout this enquiry. 
19 
generally broadcast or discussed across the media and is largely unconsidered within the 
academic practices of musicology or aesthetics. It may be conjectured that this is because 
it usually takes place within a confidential therapeutic setting between client and therapist. 
For this reason in particular, at the start of the enquiry I provide an account of music 
therapy as involving a specific form of music-making with a history and current context of 
its own. Clinical improvisation is thus presented as a technique for music therapy that has 
developed from the 1960s onwards, today forming a central part of music therapy training 
in the UK.
18
 It should be emphasized at this point, in terms of the actual practice of the 
therapist,  whilst I make highly specific distinctions between the two approaches, the 
work of  many practitioners, including my own, will move between these approaches as 
per the need of the client. Similarly, clients will also move between a desire for music 
making that pursues a conventional musical aesthetic and one which through their 
playing belies a need for a closer more directly relational musical response from the 
therapist. The two approaches can be understood therefore as manifesting within 
practice in a far more fluid way that they are presented within this enquiry.      
 
Music Therapy and Clinical Improvisation 
Music therapy is a term given to a multitude of ways in which music is applied in the 
service of some kind of „help‟. As far as can be known it occurs ubiquitously and has 
                                                 
18
 
 
There are six professional training courses in music therapy at MA level in the UK. Each course is 
legally required to be recognized by the Health and Care Professions Council (http://www.hpc-
uk.org/), an independent UK-wide body that registers practising music therapists. Whilst each 
individual course follows a resume of core standards and competencies, some courses follow one of 
the two approaches examined in this enquiry, whilst others have developed a more eclectic programme 
consisting of a combination of approaches. 
20 
always done so, although not solely in the way that therapy is understood within the 
Western medical and social contexts I consider in this enquiry.
19
 The historian Peregrine 
Horden writes: 
 
At various times and in various cultures over the past two and a half millennia – and probably still 
further back in time – music has been medicine. Performing or listening to music have variously 
been thought to achieve something more than arousal or entertainment; something different from, 
though often related to, enhanced spiritual awareness; something that beneficially outlasts the 
performance, that maintains or restores the health of mind and, even, body.
20
 
 
In recent years, in many places where music therapy is practised and documented, 
improvisation has been significant and widespread as a technique for clinical work.
21
 This 
contemporary version of music therapy has emerged since the 1950s in the UK, the USA, 
Europe and other places in the Western-influenced world. Developed by practising 
musicians, „improvisational music therapy‟ is based upon varying forms of free tonal and 
atonal improvisation and, as specified above, known in the UK as „clinical 
improvisation‟.22 
What is Clinical Improvisation? 
Clinical improvisation is based upon a twentieth and twenty-first-century conception of 
music. Essentially, it is free improvisation, which can simply encompass any sound that 
seems appropriate for or with the client at any one moment. For example, in any one 
                                                 
19
 
 
P. Horden (ed.), Music as medicine (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers Ltd, 2000), p.1. 
20
 Ibid., p.1. 
21
 
 
For a reliable source of recent literature documenting music therapy practices worldwide, see the 
Norwegian-based online journal Voices: A World Forum for Music Therapy, http://www.voices.no/. 
22
 
 
For a comprehensive and international survey of improvisation in music therapy, see: K. E. Bruscia, 
Improvisational models of music therapy (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1987). 
21 
clinical session, the content might include all kinds of music-making: „the raw sound of 
a human voice or an infant‟s cry; the most crafted of sounds forming a musical 
composition; spontaneous sounds freely improvised, without conscious regard for 
structure or form; functional sounds made by or upon objects which are not musical 
instruments, such as the shutting of a door or the moving of a chair‟.23 It is, of course, 
not only the music of the client that determines the sound of the clinical session; it is 
now possible in the UK for prospective therapists to be accepted to train with 
proficiency in any musical style or technique of performance, including non-Western 
music.
24
 This means whilst for some training courses specific musical styles of 
improvisation are favoured over others, amongst individual therapists the sound of 
clinical improvisation is greatly varied, particularly in terms of choice of instruments, 
harmonic language of music and form. Mercedes Pavlicevic provides an idea of what a 
music therapist might do, emphasizing a quality of listening needed in order to know 
how to respond to the patient: 
 
She [or he] listens carefully to the patient‟s musical utterances: tempo, rhythmic structure (or lack 
of it), melodic shape, phrasing, the quality of pulse or beat (is it regular, irregular, intermittently 
regular and irregular?) ... The therapist then joins in, improvising in a manner that reflects or 
confirms aspects of his playing. Thus, she will match the tempo and dynamic level, play in the 
same metre and pulse, if this is regular, or attempt to match or meet the pulse if it is irregular. The 
therapist‟s first goal is to meet the patient‟s music, thereby providing a shared musical environment 
within which both players‟ improvisation can make sense to one another.25 
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From Pavlicevic‟s description here, it is not surprising that the professional training of 
music therapists emphasizes the personality of the individual therapist and the 
development of their own way of creating an „authentic‟ relationship in and/or through 
music with the client or clients. A combination of client, music and therapist is at the 
heart of clinical improvisation. As shown later in this chapter, the distinction between „in 
music‟ and „through music‟ or „as music‟ will become integral to the respective 
conceptualizing of the music-centred and psychodynamic approaches to music therapy. 
One additional point must be made about clinical improvisation. Whilst the focus of 
this enquiry is improvisation, clinical improvisation encompasses not only musical 
improvisation; in the context of UK music therapy the term has been taken to refer to 
any form of spontaneous, rather than planned, music-making. In particular, the song a 
client might start to sing or ask for can become part of clinical improvisation. As such, 
the improvisation can be as much about what might happen, e.g. who plays which music 
and for how long, as the actual musical form of improvisation.
26
 Ansdell explains the 
origin of this approach in reflecting on the work of Nordoff and Robbins: 
 
Nordoff and Robbins used their own and additional pieces, especially in group work. Equally 
[today] many therapists incorporate songs into sessions when appropriate. The important point is 
that even the „philosophy‟ is an improvisational one – the emphasis being not necessarily on the 
song for its own sake, but for its use in music-making as a whole.
27
 
 
Outside of the UK, the broader term „clinical music‟ is sometimes employed to refer to the 
music of music therapy, encompassing a range of musical practices, even where 
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improvised music is mainly used.
28
 This is a useful general designation, but since the 
practice of British music therapists will form the conceptual and musical starting point for 
this enquiry, it is specifically clinical improvisation that will be referred to and examined 
throughout. 
What is Music Therapy? 
A frequently asked question about music therapy by the layperson is „what sort of music 
do you use?‟ This belies, however, a fundamental but unsurprising misunderstanding of 
music therapy in the UK. The question suggests that therapists use music like 
medication, choosing and administering it accordingly as per the need of the client. 
There are contemporary versions of music therapy outside of mainstream practice, not 
necessarily carried out by music therapists, which at least partially operate in this way. 
For example, a clinician such as a nurse or clinical psychologist might systematically 
choose recorded music to help foster pain relief or as a relaxant.
29
 Guided Imagery in 
Music is a music therapy approach that uses a particular repertoire of recorded Western 
classical music as a tool to evoke personal unconscious processes for individual clients 
within a psychotherapeutic framework.
30
 
However, these methods are not the methods of music therapy that have become 
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prominent in the UK over the past fifty years or so. Instead, a rich mixture of 
improvisation and other spontaneous musical activity remain the principle means of the 
British music therapist. Music, therefore, is not administered as such. Instead, the 
therapist creates a therapeutic environment in which music is freely co-improvised 
between client and therapist. Gary Ansdell writes of the early work of Nordoff and 
Robbins during the 1960s in special schools: 
 
Previously people had, as a rule, taken in prepared music to play for or with the children, expecting 
them to fit into musical activities with an already fixed form. But this instantly creates a situation 
where right and wrong becomes an issue. If a piece is pre-set it is the person who must fit in, must 
play or sing a particular note at a particular moment. In most situations where music therapy is 
needed, however, such an approach is often counterproductive. Instead, Nordoff and Robbins began 
from the opposite angle, with free improvisation as their tool, inviting the child simply to play. 
Nothing could be right or wrong, but equally anything could happen.
31
 
 
For two reasons the statement „nothing could be right or wrong, but equally anything 
could happen‟ is of profound importance. First, it suggests a mode of participation in 
music that links historically with the development of free improvisation and aleatoric 
musical practices in Europe and the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
notion that it is meaningful to create music freely, between people with and without 
formal training, was famously developed by Cornelius Cardew through his Scratch 
Orchestra Project. For Cardew, it was not only the trained musician who could 
contribute new ideas to the spontaneous musical event, but both the trained and 
untrained playing music together enhanced the creative process overall. As explained in 
the programme notes to a performance in 1984 of The Great Learning, „Cardew‟s 
intention was not to replace trained with untrained performers, but to bring them 
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together into a participatory situation in which different techniques and abilities could be 
fruitfully combined and contrasted, and in which performers from different backgrounds 
could learn from each other, and so extend the creative capacities of all participants in 
unexpected ways.‟32 Thus, music therapy was emerging at a time of musical 
experimentation with the notion of expertise and non-expertise. It wasn‟t merely a 
question of the improvised music of clients being of amateur quality or as yet unskilled, 
but instead as meaningful on its own terms. Second, the idea inherent within the work of 
Nordoff and Robbins, that „nothing [in the music] could be right or wrong, but equally 
anything could happen‟ points towards a model of therapeutic treatment chiefly 
concerned with the process rather than the product.
33
 Clearly, the music therapist does 
not simply work with outcomes; additionally, the musical experiences between client 
and therapist that happen along the way, over time, and the shared meanings of those 
experiences, are fundamental to the progress of therapy.
 
 
This raises some of the difficulties for music therapy research, common amongst 
healthcare practitioners working outside of a medical model, where there is not a 
necessarily observable relationship between the therapy and the outcome of therapy. The 
difficulty is not dissimilar to the theoretical and clinical problems encountered by Freud as 
he developed psychoanalysis in the early decades of the twentieth century, with the full 
intention of formulating a science of psychoanalysis. The original theory of 
psychoanalysis rests upon a naturalistic model of the mind, working from the premise that 
our consciousness and unconsciousness is observable and „out there‟ in the world and so 
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can receive medical treatment in the same way as physical bodies or objects. As Peter 
Dews comments, a distinction can be made between Freud‟s creation of a theory of 
knowledge and his clinical project, in which „natural science was to remain for Freud the 
only conceivable prototype‟.34 Furthermore, „in Freud‟s work there always exists an 
interplay and tension between the hermeneutic foreground of his work, in which his 
concern is with the interpretation of human behaviour, and a metapsychological 
background, in which the fundamental processes of the psyche are described in terms of 
economics and dynamics of the libido‟.35 The tension between outcome-oriented 
treatments in healthcare informed by science, and the process-oriented treatments 
informed by hermeneutics, remained a key issue within the politics of mental healthcare in 
the early decades of the twenty-first century. The demand for evidence, based upon 
experimental enquiry, continues to dominate the struggle for recognition and public 
funding of music therapy.
36
 
How did this process-oriented approach emerge? In other parts of the world, such as 
the USA, there is a distinctly goal-oriented approach towards music therapy. It will be 
seen in the next section, and in Chapter Two, that the profession was largely developed 
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by practising musicians. It can be speculated that for these pioneers, the process of 
music-making per se as a pathway towards health never lost its interest or value. The 
music never became merely a „tool‟ in the way that it possibly has had a tendency to do 
in some of the behavioural/educational approaches that have developed in other parts of 
the world. Furthermore, as already indicated, within the UK practice of music therapy 
there are at least two distinct approaches. How did these distinct approaches develop? In 
the next section, I will begin to address these questions as I introduce the historical 
development of clinical improvisation during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Two Approaches to Clinical Improvisation 
The emergence of distinct approaches to clinical improvisation can be traced to the work of 
two separate groups of individuals, both subsequently instrumental in the founding of 
training courses. The first course began in 1968 at the Guildhall School of Music and Drama 
in London under the direction of cellist Juliette Alvin (1897–1982) and assisted by the 
influential teaching of atonal improvisation by the composer Alfred Nieman (1914–1997). 
In Chapter Two, I will show how the foundations were prepared for a psychodynamic 
approach to music therapy through the interest of Alvin and Nieman in the meaning of 
music and the unconscious. The beginnings of this approach were consolidated by Mary 
Priestley, a student of Alvin, who during the 1970s wrote extensively about her work in 
adult psychiatry. With her colleagues Peter Wright and Marjorie Wardle, she developed a 
form of psychodynamic work called „analytic music therapy‟.37 
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The second course established was at Goldie Leigh Hospital, London, in 1974, by 
the American „neo-romantic‟ composer Paul Nordoff (1909–1977) and teacher Clive 
Robbins (1927–2011).38 Together with the music educationalist Sybil Beresford-Peirse 
(1912–2002), Nieman acted as an advisor here also.39 This work has been referred to 
variously as Nordoff-Robbins music therapy, creative music therapy (after the book of 
the same name) and, recently, in the broader terms of „music-centred music therapy‟.40 
In Chapter Two, I show how the influence of Rudolf Steiner on the work of Nordoff and 
Robbins laid the foundations of this music-centred approach. 
In all, these two approaches developed out of different beliefs about the therapeutic 
use of music. The psychodynamic approach tended towards an aesthetic of music as 
„self-expression‟, whereas the music-centred approach tended towards an aesthetic of 
music as „healing in itself‟. This distinction has sometimes been encapsulated using Ken 
Bruscia‟s distinction between the use of music in therapy or music as therapy.41 Music 
in therapy might entail the use of music as a therapeutic means of self-expression, for 
example, within a psychotherapeutic model of treatment. Alternatively, in the instance 
of music-as-therapy, it might be the music itself as the therapeutic treatment within a 
paramedical model, akin to occupational therapy, speech therapy or physiotherapy. In 
each instance, it is possible to discern not only a distinct use of music, but also a distinct 
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set of aesthetic priorities enabling „good‟ therapy to occur. Indeed, the work of the 
pioneering music therapists arguably set the scene for a rich tension between ways of 
thinking about music and practising music therapy, a tension that continues to the 
present day. It should be emphasized at this point however, that whilst throughout the 
enquiry I build some specific distinctions between these two approaches, the work of 
many practitioners will move freely between these same approaches as per the need of 
the client. Similarly, clients will also move between a desire for music-making that 
pursues a conventional musical aesthetic (as reflected in my account of a music-centred 
approach) and one which through their playing belies a need for a closer more directly 
relational musical response from the therapist (as reflected in my account of a 
psychodynamic approach).  The two approaches can be understood, therefore, as 
manifesting within clinical practice in a far more fluid and non-partisan way than might 
be assumed from the philosophical emphasis of the enquiry as a whole. 
 
We now turn to the concerns of methodology and the means by which I address the 
inherently philosophical topic of this enquiry. 
From Clinical Practice Towards a Philosophical Enquiry 
As already specified, the impetus for this enquiry has arisen out of everyday dilemmas 
found in three areas of clinical practice. 
First, it is common for music therapists to find their work misunderstood by clients 
and other professional disciplines alike. Music therapy sessions, for example, are 
frequently misunderstood as opportunities for music-making as an activity for its own 
30 
sake rather than music-making as part of a therapeutic process. Second, this 
misunderstanding can manifest in the expectations of the clients, for example through 
expressing anxiety that they will not be skilled enough to take part. Third, it can also 
manifest in the approach professionals from other disciplines, such as nursing and 
occupational therapy, take towards referral, and such practical matters as the type of 
room made available or the extent to which the privacy of a session is respected. 
In this enquiry, I take the view that underlying this dilemma is an inherently 
philosophical question about the nature of the music itself, and that the dilemma has led 
music therapists Sandra Brown and Mercedes Pavlicevic to pose the question „is 
improvisation in an individual music therapy session ... any different from improvisation 
in a context of two people making music?‟42 
Comparative Musical Ontology 
Ontology is a branch of metaphysical thinking in philosophy that, at different times 
with different emphasis, has been concerned with the question of the being of things. 
There is an obscurity to this statement that can only be illuminated by reference to the 
type of questions musical ontologists ask. I am taking musical ontology to be a mode 
of enquiry that poses questions of metaphysical meaning, indeed an enquiry whereby 
metaphysics is „done‟ through the philosophical problems raised by music. 
Of central concern for philosophers has been the question of what kind of being or 
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thing can music be, and what is its nature?
43
 This type of question has recently been 
identified as belonging to „fundamental ontology‟, in reference to the fundamental 
questions of what kind of thing is a musical work and how does the kind of thing it is 
relate to musical scores and performances?
44
 These questions, it should be added, reflect 
the interests of musical ontologists in the metaphysical problems raised by music 
belonging to the canon of Western classical music. On the other hand, and particularly in 
the twenty-first century, aestheticians have begun to turn their attention to questions 
about music outside of the classical musical work. Kania writes: 
 
The issues discussed in the literature on the ontology of other traditions, particularly rock and jazz, 
are quite different from those central to the fundamentalist debate. The fact that there are creatable ... 
[multiple] instantiable pieces and recordings, and particular playback events that instantiate them is 
taken more or less for granted. The focus of these debates [of higher level musical ontology] is rather 
on the relationships between these things and the roles they play in musical practices.
45
 
 
This enquiry is concerned with the comparative question of difference between two 
different practices of improvisation. In an earlier publication in which a distinction was 
made between clinical improvisation and what was termed „performance improvisation‟, 
the difference was presented as one of purpose.
46
 However, this presupposes that the 
ontology of the music remains the same. Although, for example, the context might differ 
radically, there is within this distinction nothing to suggest how the music is any 
different; instead, it is the same music simply used for this or that purpose. 
One example of differences between musical styles is discussed by Kania, who, 
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while writing about the ontology of rock music, summarizes philosophers‟ concerns that 
the reason rock music might be „held in lower esteem by some is that its artworks have 
been misunderstood to be of the same kind as classical music works‟.47 He continues by 
discussing a difference in the ontologies of classical and rock music, stating that „the 
claim is that classical works are of the ontological kind works-for-live-performance, 
while rock works are of a different ontological kind: work-for-studio-performances‟.48 In 
this enquiry, I use a similar format of comparative ontological enquiry, whereby I 
establish the distinction between clinical improvisation and other forms of 
improvisation. I do this through an in-depth examination of clinical improvisation where 
issues of comparative ontology are revealed through other issues of aesthetics, namely 
musical meaning (emotion) and performance. 
Aesthetics as a Topic of Enquiry for Music Therapy 
There is a general agreement in music therapy literature over the absence of 
philosophical aesthetics as a tool with which to address theoretical problems in music 
therapy.
49
 Such literature, as currently exists in English, is to a large extent concerned 
with the search for meaningful theory, a „good fit‟ with which to encapsulate the 
complexity of the live practice. Theory is frequently discussed as a means of developing 
a therapeutic approach or stance. For example, to decipher the role of „beauty‟ in a 
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clinical improvisation (a question posed by both Aigen and Carolyn Kenny) is to 
consider the therapeutic efficacy of beauty.
50
 This leads to questions of value, such as 
what makes a good clinical improvisation, and should „the notion of beauty in music 
play a role‟? Colin Lee has addressed this question indirectly in his development of 
Aesthetic Music Therapy.
51
 It arose, he writes: 
From a need to understand the musical foundations and structures of clinical improvisation from 
within an explicit music-centred music therapy theory … Aesthetic Music Therapy (AeMT) 
considers music therapy from a musicological and compositional point of view … [that the] 
creative potential of the client can only be released if the therapist is aware of the musical 
constructs they are using.
52
 
 
Lee‟s work will be examined in detail in Chapter Five of this enquiry. At this stage, it is 
sufficient to note how he conflates a concept of aesthetic value in clinical improvisation 
with a concept of therapeutic value. A consideration of the question of emotion in music 
is raised in the context of another question frequently discussed within clinical practice, 
the question of where the therapy takes place; is it between people or in the music itself? 
This topic is examined in Chapter Six, taking as a starting point the formalist ideas of 
Eduard Hanslick. 
Whilst it might seem that any activity entailing an art form will raise questions 
regarding the philosophy of art, central to this enquiry is the claim that to pose particular 
questions, such as examining what it means to perform clinical improvisation (as will be 
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explored in Chapters Seven and Eight), is to address such distinctions. Conversely, to 
put the matter the other way round, it will be claimed that making fundamental 
distinctions between clinical improvisation approaches sheds light upon diverse musical 
ontologies to be found within clinical improvisation. On the other hand, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, a particular concern with „the aesthetic‟ or „the beautiful‟ in 
music as integral to the practice of clinical improvisation indicates a particular stance. 
At this introductory stage of the thesis, however, I will discuss the use of aesthetics as 
a methodology for this enquiry. What follows are some recent views from the perspective 
of the Anglo-American analytic tradition whereby aesthetics may be said to exist as a sub-
discipline of philosophical inquiry concerned with the arts and with situations outside of 
„art‟ that involve aesthetic experience and value.53 
The Focus of Aesthetic Enquiry 
Jerrold Levinson cites three areas of focus for aesthetic inquiry, which I will now 
examine briefly in turn.
54
 Levinson‟s first focus is that of art, including the activity or 
practice of making art and the art object, in this case music. For the purpose of this 
enquiry, I am starting from an open perspective that the improvised music of music 
therapy might constitute more than one version of what music as an art object or art 
process might be. I am working with the assumption that, on the one hand, the music of 
music therapy might afford aesthetic consideration, responses and experiences in a 
similar way to music made outside of the clinical setting. Alternatively, within the 
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clinical setting, on the other hand, such considerations, responses and experiences might 
also differ. This discussion will form the heart of the enquiry in that it belongs to a 
consideration of musical ontology. 
Levinson‟s second focus consists of those properties, features or aspects that we call 
aesthetic, many of which are evaluative or contemplative. Levinson provides an open-
ended list of these, including beauty, grace, balance, power, ugliness and crudity. He 
also includes some that relate to emotion, such as sadness and melancholy. However, it 
is important to note that many of these features, especially those which relate to 
emotion, are not specified in the sense of literally being so, but rather many of the 
properties on this list are aesthetic only when the terms designating them are understood 
figuratively. Questions of the relationship between music and emotion are key areas for 
concern in therapy, in that it is the emotional possibilities afforded by music that are at 
the centre of the modern rationale for therapy and given weight in recent years by 
empirical studies into music psychology. However, the question remains open, as it has 
done since the seminal work of music theorist Hanslick during the nineteenth century, as 
to whether the emotion is in the music or in the experience of the person 
(client/therapist). Does the emotion (therapy) take place between people, regardless of 
whether or not music is actually taking place, or is emotion (the relationship) sounded 
through the music? This concurs with the question we will examine in Chapter Six, cited 
by music psychologists Juslin and Zentner, of „where is the emotion, is it located in the 
music or in the listener or both?‟55 
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Levinson‟s third area of focus is aesthetic experience, or the idea that in contemplating 
art there may or may not be a special attitude of contemplation as distinct from other states 
of mind.
56
 This is sometimes discussed in terms of aesthetic or psychic distance. Possibly 
the most well-known distinguishing features of such an attitude are those of 
disinterestedness – which Levinson further qualifies as detachment from desires – needs or 
practical concerns and non-instrumentality, or being undertaken or sustained for its own 
sake. To simplify, when we watch the play A Midsummer’s Night Dream, we do not feel 
compelled to explain the misunderstandings to the characters in the play; we know that we 
are being asked to contemplate the narrative for its own sake as it is. Similarly, it is 
arguable that the humour of the surprise outbreak of choral singing in shopping centres, 
which has recently become popular, works based on a concept of aesthetic distance. The 
casual shopper is suddenly thrust into an aesthetic experience provided by people hitherto 
assumed as fellow shoppers but from whom the same shopper is now aesthetically 
distanced. The joke pales quickly as the shoppers adjust themselves into their newly 
enforced role of audience members present at „a performance in a concert hall‟. 
Stolnitz writes from the premise that „we cannot understand modern aesthetic theory 
unless we understand the concept of disinterestedness‟, whilst referring to the idea that 
there is an aesthetic attitude whereby a distinction can be made between an „interested‟ 
and „disinterested‟ way of perceiving the art object.57 Furthermore, as Stolnitz describes, 
such a distinction has a historical basis in eighteenth-century „controversies in ethics and 
religion‟, when „interestedness‟ was equated with self-interestedness, which is less pure 
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than disinterestedness.
58
 This enquiry is about a form of music-making that, by 
definition, entails an „interested‟ stance in relation to the music. Within music therapy, 
this takes us into the domain of musical meaning. Music therapists consistently ask: 
what does the music in music therapy mean? For example, what does the music 
symbolize, express or indicate?
59
 Alternatively, some music therapists have proposed a 
stance that has more in common with the idea of „disinterestedness‟. Ansdell writes: 
 
Whether it is in a pre-composed piece or in the development of an improvisation, music contains 
and continually creates meaning within itself rather than beyond itself. The confusion comes when 
people try to compare the way music works with the way verbal language works ... We 
communicate with words to convey our meaning, whereas we improvise music to find something 
meaningful between us.
60
 
 
Furthermore, there is a sense within music therapy discourse that to consider or interpret 
music in non-musical terms is a kind of bastardization of the art form. To a small extent, 
this tension can be seen in parallel terms to the eighteenth-century notion of equating 
„disinterestedness‟ with „purity‟. For some music therapists there is an underlying ethical 
question in relation to considering the music of therapy in terms other than the strictly 
musical. An ethically held belief regarding the „proper‟ way to appropriate music for 
therapy accounts for some of the fervour that can be seen as pervading the theorizing of 
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a „music-centred‟ approach.61 I examine this topic in Chapter Five, particularly in 
relation to the work of Aigen and Lee.
62
 
Conclusion to Chapter One and Summary of  the Enquiry 
In this chapter I have introduced the topic of the enquiry. I have described the 
theoretical debate concerning a practice of „community music therapy‟, which has 
stimulated the core question of what is the music of music therapy. I have defined the 
philosophical emphasis of the enquiry and discussed the methodological approach that I 
take.  
For the remainder of Part I, The Context of Clinical Improvisation, I provide an 
account of the specifically British practice that is the topic of this enquiry, although 
reference has been made to the work of music therapists working outside of the UK for 
whom some of the central concerns regarding the music of music therapy are the same. 
This account enables a historical perspective of clinical improvisation which I claim is 
integral to an understanding of aesthetic issues that underlie the two approaches. At an 
early stage of the research process, I found that the addressing of the core question 
entailed a consideration of its philosophical implications. For this reason, as I have 
described earlier in this introductory chapter, I explore at some length aspects of 
ontology arising out of musical aesthetics and musicology.  
Part II of the enquiry, The Diversity of Clinical Improvisation, is concerned first of 
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all with what is common to both approaches, namely a dichotomy of process and 
product. Indeed, in carrying out the research I found that it was not possible to move 
forward without addressing the complexity of clinical improvisation as a whole, in terms 
of its diversity as a form of music-making. In particular I consider how clinical 
improvisation can be considered on the one hand in terms of a process and on the other 
hand in terms of a product. This particular dichotomy was found to be in keeping with 
some parallel concerns in the literature of aesthetics in philosophy and musicology, 
where similar questions of diversity have been explored. Second, I focus upon building 
an initial distinction between the two approaches. The distinction made between the 
aesthetic (music-centred approach) and the relational (psychodynamic approach) later 
leads to addressing the question at the heart of the enquiry; whether there is a distinction 
to be made between clinical improvisation and art improvisation. 
To this end, in Part III, The Ontology of Clinical Improvisation, I set out two areas 
where I indentify distinct ontologies of music-making as emerging. These areas focus 
upon music and emotion and musical performance. in the location of emotion,  I explore 
Hanslick‟s theory of the „musically beautiful‟ in parallel with the question of the 
location of therapy in clinical improvisation, asking whether its efficacy lies in the music 
or in the therapeutic relationship. As an example of this discussion, I explore Streeter‟s 
critique of a music-centred approach that, from Streeter‟s perspective, disallows a 
consideration of psychological thinking, focussing instead upon the music as the prime 
therapeutic agent. I showed how Streeter‟s concern with the possibility of „unconscious 
merging‟ can be understood in parallel with Aigen‟s notion of the „continuity‟ in the 
experience of clinical improvisation and art improvisation. The themes of „continuity‟ 
40 
and „discontinuity‟ underpin the discussion of the final chapters. 
Finally, I consider some aspects of musical performance and explore the recent 
development of performance as an integral part of the clinical practice of music therapy. 
Taking an aspect of the philosopher Judith Butler‟s work, I have examine her distinction 
between the real and the imaginary, which enables a closer look at the various 
connotations of „performance‟, particularly as a means to distinguish between notions of 
the performed and the performative. Both these distinctions, I claim, have ramifications 
for an ontological understanding of the music of music therapy. 
In all, I examine the distinction between the music of music therapy and art music. It 
transpires that this rests not upon a distinction between art and therapy, but instead upon 
different ways in which therapy relates to art. Whilst throughout this enquiry I show the 
ways in which the music of the psychodynamic approach is to be distinguished from the 
music of the music-centred approach, it turns out that this is not due to its nature being 
identified as separate from a notion of art in general. Whilst I demonstrate the way in 
which the music-centred approach is predicated upon a continuous notion of the art-
object as in-itself healing, both inside and outside of therapy, the psychodynamic 
approach, it turns out, can also be predicated upon the notion of an art object. However, 
the art object of this approach rests upon a discontinuous notion of clinical 
improvisation. As music that is not for performance, the clinical improvisation of the 
psychodynamic approach takes its meaning from the site of therapy (or analytic) space 
only. Therefore in conclusion I characterise the psychodynamic approach to clinical 
improvisation as a distinct musical form of site-specific art. Furthermore, taking a stance 
from outside of music therapy, I describe clinical improvisation as a specific form of 
41 
music for a purpose.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Emergence of Clinical Improvisation 
The war has given great impetus to what may be roughly termed applied music – 
music in industry and music therapy… [which] is being increasingly used in 
hospitals, particularly war hospitals, and gives promise of developing into an 
accredited science. 
D. K. ANTRIM
63
 
 
 
How did a practice of music therapy come into being? What were its influences and 
precedents? In this chapter, I pose these questions to present an initial understanding of 
the distinctiveness of clinical improvisation as a specialised form of music-making. I 
show how, influenced by the freedom and personal expressiveness of the music of jazz 
and the twentieth-century avant-garde, particularly free improvisation, together with 
changing attitudes towards the provision of the arts, health and education, a specific 
form of music-making began to emerge. This form of music-making was later to be 
called clinical improvisation. I argue that out of these developments two distinct 
approaches to clinical improvisation emerged, approaches I have distinguished as 
„psychodynamic‟ and „music-centred‟. I show how these approaches evolved directly 
out of the musical interests and ideas of the pioneers whose work I describe, and as 
such, their music-making can be seen to occupy different aesthetic domains. Whilst the 
music-making practices of both approaches entailed a specific emphasis upon listening 
and freedom of expression, it is not clear from considering the work of these 
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individuals the nature of the musical development they had pioneered and how it was 
different to music-making within special education or indeed music-making for its 
own sake. 
Towards a Contemporary Music Therapy Profession: Influences and Precedents 
The emergent occupation of music therapy had many precedents during the twentieth 
century that can in part be traced through various „experiments‟ in the therapeutic use of 
music, such as the organization of special concerts in hospitals.
64
 These were the type of 
activities that led to the founding of the Society for Music Therapy and Remedial Music 
in 1958. However, there were also a number of political developments to demonstrate 
the developing attitudes towards arts activities as having value beyond the concert hall 
or art gallery. Such developments were in part interrupted by two world wars, but as the 
quotation above suggests, from a North American perspective, the extremity of 
widespread conflict during the early years of the twentieth century also stimulated a 
need for innovation in healthcare and education.
65
 In this first section, I will look at 
some of these political developments and examine some of the ways they were to both 
influence and enable the emergence of professional music therapy. 
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The Cambridgeshire Report: Therapeutic Music Education  
One such precedent is found in the influential Cambridgeshire Report on the Teaching 
of Music.
66
 Published in 1933 and compiled by a panel of distinguished composers, 
teachers, musicians and academics, its findings advocated three important ideas that 
highlight a link with the post-war music therapy practice that was to come. First, there is 
a general idea that music is good for people on an everyday basis, that it brings 
communities together on many levels and as „the greatest of all spiritual forces‟ meets 
many needs.
67
 The report continues: 
 
Music is something more than an individual possession … made in cooperation with others [it] 
gives us not merely the experience of music itself, but the intimate communion with our fellow 
creatures ... All over the country we can see musical organizations of this type, which bring 
together people of various ages and different social conditions; there is nothing comparable to a 
chorus or orchestra for creating a sense of fellowship among those who in other aspects of life are 
unable to achieve it.
68
 
 
Second, in the absence of a widespread culture of improvisation in the UK at the time of 
writing the report, the presence of composers on the panel possibly motivated an 
understanding of improvisation as a „helpful‟ way to make music.69 In this case, 
improvisation was considered particularly useful as a means towards more formalized 
musical activity. For example, the report recommends: „Children should be encouraged, 
when quite young, to sing improvised melodies. They enjoy doing this, and the 
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experience serves as a basis for later musical training ... Vocal improvisation is a natural 
first step to the composition of tunes.‟70 
Third, and of particular significance here, a musical education is advocated for 
children with special needs: 
 
The interesting task of giving musical training to children with retarded mentalities is of so 
experimental and varied a character that we have not been able to prepare a specimen scheme of 
work. Certain fundamental principles have been established, however, as primarily important in 
this type of training ... [for example] There is little doubt that music and pre-eminently rhythm has 
a striking and subtle power to quicken slow intelligence. Where instruction has been built upon 
rhythm, nervous energies have been co-ordinated, stammering has decreased and articulation 
improved beyond recognition ... Since children of this type can only concentrate for very short 
periods the value of rhythmic stimulus at frequent intervals cannot be exaggerated.
71
 
 
 
The promotion of musical education for children with disabilities was particularly 
prevalent during the 1930s. As Helen Tyler writes: „Before the Education (Handicapped 
Children) Act 1970, children who were born with disabilities or who developed illnesses 
like poliomyelitis, often spent many years in hospital. Because of their disabilities, they 
were deemed inappropriate for normal schooling or, in the terminology of the day, 
“ineducable”.‟72 In the „Cambridgeshire Report‟, the principles whereby elements of 
music can be used as part of a process to help a child with a disability or special needs 
envisage some of the ideas that were to be developed over the ensuing decades, finding 
form in the therapeutic work of the music therapy pioneers and those who followed. 
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Influencing Therapeutic Attitudes to Music 
Indeed, the „Cambridgeshire Report‟ is just one instance demonstrating the ease with 
which a practice of contemporary music therapy could arise out of the careful 
observation of the benefits of music. In 1939, the Council for the Encouragement of 
Music and the Arts (CEMA) was formed, „initially to give financial assistance to 
cultural societies, which were struggling to continue their activities during the war‟, and 
later in 1946 to become the state-funded Arts Council of Great Britain.
73
 As a brief 
historical account describes, there were two distinct schools of thought about its 
„mission‟; whether on the one hand the organization was about the promotion of 
excellence, and should provide funding for the best in arts (the dissemination of 
„masterpieces‟), or, on the other hand, that it was about community, and should provide 
funding for the most (the involvement of the local and the amateur) on the grounds that 
it can provide occupation and learning, and „improve national morale during wartime‟. 
As the account continues, „over the next six decades, the pendulum swung back and 
forth between these ideas of what the Arts Council should accomplish‟.74 However, both 
„sides‟ of the debate were committed to the importance of art to society in general, 
particularly in time of war when „spirits are at a low ebb‟.75 
Significantly, it was on the initiative of the Arts Council, together with a „generous‟ 
donation from the Ex-service Welfare Society, that another organization, The Council 
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for Music in Hospitals (CMIH), was set up just after the war in 1948.
76
 Today, known as 
Music in Hospitals, the organization is quite separate in its mission from „professional‟ 
music therapy.
77
 However, it was originally set up with the aim of therapy in mind. The 
Times music critic writes of the founding of CMIH: „The work did not start in a void, 
since during 1947 some 40 or 50 concerts had been given in hospitals whose medical 
superintendents believed in the therapeutic value of music presented as music, not as 
entertainment, but generally with some verbal running commentary calculated to engage 
the interest of the patients.‟78 
The connection between the CMIH and the medical activities of hospitals continued 
with the introduction of the National Health Service in 1948. A report in The Times 
(London) details how „a small sub-committee of the CMIH has been formed for 
experimental work in music therapy in mental illness. In some hospitals, art classes for 
patients have been established and are proving valuable.‟79 The founder members of the 
Society for Music Therapy and Remedial Music included musicians who regularly 
performed in hospitals; these were musicians who performed live music to sick people 
and were considering non-musical therapeutic aims for their work. 
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However, the beginning of the modern practice of music therapy in the UK was 
enabled not only by the activities of organizations and government committees, but 
developed at a time of enormous change and innovation within music, both in 
approaches to composed music and improvisation. The musical context of any era has 
been highly influential upon the work of clinicians. However, the emergence of a 
musical aesthetic, which could encompass the soundworld of free improvisation and 
„indeterminate music‟, was to prove pivotal in the development of improvisation as a 
technique for therapy, a soundworld in which there were no right or wrong notes. Whilst 
the organization of concerts for people „in need‟ marked the beginnings of the 
contemporary practice during the 1960s and 1970s, clinical improvisation was to 
develop as central to music therapy practice. In the next section, I will consider the 
musical context for the development of clinical improvisation. 
The Influence of the Avant-Garde: Free Improvisation and Aleatoric Music 
Free improvisation in the UK emerged, at least in retrospective terms, out of the dissonant 
soundworld of twentieth-century serialism (including the music of Webern and 
Stockhausen). However, guitarist Keith Rowe comments, this influence didn‟t extent to 
processes by which the music came into being. He writes how the formal procedures of 
serialism, with its „objectification of the material ... didn‟t allow for improvisation because 
the notion of the permutation of 12 notes isn‟t the kind of thinking that lays itself open to 
improvisation unless you‟ve got a computer for a brain!‟ [Italics added].80 Rowe 
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continues, following the Second World War, there was a move away from „the stream of 
Viennese and German music, because of problems with suppression that was suffered in 
the period of the Third Reich, and then subsequently the difficulties of performance, and 
maybe then a rejection of those ideas generally in European music.‟81 Free improvisation, 
Rowe suggests, emerged out of a broader set of European and American ideas and 
influences. As such, it also emerged from the free jazz textures, harmony and musical 
gestures of improvisers, such as John Coltrane, Ornette Coleman and Bill Evans. The 
musical and theoretical influences of John Cage, with his free musical aesthetic and the 
possibilities of experimenting with silence, were evidently far-reaching.
82
 However, the 
rise of free improvisation was in itself also pragmatic, as there was a sense of some of the 
innovators following a personal musical mission. The guitarist Derek Bailey initially 
developed „free improvisation‟ during his early career in commercial music when he was 
regularly performing a wide variety of popular styles, including jazz. However, during 
these early years, he was always „practising‟ his own improvisations, even during 
performances.
83
 His gradual move into full-time free improvisation, which took initial 
shape through the group „Joseph Holbrooke‟, was motivated in part by the wish not to be 
imitating the jazz musicians he emulated. Possibly an even stronger motivation was his 
alleged „impatience with the gruesomely predictable‟ and the wish to play his „own‟ music 
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and experiment with his colleagues‟ likewise.84 Indeed, Bailey was to describe free 
improvisation as follows: 
 
The lack of precision over its naming is, if anything, increased when we come to the thing itself. 
Diversity is its most consistent characteristic. It has no stylistic or idiomatic commitment. It has no 
prescribed idiomatic sound. The characteristics of freely improvised music are established only by 
the sonic-musical identity of the person or persons playing it.
85
 
 
As we will see later in this chapter, free improvisation on Bailey‟s account, relates to the 
conception of improvisation as personally identified with the players, similar to the form 
of clinical improvisation that was to develop out of music therapy practice. 
Aleatoric music, as developed during the 1950s, was also an influence. This is music 
where the composer‟s directions deliberately leave the actual notes to be played 
undetermined. It is arguably a kind of composer’s free improvisation, in that such music 
presents players with similar freedom of soundworld – a soundworld that does not 
require adherence to traditional tonal or modal harmonic procedures.
86
 It is particularly 
associated with John Cage, who employed chance operations within the process of 
composition so that the musical outcome could literally be unforeseen or, to use the 
technical language, „indetermined‟.87 
An important contrast between these two forms of experimental music-making, 
aleatoric music and free improvisation, is the relationship between the musical sounds 
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and those directly involved in the production of those sounds, be they composer or 
performer. Cage placed great emphasis upon the objectivity of the music; sounds could, 
or even should, be left to be themselves, in the world separate from people.
88
 Free 
improvisation, on the other hand, places emphasis upon the personal authenticity of the 
player in time, arising directly out of a close interpersonal listening. Gavin Bryars 
describes how the free playing of Joseph Holbrooke grew out of the harmonic jazz 
approach of Bill Evans in particular.
89
 This approach arguably provided a more 
individual and equal creativity within the music, in contrast to the traditional 
soloist/rhythm section format, as Bryars describes, „a genuine interplay between the 
players‟.90 He continues, „Anything could happen. We had to be ready for anything. 
Because we were developing these systems of trust and mutual confidence in the general 
playing, once we moved into the freer playing, that was already there – we were used to 
listening to each other very intensely.‟91 
What can be seen as linking the immense variation of musical forms that developed 
during the 1950s and 1960s was the radical notion that „art‟ arises out of free play with, 
or the random organization of, sounds. Furthermore, that such freedom of musical action 
could link to the psychic processes of the unconscious, in much the same way as the 
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freedom of spoken/unspoken thought processes in psychoanalysis could reveal what was 
of significance. The composer Alfred Nieman, who was passionately committed to these 
ideas, had an enormous influence upon the development of music therapy in the UK, 
both during the early development of the approaches to clinical improvisation and 
latterly as he continued to teach generations of music therapy students until the early 
1990s. I shall now turn to an examination of the background and work of the music 
therapy pioneers, and uncover how some of the musical and political influences 
described above began to merge with the idea of music therapy. 
Alfred Nieman and Improvisation 
It is significant that the leaders of the two initial training courses engaged the interest 
and support of Alfred Nieman in teaching improvisation to their students, thus ensuring 
a widespread understanding of the possibilities of free atonal improvisation. Nieman 
describes how prior to his work in music therapy, around 1955, he began to teach free 
improvisation at a University of London extramural class: 
 
I think I can say that then – around 1955 – I was very much a “loner”! Old ways die hard and only 
the first experiments of John Cage were emerging. Of course, I am referring to improvisation in a 
modern style, exploring new textures, sounds and forms in the media of chamber music with any 
instruments we could lay our hands on. I was very diffident about my first experiments, having 
little experience and even less expectation of results. What happened was staggering. The first 
problems were psychological – to overcome self-consciousness, shyness, violent repression, the 
junk of worn-out clichés, the actual fear and sense of exposure. Gradually an atmosphere was built 
up – sympathetic yet demanding. Some astonishing performances took place and the personalities 
suddenly revealed a new light and warmth ... The classes attracted many who were not 
professionals and some who could not play at all. Nothing deterred us ... We knew only that we had 
seen into each other, creating ties between us all.
92
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It is striking to infer from this extract how, on the one hand, Nieman emphasizes his 
wish to experiment freely in music, but on the other hand, how the process of teaching 
took on its own interpersonal dynamic and that this was equally fascinating for him. It is 
possible that Nieman‟s role as teacher enabled him to explore feelings in and about free 
improvisation in a way that might not have been possible in a professional group of 
performers. He had a „format‟ for teaching, which, judging from the available accounts 
of his work, he did not vary from.
93
 This format entailed providing a combination of 
titles that each student would improvise upon, initially as a solo „pianist‟. Each piece 
would be meticulously recorded and sometimes played back in class for the benefit of its 
„creator‟. Nieman would give detailed feedback and, of course, there would be general 
discussion. In the latter weeks of a class, he would set up group improvisations. 
There were clear rules about the atonal musical language to be employed. Mary 
Priestley, one of the first music therapy students to be taught by Nieman, writes: 
 
At the first lesson, we were told that we were going to learn to break up all the obsolete and old 
forms of diatonic, melodic and harmonic structure and break into something much more free, 
personal and transpersonal. The introductory rules were that we were not to use octaves, or more 
than three consecutive chromatic steps, or any honest common chords and arpeggios or to play in 
accordance with any recognisable time signature. What was left?
94
 
 
There was also a clear rule about musical expression: whatever the title of the 
improvisation, the music must be „personal‟. An improvisation about „the forest‟ had to 
be the improviser‟s own forest, played „for themselves‟, rather than attempting some 
kind of musical descriptiveness or programme. A good improvisation in Nieman‟s terms 
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followed his rules about atonality and at the same time conveyed an emotional 
coherence. Not surprisingly, he welcomed the inception of the new postgraduate training 
in music therapy, writing: 
 
In one sphere at least we are moving into a brave new world and musical improvisation is playing a 
big part in it ... thus the ancient practice of musical healing is brought to a scientific level in studies 
leading to research and more discovery ... What we are all asking is how we can escape from the 
savagery of mental oppression into physical freedom; from the sickness of violent tension into lyric 
release. This is where improvisation has shown its power to act.
95
 
 
Nieman‟s interest in music therapy was further demonstrated by his involvement from 
1968 with the new British Society for Music Therapy (BSMT).
96
 In 1974, he became 
involved in the second music therapy course, set up by former Guildhall student Sybil 
Beresford-Peirse, at Goldie Leigh Hospital, in collaboration with Nordoff and Robbins. 
However, Nieman always remained a composer and teacher. Indeed, it is striking, upon 
comparing two separate accounts of his work, that his teaching methods remained the 
same whether he was teaching amateur musicians, composition or music therapy 
students.
97
 Furthermore, he did not consider the improvisation sessions as „therapy‟ in 
any sense. Indeed, the experience for each student improviser was akin to giving a 
performance. For Nieman, the improvisational music-making was first and foremost the 
creation of an artistic product. He wrote: 
 
What we are all asking is how can we escape from the savagery of mental oppression into physical 
freedom; from the sickness of violent tension into lyric release. I must stress that improvisation is 
not just a function of therapy but a means of valid artistic creation. To normal people this is its aim, 
its purpose, its significance. To discover and reveal the innate artistic power of the human soul to 
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individualize musical language into a personal and natural beauty and expressiveness, to free the 
means of communication between fantasy life and the conscious being; the bridge of meaning in 
life. Thus after each performance we criticize and comment on the level of achievement quite 
frankly and freely.
98
 
 
Sam Richards, a former piano and composition student, takes this stance a stage further. 
He comments upon the way in which Nieman‟s method was as compositional, in the 
aleatoric sense, as improvisational: 
 
It struck me years later that by giving titles and giving an example of how they could be played he 
was determining so many important elements that it could almost be called composition. I now see 
what he did as notation. It may not be composing in the classical European sense, but someone 
who does such things is being a composer – assembling and predetermining certain elements which 
lead to music making. Notation is any form of communication which causes music to be made. 
Some composers, myself included, have been happy to leave it at less.
99
 
 
In all, Nieman‟s influence linked the soundworld and practices of contemporary music 
to the emerging improvisation of music therapy in an intuitive and practical way. I will 
discuss his particular influence on the beginnings of a psychodynamic approach later in 
this chapter. 
Pioneering the Music of Music Therapy 
The modern practice of music therapy was developed in the UK by musicians, be they 
performers, composers, educators or healthcare practitioners. For some, there was a 
moment when their interest in their audiences shifted towards an interest in children or 
adults in need. Helen Patey describes the personal response of Paul Nordoff following a 
visit to the anthroposophical Centre for Curative Education in Heidenheim, Germany: 
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Here he observed a musician helping a very disabled child to communicate through singing to the 
accompaniment of a lyre. Afterwards he told Clive Robbins that it was a moment of truth. He 
[Nordoff] thought: “Here am I in Europe with a trunk full of music trying to get a symphony 
performed, and here is a musician using music to bring a child into speech. There is no doubt in my 
mind which is the more important.”‟100 
 
It seems reasonable to speculate how this may have been a common experience prior to 
music therapy becoming an established occupation. That, in seeking to perform outside 
of the usual concert venues, musicians began to experience a shift of focus in their 
interests away from music as a personal artistic process, developing instead an interest in 
the people they were playing to, or writing music for.
101
 Teachers might have become 
more interested in the emotional needs of the children they were working with, in the 
process of the work rather than the educational outcome. In all, it appears that out of 
such personal discoveries „music therapy‟ began to develop. 
The beginning of the UK music therapy profession between 1958 and the mid-1970s, 
as mentioned earlier, is characterized by the work of two groups of people: in the first 
group, Juliette Alvin, and subsequently Mary Priestley; in the second group, Paul 
Nordoff and Clive Robbins, and subsequently Sybil Beresford-Peirse. Alfred Nieman, 
whose work I introduced above, was a catalyst, influencing both approaches. It is 
worthwhile looking at the respective chronological developments that led each group to 
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form an approach. Although both approaches have gone through developments and 
changes over the ensuing years, they can be seen to retain something of a theoretical 
stance or assumption underlying the work. In this section, I shall discuss the musical 
history of the key pioneers, highlighting the way in which their musical backgrounds 
influenced the type of approach they were to develop in clinical work. For reasons of 
chronology, I shall begin with Juliette Alvin. 
Juliette Alvin 
The history of Juliette Alvin‟s contribution to the inauguration of the profession in the 
UK is distinctive in that she researched and developed not only a modern approach to 
music therapy, but also organized and founded the Society for Music Therapy and 
Remedial Music in 1958. 
The declared objective of the society was the promotion of „the use and development 
of music therapy in the treatment, education, rehabilitation and training of children and 
adults suffering from emotional, physical or mental handicap‟.102 As Barrington 
suggests, it was the very „existence of the organization that enabled these [same] 
developments to occur‟.103 During the first ten years, Alvin brought together a wide 
range of professionals who were already actively engaged in music therapy in one way 
or another, whether they were psychiatrists, music educators, psychologists or, like 
Alvin herself, musicians. As one commentator wrote in 1982, „it was the increasing 
interest in music therapy shown by the medical, musical and educational professions that 
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led Alvin to the idea of it becoming a discipline in its own right‟.104 
Alvin was born in Limoges, France and studied at the Paris Conservatoire 
(Conservatoire National de Musique), where she won the Premier Prix d‟Excellence and 
the Mèdaille d‟Or. As is well-known, she attended master classes with Pablo Casals, 
with whom there was evidently a significant degree of respect on both sides.
105
 In 1929, 
she married the London-born academic and Fabian socialist, William Robson.
106
 Her 
debut recital was at the Wigmore Hall in London in December 1927
107
 and up until the 
early 1950s her performances were regularly reviewed in the national press. These 
reviews can provide insight into the musical soundworld with which she was engaged 
before becoming a music therapist.
108
 
Whilst Alvin was sometimes praised in reviews for her interpretation of 
unaccompanied Bach, no doubt influenced by her time with Casals, her choice of 
repertoire is frequently criticized, especially where it is of modern or lesser-known 
composers.
109
 Her performances of contemporary music included works by Bax, 
Martinu and, more taxing for the average critic, the Concert Piece (1936) for cello and 
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piano by Alan Bush, performed with the composer as pianist.
110
 Alvin possibly suffered 
due to an extreme conservatism of taste because her reviewers evidently preferred the 
„old‟, the tonal romantic, to the „new‟ emerging serial experiments of the Second 
Viennese School. Arnold Whittall, reviewing the contents of the London Musical Times 
of 1934, writes of the „fatal negativism‟ towards European atonality revealed by critics 
that in his opinion proved in hindsight to be so wrong.
111
 Whittall encapsulates a stifling 
attitude that „even if you experiment, the assumption is, you will only succeed if you 
ignore the unsteady, precipitate Europeans, the anti-romantics and atonalists‟.112 Alvin, 
it can be surmised, on the other hand, brought to her therapeutic approach an openness to 
the new and unusual in music. Her vision of the freedom of improvisation in music 
therapy was pragmatically inspired by the sheer variety of the twentieth-century 
soundworld. In 1966 she wrote: 
 
Music therapy benefits from the fact that musical means are becoming richer and more available to 
all. Musicians use new techniques, unthought-of some years ago. Contemporary composers of the 
avant-garde act as explorers in a world of sounds and often provide us with strange experiences 
related to the modern scene. Music has through its diffusion become a powerful mass medium to 
which we are all exposed and sometimes absorb it unconsciously, for instance when it is used as 
background to a film to engender a premonition of fear. Often such music includes many dissonant 
sounds or noises, it may also sound shapeless, but we get conditioned to it. Pop music is another 
example of absorption in that it has become a necessity to thousands of young people although 
discriminating adults may find the music poor and monotonous.
113
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Over the ensuing years until the late 1960s, Alvin was a regular soloist and chamber 
musician, touring internationally, performing at the Wigmore Hall, London and 
broadcasting for the BBC. Alvin‟s background as a cellist and teacher of cellists was 
certainly to be reflected in her future work as a clinician. Her young clients were 
obviously fascinated by the instrument and her playing and use of it as a way to 
communicate and be expressive. The cello was evidently an integral part of her sessions, 
with some of her young clients becoming interested in learning the instrument for 
themselves.
114
 She obviously encouraged this interest as part of the work, in the way any 
inspirational teacher might. 
In an insightful obituary upon her death in 1982, published in The Times, her 
knowledge and commitment to work with children stand out as important in terms of her 
contribution to the development of music therapy, and it is explained that „she became 
internationally recognised as a leading authority on musical education‟.115 Indeed, „since 
1940 Alvin had been giving special concerts for children, putting into practice her belief 
that the most valuable period during which children can absorb music is between the 
ages of four and twelve‟.116 This experience Alvin carried into her work as she created a 
new profession. She was familiar with the territory of music in special education and 
was in a strong position to develop music therapy as offering something „different‟. Her 
ideas were strengthened through contact with the music educator Jack Dobbs, who was 
chair of the BSMT during the 1960s and closely involved in the setting up of the training 
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course at the Guildhall. 
Her obituary also reveals how during the 1939–1945 war, Alvin worked (it would 
seem) tirelessly, giving concerts outside of the traditional concert hall in a wide variety 
of places. For example, „she toured factories throughout the British Isles and appeared in 
concerts organized by the Arts Council (CEMA) in military and Red Cross hospitals, 
and gave more than 200 concerts in aid of war charities‟.117 This piece of biographical 
information is valuable in gaining a picture of Alvin as a musician, committed to 
reaching out to people of all ages in their everyday lives – lives it can only be imagined 
that were particularly stressed and impoverished by war. Those who remember her 
personally frequently mention Alvin‟s musicianship and strength of personality.118 
These were to be crucial qualities for a pioneer of music therapy. However, it is clear 
from the short Times obituary that upon founding the Society for Music Therapy and 
Remedial Music in 1958 she had a wealth of practical experience from which to draw 
upon. Her experience meant that she had a clear understanding of the range of 
possibilities for music therapy in relation to the needs of children and adults. By the time 
she founded the first training course in the UK in 1967, at the Guildhall School of Music 
and Drama, she had developed an eclectic and informed approach to music therapy. 
Alvin‟s Music Therapy Approach 
Juliette Alvin is well-known for her role in developing the music therapy profession, but 
her influence upon psychodynamic music therapy has rarely been assessed. Until the 
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early 1990s, her first book Music Therapy, originally published in 1966, was one of less 
than half a dozen specialized texts available to students and practising clinicians.
119
 
However, whilst Alvin provided a full introductory background to her work, complete 
with a historical account of the ancient precedents for the modern profession, she did not 
put forward a distinct theoretical basis for her work. Instead, it appears Alvin was 
aiming to provide as broad an account of music therapy practice in the UK during the 
early 1960s as possible. She writes: 
 
If we look at the wide panorama of music therapy today and throughout the ages, we can detect 
three different trends in its conception and its practice, namely the clinical, the recreational and the 
educational approach. In spite of their differences they are all related to one another and have in 
common a social outlook on the subject. Each of them deals with social, physical or mental 
rehabilitation which enables the patient to go back to his community.
120
 
 
Alvin‟s description of „three approaches‟ or therapeutic uses of music are all 
recognizable in relation to music therapy practice today, and as such illustrate the 
breadth of her conception of the work. I shall now refer to each briefly in turn. 
For Alvin, the recreational approach was where music works, to use her terms, at a 
„superficial level‟, as „entertainment‟, demanding „no effort on the part of the patient‟.121 
However, this is not to underestimate the therapeutic benefits of such music-making, 
helping, for example, to „fight against institutionalization which threatens any long-term 
patient‟.122 Indeed, Alvin wrote about how such music-making can bring the hospital 
community together in working towards „the production of a Christmas show, a concert 
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or festival‟.123 As seen in Chapter One, this idea of music enabling and enhancing the 
life of a community, whether hospital or otherwise, can be seen to underpin some of the 
current ideas of „community music therapy‟. Indeed, rather than using music as a tool 
for therapy, it is incorporated into everyday life and, through its ability to join people 
together in meaningful creative activity, is considered as healing in itself.
124
 
In her comments about an educational approach, Alvin demonstrates the therapeutic 
use of music that was now developing with children in schools, clearly distinguishing it 
from music education. She writes: 
A therapeutic situation is always a learning situation ... The aim is not to „educate‟ [however] but to 
develop the flame of intelligence which exists in every human being. As a means of non-verbal 
communication which can work at a low brain-level, music in skilled hands has already proved an 
invaluable means of conscious development. A number of well-planned specific musical techniques can 
help the child to grasp abstract concepts and to develop his imagination and speaking ability.
125
 
 
Alvin‟s third approach, which she describes as „clinical‟, is arguably allied most closely 
with a generalized conception of a psychological therapy where music is applied as part 
of hospital treatment for a broad range of medical conditions: 
 
The clinical approach to music is therapeutic in the full meaning of the term. It works in depth, 
applied to the medical or psychological treatment of physical, mental or emotional disorder. The 
work demands from the music therapist a basic psychological knowledge, a high degree of musical 
skills and a full understanding of the nature and extent of the illness. The music therapist is a 
member of the therapeutic team and must integrate with it.
126
 
 
Such a stipulation by Alvin, in 1960s Britain, represents a remarkable achievement, 
demonstrating how music therapy was beginning to be accepted in places as part of the 
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work of a medical team and thus reaching adults and children who were seriously ill, 
either mentally or physically. In all, these three approaches indicate a kind of tireless 
experimentation with what music therapy could become, whilst at the same time Alvin 
was developing specific techniques that were to provide the basis for both educational 
and psychodynamic approaches to music therapy. Within this enquiry, I am most 
concerned with her influence upon the psychodynamic approach. 
Towards Psychodynamic Music Therapy 
Given the breadth of Alvin‟s account, I am now going to demonstrate how her view of 
contemporary music and experimental clinical work laid the foundations of a 
psychodynamic approach. I am taking the term „psychodynamic‟ music therapy 
specifically to refer to a psychoanalytical informed approach, whereby a process of 
understanding the conscious and unconscious dynamics in the therapeutic relationship is 
at the centre of the work.
127
 
This orientation is not easy to establish in Alvin‟s work, as, whilst her interests were 
indeed broad, she was primarily concerned with the practical activity of music therapy 
rather than with developing the theory of that same practice. This view concurs with 
Kenneth Bruscia, who, whilst describing Alvin‟s work as psychoanalytic in orientation, 
writes: „Alvin‟s approach to client assessment and evaluation was informal rather than 
formal, and was described almost entirely through case material ... [and that] she did not 
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develop standardized forms, scales or procedures‟.128 On the other hand, Helen Odell-
Miller, who trained with Alvin, writes of her „surprise‟ at Bruscia‟s view of Alvin‟s 
orientation as „psychoanalytic‟, and describes her training method as quite 
„educationally orientated, and it focused on cause and effect rather than exploring the 
unconscious world of the patient‟.129 
However, some aspects of Alvin‟s work are key to the psychodynamic foundations 
later developed by others in music therapy, in the first instance by Mary Priestley. Of 
prime significance are her awareness of contemporary music and the possibilities of free 
improvisation. In part, she attributes the musical possibilities of therapy to the 
concurrent developments in contemporary music as described earlier in the chapter. She 
writes: 
 
Music therapy benefits from the fact that musical means are becoming richer and more available to 
all. Musicians use new techniques, unthought of some years ago. Contemporary composers of the 
avant-garde act as explorers in a world of sounds and often provide us with strange experiences 
related to the modern scene ... We are referring to the method of free improvisation by the 
individual or by a group, a technique sometimes called „instant music‟ or „collective improvisation‟ 
according to the circumstances and for which no specific musical ability is needed when used in 
therapy.
130
 
 
In turn, free music-making is linked, albeit loosely, in theoretical terms to the inner 
world of the client: 
 
The use of free rhythmical atonal improvisation liberates the player from obedience to traditional 
rules in tonality and musical form which he may not be willing or able to follow. He may let 
himself go on a musical instrument needing no specific technique without offending any 
convention and express himself directly often at a subconscious level, as one may do in art 
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therapy... In the process, the patient can overcome his self-consciousness, his sense of fear, and 
reveal an untouched side of his inner life.
131
 
 
Indeed, Alvin‟s approach to improvisation appears to have been distinctly interpersonal, 
based upon a musical and personal openness to the client through a process of listening 
and freely responding. Wigram (who trained with Alvin during the 1970s) et al. 
emphasize in their summary of Alvin‟s work the complete freedom of the improvised 
music-making,
132
 as „every conceivable kind of musical activity can be used‟ and the 
therapist imposes „no musical rules, restrictions, directions or guidelines when 
improvising, unless requested by the client‟.133 These features of listening and musical 
freedom underpin what might be called a „psychodynamic attitude‟ in her playing; it is 
primarily improvisation that is intuitive and responsive to the client she is with. 
Furthermore, Alvin was prepared to work with the minimal level of musical 
material, such as a „single vibration‟. She writes how „music therapy is based upon an 
exhaustive use of everything music is made of. It begins with a simple vibration which 
penetrates the child‟s closed world, producing in him a resonance and provoking a 
response‟.134 
The following extract taken from Alvin‟s account of work with autistic children 
provides an interesting summary of how she experienced and understood her work. It is 
clear how Alvin viewed the spontaneity of the music as revealing of the whole 
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personality of the client, both conscious and, in her words, „subconscious‟. Some of the 
music is improvised consciously, when the client intends to make this or that sound. At 
other times, it would seem that the music simply „happened‟, and Alvin interpreted this 
as revealing the client‟s inner world; in psychoanalytical terms, the client‟s unconscious: 
 
I have taken hours of recordings of the sessions with autistic children under my care. It is possible 
to extract from them examples of the children‟s spontaneous improvisations. These extracts show 
the musical personality of each of the children. The improvisations certainly reveal subconscious 
processes at work – there are some happenings by chance, others are deliberate, perhaps when a 
child has discovered a sound he likes, or a pleasant sequence which he tries to reproduce.
135
 
 
Furthermore, Alvin indicates that she is not striving for a particular kind of „result‟ in the 
music itself. For, as she continues, „however poor or rich is the musical result, the 
personality of the child comes through. The obsessive type plays in an obsessive way. 
The imaginative, independent child uses space, different instruments and changes his 
speed or his dynamics.‟136 
To summarize, there are three main strands in Alvin‟s writings that demonstrate her 
interest in an approach that would come to be informed by psychoanalytic ideas and 
practices. First, Alvin‟s openness to contemporary music meant she was aware of the 
emotional possibilities of harmonic dissonance and chaos of form that occurred in free 
music-making. Second, free music-making involving „atonal improvisation‟ could be 
implicitly understood as an act of self-expression that could, in turn, lead to greater self-
knowledge. Furthermore, free music-making also presented the possibility of 
communicating in music with another through a process of intent listening. Third, Alvin 
was aware of Freudian and Jungian models of the mind and took opportunities to 
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consider music, music-making and the use of musical instruments in terms of 
psychoanalytical concepts of projection, transference and countertransference.
137
 This 
also linked to her conception of music as a therapeutic agent, with many historical 
precedents „born out of man‟s vital need to communicate with the visible and invisible 
world‟; linked, therefore, to an idea of music as ineffable.138 All these interests, as 
developed by Alvin, prepared the ground for what was to become widespread within the 
UK: a psychodynamic approach to music therapy. 
Mary Priestley and a Psychodynamic Approach 
Mary Priestley originally trained at the Guildhall with Juliette Alvin, and together with 
her colleagues Peter Wright and Marjorie Wardle she is widely recognized as having 
begun the development of a psychodynamic approach to clinical improvisation. This 
group named their work Analytic Music Therapy.
139
 Employing a rich anecdotal style of 
writing, she has described her work and ideas about the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and music therapy in depth. Music, for Priestley, in improvised or 
composed form, was an expression or symbol of the unconscious.
140
 As Hadley writes: 
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Priestley‟s way to the unconscious is through improvised music. She describes the self in terms of its 
„inner music‟, which is “the prevailing emotional climate behind the structure of one‟s thoughts”… 
Although it is outwardly expressed in improvised sound or music, a person‟s „inner music‟ is not her 
or his musicality potential, but rather the core of the psyche – where the unconscious resides. So, the 
improvised music is „projective‟ in the sense that it is a manifestation of the unconscious.141 
 
To summarize in Priestley‟s words, „The patient explores new pathways symbolically in 
the world of the imagination but with the bodily-expressed emotion in sound which 
gives her a safe toe-hold in the world of everyday reality.‟142 
It is significant that at the same time Priestley was in training, she was undergoing 
her own psychoanalysis. For Priestley, Alvin‟s training focused upon „the use of music 
in a relatively simple and straightforward way‟. Whereas, through the experience of her 
own analysis, Priestley was becoming aware of „subtler, more problematic, and often 
conflicting workings of the psyche, with conscious and unconscious moving in different 
directions and sapping the vital energy and causing confusion in the thinking and 
subsequent behaviour‟.143 This level of emotional awareness was instrumental in the 
development of her psychoanalytic thinking as a music therapist. However, it is 
important to note that she did not develop this style on her own. Following her training, 
drawn, as she writes, by the „emotional pain‟, she began work in adult psychiatry at St. 
Bernard‟s Hospital on the outskirts of west London. 144 She was to remain in this post for 
the rest of her working life as a music therapist with her aforementioned colleagues 
Wright and Wardle. 
Together they devised a type of post-qualification training known as „inter-therap‟, 
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which, whilst not adopted to any significant degree in the UK, has proved influential in 
other parts of Europe, in particular in Denmark and Germany. It was a form of therapy for 
therapists, who met weekly and, drawing upon their own personal experience of 
psychoanalysis, would each take it in turn to be the client. This way they were able to 
learn more about the music therapy techniques they were developing and support each 
other in their clinical work. The format of sessions was similar to the format developed for 
patients as „analytic music therapy‟. The session would begin with some free-flowing 
verbal reflection on the part of the client, out of which an image might occur to the client 
or therapist.
145
 The client and therapist would then freely improvise upon the idea or 
image, followed by further verbal exploration. 
Priestley‟s approach arguably built upon Alvin‟s in a particular way. I have 
demonstrated how Alvin‟s approach had features of psychodynamic work; however, 
Alvin‟s case material and theoretical writings tend to focus upon descriptions of her 
work, providing an external viewpoint rather than a sense of involvement on the part of 
the therapist. Therefore, whereas Alvin‟s clinical work laid a foundation for 
psychodynamic work, her understanding was of psychoanalytic concepts in relation to 
music, in contrast to psychoanalytic practice. 
Priestley, on the other hand, responded to the spontaneity of free improvisation in a 
deeply personal way and so gained an understanding of the possibilities of music therapy 
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from „the inside‟ of the experience, from the viewpoint of the client. In her first book, 
Music Therapy in Action, she describes Alfred Nieman‟s improvisation classes as „so 
seminally valuable‟.146 It can be presumed that what she meant by this was „valuable‟ in 
terms of the space to think about and feel the emotion of improvisation, in preparation 
for the working life that was to come. She writes: 
 
The title of my very first piece was “Fear”. I stood up in front of the class and approached the form-
giving instrument. For a while I sat frozen in front of the grand piano, starting at the black and white 
keys … Inside me were feelings enough … but the gulf between the inner and the outer was vast. A 
chasm. Just to connect the two stretched my mind almost to breaking point. At last I plunged in, 
feeling it was immeasurably dangerous to unleash these painful feelings of terror on the world … But 
it was great! … I was no longer in the grip of this emotion but could use it.147 
 
In summary, it is clear that Priestley developed a psychodynamic approach to music 
therapy from the specialized vantage point of having been a patient herself in 
psychoanalysis. For Priestley, the psychoanalytic mechanisms of splitting, projective 
identification, transference and countertransference were not just concepts to be 
„spotted‟ in the client‟s music-making. They entailed the therapist experiencing powerful 
feelings of his/her own. Priestly fully understood the „inter-subjectivity‟ involved in the 
psychodynamic therapeutic relationship in a way that possibly was not the case for 
Alvin. 
Finally, Priestley understood that a therapist‟s own process of „inner learning‟ is an 
essential tool for the work; she introduced into music therapy practice the necessity for 
the therapist‟s own music therapy, in order that they gain at least a working 
understanding of their own unconscious, alongside the process of working with the 
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unconscious of their patients. 
Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins and a Music-Centred Approach 
The pioneering work of Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins is well-documented in publications 
describing their collaborative work, recent commentaries and historical research.
148
 Nordoff 
and Robbins‟s collections of songs and musical stories for therapy are also widely 
available.
149
 
As a young man, Nordoff had achieved success as a teacher, pianist and composer. 
Between 1935 and 1950, his commissions included four scores for Martha Graham 
including Every Soul is a Circus (1939), which remained in the repertoire of the Martha 
Graham Dance Company for many years.
150
 He also set music to the words of the 
British poet Sylvia Townsend Warner, after which they became close friends, 
corresponding by letter over many years up until the week of Nordoff‟s death in 1977.151 
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 There are a number of letters contained in this volume written by Townsend Warner (who originally 
trained as a musicologist) to Nordoff. The letters document a close friendship, together with plans for 
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Nordoff also established a friendship with Benjamin Britten, who was later to write the 
foreword to the first book published with Robbins.
152
 
As a younger contemporary of Henry Cowell (1897–1965) and just three years older 
than John Cage (1912–1992), Nordoff‟s musical language did not follow the „East 
Coast‟ nor central European avant-garde traditions of indeterminacy or serialism. At the 
time of his sabbatical, he was struggling to maintain his recognition as a mainstream 
composer. As Simpson writes, his „compositional style was tonal and lyrical, often 
written within traditional structures. He loved the Broadway musical tradition and his 
own compositions show the deep influence of this style.‟153 
Nordoff and Robbins famously began their collaboration in 1959, meeting at the 
Sunfield Children‟s Home, a community based „home school‟ conceived from the ideas 
of Rudolf Steiner, in Worcestershire, UK. Clive Robbins studied music as a teenager, 
but upon joining the RAF at the age of 18 sustained a serious gunshot injury. This left 
him with „little direction‟ until his mid-twenties when his wife, a nurse, accepted a job at 
Sunfield and they joined the community. Robbins subsequently trained as a teacher in 
„curative education‟.154 When Nordoff and Robbins met, in addition to music, they 
shared a deep interest in children and commitment to anthroposophy as a way of life. 
Nordoff was a professor of music at Bard College, New York, and at the same time 
lived with his wife and family in an anthroposophical community, Threefold Farm, 
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Spring Valley New York.
155
 Robbins was later to write how during this sabbatical, 
Nordoff had encountered „by chance the use of composed music for therapy with 
physically disabled children in Scotland, and the use of improvised music with speech 
impaired children in Germany‟. Robbins recounts how he was „intrigued by the 
possibilities of live music and the implications for composition and improvisation‟.156 
The following year, 1959, Nordoff returned to Worcestershire and from this time 
onwards began to work with Robbins as part of a special „experimental investigation‟, 
for which he had secured funding from a foundation recently set up in memory of 
Rudolf Steiner.
157
 Their initial collaboration was classroom-based, and they created a 
number of musical plays, in the Steiner tradition, based upon folk tales and starting with 
Pif-Paf-Poltrie. Together they improvised and experimented, creating a miniature 
„dramatic piece‟. At the same time they were also writing „play-songs‟, with the plays 
„designed to raise the children‟s awareness of self and surroundings‟.158 
The school director subsequently asked Nordoff to work individually with 
particularly disturbed children. Out of this work, with the need for „an assistant to 
facilitate the child in the room‟, the collaboration between Nordoff and Robbins began 
to take shape. Fraser Simpson, in his detailed account of this initial period, emphasizes 
„the rigorous consistency‟ of Nordoff‟s „investigative approach‟. Simpson writes: „It was 
not a slipshod hit-and-miss affair; experimental, yes, but with considered application of 
techniques tried and found to be effective, coupled with intense observational acuity. 
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The legacy of this approach has primed the training of Nordoff-Robbins music therapists 
to the present day.‟159 
Two other features are important to note from Simpson‟s account. First, Robbins 
almost immediately started an archive of their work together, recording the sessions with 
children on a reel-to-reel tape recorder. This archive remains in the public domain today 
and has contributed to the idea of Nordoff and Robbins founding an approach.
160
 
Second, following his initial visit to the Sunfield Home, Nordoff returned to the USA. 
Upon joining the American organization the National Association for Music Therapy 
(NAMT) (founded in 1950), Nordoff discovered that here the phrase „music therapy‟ 
implied work with „recorded music‟ or the „familiar song repertoire‟. This therapy was 
altogether different from the model of special composition and improvisation that he 
was developing, and it demonstrates how modern improvisational music therapy arose 
out of a specifically European culture. 
Towards a Music-Centred Approach 
Crucial to this enquiry is the identification of the areas of difference between the two 
approaches, psychodynamic and music-centred. There were, however, some similarities 
between the two approaches as they began to emerge during the 1960s that, for clinical 
improvisation, are important to identify. First, as we have already seen, the clinical 
technique of improvisation, soon designated clinical improvisation, was to create music 
freely, moment by moment, in a session to „stimulate, support and develop children‟s 
                                                 
159
 
 
Ibid., p.23. 
160
 
 
See: Nordoff, Robbins and Marcus, Creative music therapy. This publication includes recordings of 
case studies. 
76 
responses‟.161 Second, for both groups of pioneers there was a premise that the 
improvisations afforded a direct emotional engagement through music, an „active 
emotional substance in the inter-responsiveness between child and therapist‟.162 
How was the therapist intended to work to achieve this? Nordoff and Robbins write: 
„When a child… cannot immediately respond vocally or instrumentally … begin your 
work by creating a musical setting with form and mood: a musical emotional 
environment with which he may feel some affinity.‟ This highlights the essential 
similarity: both groups presented above were concerned with live music-making, as 
opposed to listening to recorded music. In particular, they were concerned with 
improvisation as a „new‟ technique for therapeutic work in music. However, a starting 
point for examining the differences between the two approaches, I propose, lies with the 
fact that Paul Nordoff, as the primary musical instigator in the Nordoff-Robbins 
partnership, was a composer and pianist. 
In Chapter Four, I will discuss two different paradigms for improvisation. The first 
relates to a concept of improvisation where it is essentially performers‟ music, in part 
where the raison d’être is for it not to relate to composition.163 The second paradigm is 
where improvisation and composition are processes intrinsic to each other, 
improvisation contains composition and vice versa. Indeed, one phenomenological 
account of improvisation places the two activities in relation to each other on a 
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continuum with free improvisation at one end and composition at the other.
164
 It is the 
second paradigm of improvisation that Paul Nordoff‟s work closely relates to; he 
naturally approached improvisation as a composer and composed many songs out of the 
improvised material. 
I have mentioned above how Priestley approached the psychodynamics of music 
therapy from the „inside‟. Paul Nordoff certainly approached the music of music therapy 
„from the inside‟. His teaching of clinical improvisation, recorded and transcribed, 
constitutes a live demonstration of the „inner workings‟ approach he and Robbins 
developed.
165
 For example, he talks about the composition of melodies in terms of the 
craft of the composer: 
 
In the construction of melodies – and we‟re talking about after the fact, we‟re not talking about 
actually manufacturing them, we‟re talking about looking at the inspired melodies of composers – 
we find the enormous importance of the scale in melodic construction … [For example, J. S. Bach, 
Chorale from Cantata 147, „Jesu Joy of Man‟s Desiring‟] This is something I think we can really 
get down on our knees to. Not only what the man has done with this chorale melody … but that we 
can listen to it … we can see this beautiful embroidery that rises and falls also consists constantly 
of steps and skips and steps and skips!
166
 
 
In places, Nordoff is quite specific in how music operates with fewer restrictions in 
therapy, as he says: 
 
One has to divorce the triad from one‟s conventional harmonic training, and begin to think of the 
triad as something one can use quite freely in therapy in quite a different way, without the 
harmonic connections you‟ve been told and taught. [Plays a selection of major and minor triads as 
he speaks] This is an event [C- E flat- G]…! This is an occurrence [F-A- C]...! This is a challenge 
[A flat-C- E flat]...! And yet [D flat-F flat-A flat]... every one of them is just absolutely balanced 
and controlled [G- B-D].... Do this [B flat- D flat- F]... for a child [D- F sharp- A... then F- A flat- 
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C]....Marvellous experiences with just the triad, the little old boring triad [C-E flat- G]. [Formatting 
in original]
167
 
 
However, in contrast to the teaching of Nieman, this freedom is a specifically musical 
freedom rather than the more literal freedom of Nieman, which is both musical and 
emotional. Nordoff speaks about the freedom of improvisation with reference to Debussy: 
 
You will find, when you study the works of Debussy, that there is a basic musical structure that he 
seldom abandons, and that is the relationship of five and one. No matter how free the harmony, no 
matter how dissonant it might seem, you will find this relationship of the dominant and the tonic is 
there, and it gives its underpinning. [Demonstrates from opening of Debussy prelude, Book 2, 
No.3] ... It‟s from this kind of freedom that a real music therapy – a clinical improvisational 
therapy – could have come into being.168 
 
It is important to note that Nordoff and Robbins were strongly influenced in their 
conception of music therapy by Rudolf Steiner‟s theory of eurhythmy, of music and 
movement. Steiner considered that music, sound, speech and the body were one thing: 
 
Music and language, that is to say the sounds of music and of speech, are connected with the whole 
human being. When the human being sings or speaks, the experience of the singing or the speaking 
is in the astral body and ego ... Musical sound and the sounds of speech actually acquire their inner 
quality of soul from the warmth that, as it were, is carried on the waves of this air.
169
 
 
Steiner‟s theory of musical intervals creates an understanding of sound of each interval 
in direct relation to the self, from the experience of the inner self to the outer self, in the 
world. Each interval expresses some aspect of the human experience. For example, 
Steiner writes: 
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Suppose that you are dealing with a major third. Then you will show inwardness by making the 
arm movement go away (out) from yourself. If you express the minor third, you remain more 
within yourself, which you indicate with your arm back towards yourself (inwards). You have a 
gesture that really expresses the experience of the third. If you want to experience these things, you 
must repeatedly practise the corresponding gesture and try to see how the experiences of the 
intervals actually flow from the gesture and how they are within it. Then the corresponding 
experience will grow together with the gesture, and you will possess that which makes the matter 
artistic.
170
 
 
Nordoff and Robbins absorbed directly from Steiner the notion that music is intrinsic to 
the self, and as such is healing in itself. From this idea in particular, it is possible to 
ascertain the beginnings of a diverse musical aesthetic within music therapy. Whilst the 
notion of improvisation and freedom were important for both approaches, the use of 
music was quite different. For what will now be termed the psychodynamic approach, 
the basis of the therapeutic work was improvised music that was conceived as self-
expression of a conscious and unconscious kind. For the „music-centred‟ approach, the 
basis of therapeutic work was that music was conceived as itself, and, therefore, 
consciously derived from specific composers (including the therapist and client). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described four major influences upon the development of clinical 
improvisation. First, I have indicated the cross-influence of practices within music 
education where improvisation, composition and forms of aleatoric music were 
concurrently being experimented with and incorporated within class music as a tool for 
learning. Second, anthroposophy provided a practical theory of music and the self, 
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whilst psychoanalysis provided a theory of the experience of music, the self and the self 
in relation to others.  
 Finally, I discussed the influence of some developments in art improvisation 
during the 1960s. The theories afforded by free music-making and a soundworld enabled 
by twentieth-century atonality were shown to have influenced two important principles 
implicit in the emergent practice of clinical improvisation. First, implicit in music 
therapy practice was the notion that the spontaneity and freedom of improvisation 
enabled a „personal authenticity‟ in music to emerge. Second, the practice of „close 
listening‟ between players (in this case between therapist and client) was considered 
essential to the process of developing a musical therapeutic relationship through 
improvisation.
171
  
This chapter has also covered a historical period, between the 1930s and 1970s, 
when music therapy began to emerge as an activity distinct from education and the 
performance of music in the concert hall. Two approaches began to develop side by side 
with some shared ideals, but also with the beginnings of some important differences. In 
1977, a report in the British Journal of Music Therapy describes a BSMT „members‟ 
meeting‟ on music therapy techniques.172 The report comments how „Members of the 
audience were invited to come forward and show how they used some of the instruments 
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in their work as intermediary objects between the patient and himself and his 
environment – a process leading to identification.‟173 Putting the psychoanalytic 
language to one side, it is striking how some of the examples described illustrate aspects 
of the „two approaches‟ discussed in this chapter. For example, on the one hand, Peter 
Wright illustrates psychodynamic thinking in his presentation as he „emphasised the 
self-knowledge which can result from the free use of an instrument and the preference 
certain adult patients show for the xylophone in improvisation techniques‟.174 On the 
other hand, Jean Eisler‟s work suggests the influence of Nordoff and Robbins in that her 
presentation „demonstrated the transfer of spasmodic movements of an athetoid child on 
to a tambourine and how the sounds can become musically meaningful‟.175 It appears 
from this report that the separate paths that music therapy took over the coming decades 
were already being trodden. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Ontological Method and the Music of Music Therapy 
From a musicological point of view, improvisation in music therapy may not be 
“interesting” in the same way as a major piece of art music. Improvisation does not 
generally produce a musical work of art. Thus some analytical procedures from 
traditional musical analysis may not be relevant. Even if such methods might indicate 
structural idiosyncrasies of the improvisation, we do not use them to see how certain 
features may organise the musical text or what stylistic features are operating and 
how they are historically related. Instead we study how music provokes inter- or 
intrapersonal communication – in other words which musical structures will lead to 
change or a new initiative. 
EVEN RUUD, 1998
176
 
 
 
How is it possible to approach the core question of „what is the music of music therapy?‟ 
beyond a literal, empirical description?
177
 What is the problem, and where does it arise? 
In this chapter, addressing these three questions will take us to the centre of the enquiry. 
The previous chapter contained a historical account in which clinical improvisation was 
examined as an emergent form of music-making with two distinct approaches. In this 
chapter, I will be referring to the music of music therapy in more general terms, as a 
single form of musical improvisation, in contrast to other forms of improvisation. 
Furthermore, as I have already discussed in Chapter One, clinical improvisation does not 
solely refer to free music-making; it encompasses the broader notion of an 
improvisational activity of music-making that might involve the spontaneous singing of 
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known songs or playing of chord sequences. For this reason, any ontological exploration 
of the music of music therapy cannot refer solely to improvisation alone but will also 
need to consider forms of pre-composed music. It is the task of this chapter, therefore, to 
arrive at some generality as to what kind of musical domain is under discussion and at 
the centre of our concern. 
First, I provide an initial approach to the core question through a discussion of the 
role of musical ontology in this enquiry. I examine what Andrew Kania has termed 
„higher-order‟ music ontology as one such approach to making „comparisons‟ between 
different forms or traditions of music-making. Second, with reference to Lee B. Brown‟s 
critique of Kania‟s approach, I discuss the difficulty of formulating an ontological 
account of music that is sufficiently „descriptive‟ of the musical practice in question and 
embedded in live rather than purely abstract concerns.
178
 Third, in light of this critique, I 
return to the literature and concerns of music therapy. 
How did the core question come to be of concern? How did the question of what is the 
music of music therapy arise? I outline the background to this enquiry and discuss the 
difficulty of defining clinical improvisation beyond the circular terms of it being 
improvisation that takes places within the environment of therapy. I describe a scenario 
where an ambiguity has arisen regarding the type of music-making that is taking place, 
clinical improvisation or art improvisation where music therapists have improvised music 
as part of a professional meeting. As I show, it is out of this very ambiguity that, prior to 
starting this enquiry, I began to formulate what I described in Chapter One as a „pre-
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theoretical intuition‟ regarding the distinctiveness of the ontology of clinical 
improvisation. 
Next, I discuss in depth the work of music therapists Sandra Brown and Mercédès 
Pavlicevic, who have addressed the ambiguity in the form of an action research 
project.
179
 Their project considers a distinction between clinical improvisation and 
„music-making‟ improvisation through an examination of their individual experiences of 
each form under semi-experimental conditions. Finally, I identify common themes 
between the philosophical and practice-based discussions considered in this chapter and 
show how these themes provide common ground to begin to explore a distinction 
between clinical improvisation and art or music-making improvisation. 
The Role of Musical Ontology as Method 
I have identified the core question of this enquiry as a question of comparative ontology. 
What does this mean, and in what way is the question of what is the music of music 
therapy of ontological concern? In this section, I present some current discussion in 
musical ontology, particularly drawing upon the work of philosopher Andrew Kania. 
Later in the chapter, I show how some comparative questions are common to both 
musical aesthetics and music therapy. 
Approaches to Musical Ontology 
One current debate within musical ontology concerns the „right method‟ of approach, and 
in particular, what can be formulated as the question of where should a „good‟ ontology 
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begin?
180
 Should it begin, for example, with a questioning of the fundamental 
metaphysical structure of a form of music; most commonly, is it a „universal‟ (a Platonist 
position) or a „particular‟ (a nominalist position)? Alternatively, should we look to the 
musical practice itself to see what questions arise directly out of it? 
As a starting point for a critique of methodology, Kania has made the distinction 
between descriptive metaphysics, which „is content to describe the actual structure of 
our thought about the world‟, and revisionary metaphysics, which „is concerned to 
produce a better structure‟.181 Kania describes how Nelson Goodman „kick-started‟ 
analytical musical aesthetics during the 1960s through an extreme „revisionary position‟, 
whereby what might be considered as an understanding of the reality of musical practice 
is overthrown in favour of logic. Famously, Goodman argued an extreme nominalist 
position whereby the identity of a musical work in performance could only be verified 
through the complete compliance with the musical score, meaning a complete absence of 
wrong notes.
182
 
Kania traces the response to Goodman‟s „extreme‟ position and shows how this has 
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motivated a number of developments including „a growing interest in, or unrest about, 
the proper methodology for doing the ontology of music and the other arts‟.183 
Especially, Kania continues, there has been a concern with „what exactly has priority 
when we do the ontology of art‟.184 He writes: 
 
At the descriptive end of the spectrum is the particularist, who argues that there is no such thing as the 
ontological nature of the artwork, the musical work, the classical musical work for performance, or 
any kind of artwork. We must look at the particular details in any given case, describing each work as 
it is, rather than fitting them all, or any group of them into a Procrustean [sic] ontological theory ... As 
we move down the line towards the revisionary end, we encounter ontologists who give up more and 
more of our expert artistic judgements in the interests of a better theory of the way artworks really 
are, independently of how we think of them.
185
 
 
Kania is committed to what is arguably a reflective way of „doing‟ ontology; a „meta-
ontology‟ led by the art form or practice in question, in this case music. This goes hand-
in-hand with his examination of the „diverse ontologies‟ to be found upon comparing 
different forms of music. He has termed this comparative project „higher-order 
ontology‟. 
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Higher-Order Ontology 
As described above, Kania makes a distinction between fundamental and higher-order 
musical ontology.
186
 Higher-order ontology can be seen as concerned with questions 
emanating from the musical phenomenon itself. In contrast, fundamental ontology is 
concerned with the topographically deeper, broader, non-musical questions of 
metaphysics, as referred to above, namely what kinds of things are there in the world 
and what kind of thing is music?; is it for instance, a physical object?
187
 
Kania‟s framework, whereby questions of „higher-order‟ musical ontology are 
distinguished from questions of fundamental musical ontology, has proved a useful 
conceptual tool for this enquiry. The core question, what is the music of music therapy?, 
is essentially a comparative question and as such „neutral‟ in relation to the 
„fundamental‟ debates within musical ontology, which are essentially concerned with 
metaphysical questions regarding whether music is a universal or a particular.
188
 This 
enquiry seeks to understand the music of music therapy in relation to the other forms of 
music that influenced its emergence and subsequent practice. 
Higher-order musical ontology, Kania has written, enables an examination of „different 
musical traditions on their own terms‟, rather than simply, for example, examining the music 
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of jazz as a „variation‟ of the Western classical musical work paradigm.189 
The Purpose of Higher-Order Ontology: Evaluation and Misunderstandings 
Taking Kania‟s framework of higher-order ontology, different musical forms or 
traditions can be seen to raise their own distinctive questions of ontology.
190
 On this 
account, a certain ontological understanding of a musical form or tradition enables an 
evaluation of a particular form or tradition, for example an evaluation of the intrinsic 
aesthetic worth of the music and/or type of musical performance. Kania shows how one 
musical tradition can be misunderstood, dismissed even, because it is evaluated as 
though it were, ontologically, the same as another musical tradition, and there is indeed 
huge potential for occurrences of this. 
For example, what constitutes excellence in one tradition, such as the immediacy of 
expression conveyed through the „raw‟ sound produced by a folk singer such as Billy 
Bragg, would be discounted as excellence within the context of many of the 
performance practices within Western classical traditions. To listen to and evaluate 
Bragg within the same evaluative framework as Ian Bostridge, a classical singer of 
Schubert‟s song cycles and Britten‟s operas, where it could be said that consistency of 
tone is valued over roughness of tone, would certainly demonstrate a naivety 
(intolerance even) of different performance traditions and the essential purpose of each. 
In Kania‟s terms, however, such an evaluation further constitutes an ontological 
misunderstanding or category mistake. Such „misunderstandings‟ can also be manifested 
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in the provision of a music therapy service. For example, there is sometimes a reluctance 
conveyed by professional colleagues to provide considered referrals to music therapy, 
except on the (not unimportant) basis that the client „likes music‟. One explanation for 
this could be that the music of music therapy is sometimes considered in the same terms 
as the music broadcast on the radio or sung in concert performances by the local choral 
society. In other words, the musical content of therapeutic sessions are (unreflectively) 
evaluated as ontologically akin to the musical content of leisure activities, which, 
possibly, the referring teacher or medical practitioner engages with in his or her free 
time. The music is thus considered as a „relaxing diversion‟ rather than part of the 
therapeutic „core business‟ of the school or hospital. Phillip Alperson, writing about jazz 
improvisation, provides a further example, demonstrating how an entire musical practice 
can be „misunderstood‟ simply by evaluating it from within the wrong frame of 
reference. In this case, jazz improvisation is evaluated from within the same set of 
aesthetic values as the classical string quartet. He writes: 
 
It might be contended that, as complex musical structures, musical improvisation typically pales in 
comparison with the conventional situation where a composer produces a composition antecedently 
to its public performance. At a recent meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, for example, 
Denis Dutton asserted that he did not think it likely that there would ever exist a single jazz 
improvisation which would compare favourably (or even remotely) with the structural complexity 
of any of Beethoven‟s late quartets.191 
 
Alternatively, Ted Gioia argues that there is a different set of aesthetic values to be had 
in the performance of jazz in contrast to the performance of classical music, suggesting 
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that it is to be valued on account of its status as primarily a performer‟s music. It is the 
performer rather than the musical work that we are interested in, and to appreciate jazz 
in terms of the work is to misunderstand it. He writes: 
 
Clearly any set of aesthetic standards which seek perfection or near perfection in the work of art 
will find little to praise in jazz [i.e. improvisation]. Yet this approach, however prevalent, is not the 
only valid way of evaluating works of art. A contrasting, if not complimentary attitude looks not at 
the art in isolation but in relation to the artist who created it; it asks whether that work is expressive 
of the artist, whether it reflects his own unique and incommensurable perspective on his art ... This 
I believe, is precisely the attitude towards art that delights in jazz. We enjoy improvisation because 
we take enormous satisfaction in seeing what a great musical mind can create spontaneously. We 
are interested in what the artist can do, given the constraints of his art. We evaluate Louis 
Armstrong or Charlie Parker not by comparing them with Beethoven or Mozart but by comparing 
them with other musicians working under similar constraints, and our notions of excellence in Jazz 
thus depend on our understanding of the abilities of individual artists and not on our perception of 
perfection in the work of art. In short we are interested in the finished product (the improvisation) 
not as an autonomous object but as the creation of a specific person.
192
 
 
These three examples of ontological misunderstanding are concerned with a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of the music. Kania demonstrates, however, the way in 
which such ontological misunderstandings can throw light not just upon a distinction in 
the meaning of the music as musical object, but also in its manifestation through 
performance. 
Rock Music: A Case Study for Comparative Higher-Order Ontology 
In this next section, I examine Kania‟s discussion of rock music, in particular to 
illustrate the way in which one form of music can be thought about in relation to 
another. It also illustrates how different forms of music can be viewed as distinct directly 
in relation to their practice. 
Kania provides a case study to illustrate the way in which such a comparison can be 
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made between differing ontologies, which are so identified, between rock music and 
Western classical music respectively. This involves the discussions of philosophers 
Theodore Gracyk and Stephen Davies, as both of whom have examined rock music.
193
 
Terminology 
It is worth noting the terminology employed by these three authors. Taking Gracyk‟s 
own starting point, ontology as a category is treated within these discussions as what 
„counts as a unit of significance or object of critical attention‟ within a musical work.194 
The term „work‟ is used interchangeably within this literature to mean „musical work‟, 
in the same sense that it is used in Western classical music. It is also used to mean „work 
of art‟, in the sense that it is used to question where is the „work of art‟ in this or that 
form of music. At the centre of the analysis is a discussion of performance. Kania, 
Davies and Gracyk have alighted upon the particular relationships between performance 
and specific musical styles. Davies makes a contrast between what he calls musical 
works „for performance‟ and „works not for performance‟.195 Like Kania, he is 
concerned that his approach has ontological relevance to „the sorts of things that make a 
difference to the way composers, performers and listeners understand and discharge 
their socio-musical roles‟.196 He writes: 
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I separate works that are for performance from those that are not, and, within works for 
performance, [he separates] those that are for live presentation from those that are not. In addition, 
[he continues] I distinguish works rich in properties from those that are not.
197
 
 
Davies distinguishes types of performance along a continuum for different sorts of 
musical „products‟, or „works‟, including improvisation.198 His continuum charts an 
ontological comparison between „three kinds of works‟: those for „live performance‟, 
those for „studio performance‟ and those that are „not for performance‟.199 
More Terminology: Thick and Thin Works in Performance 
Underlying these distinctions is a comparative account of the music itself, which entails 
the relationship between what Davies has termed „thick‟ and „thin‟ works (of music). 
„Thick‟ and „thin‟ refers to the extent of „constitutive‟ or „determinative‟ properties of a 
work for it to be that work.
200
 An electro-acoustic work, Edgard Varèse‟s Déserts (1954) 
for tape, wind, percussion and piano, Davies cites as an example of a thick work. Here, 
not only has the composer provided directions (in the form of a score), but there is no 
possibility for any variation in the contribution made by the tape, a characteristic that is 
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not only extremely specific, but also essential to the identity of the work.
201
 Less thick 
than this are the symphonies of Josef Haydn, which, for example, can be performed 
within a wide range of tempi, dynamics and some variation in the number of players 
required. On the other hand, a „thin‟ work, for example Theolonius Monk‟s Round 
Midnight, is a piece that can tolerate all kinds of variation, including style of 
improvisation, instrumentation (including the microtonal instruments of Harry Partch), 
harmony and length, and still be identified as the same piece. As Davies writes, „If it is 
thin, the work‟s determinative properties are comparatively few in number and most of 
the qualities of a performance are aspects of the performer‟s interpretation, not of the 
work as such ... The thicker the work, the more the composer controls the sonic detail of 
its accurate instances.‟202 
Illustrating Higher-Order Ontology: Rock Music and Performance 
I shall now outline the discussion between these three philosophers. Although they make 
fine distinctions between musical forms, the relevance of which initially might seem to 
be of little consequence in a discussion of music therapy, I present them here as an 
illustration of the type and complexity of distinctions between forms of music in music 
therapy that I will subsequently make in this enquiry. In particular, their discussion 
demonstrates the way in which such distinctions can work at the level of ontology rather 
than an empirical description of this or that form of music. This is not to adopt an 
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uncritical approach; I shall later look at the limits of higher-order ontology through the 
recent discussion between Kania and Lee B. Brown.
203
 
At the centre of the discussions by all three philosophers is an initial agreement that 
in rock music, it is the recording of the rock track, rather than the song itself, that is 
considered the „primary medium‟. However, the nature of the recorded rock track has a 
different emphasis in each account. 
For Gracyk, in the „Western musical tradition‟, the classical work „has generally 
been identified with the sound-structure, not the sounds themselves‟.204 Alternatively, he 
writes that in rock music the „recordings are the primary link between the rock artist and 
the audience, and [therefore] the primary object of critical attention‟. He continues, 
„these musical works are played on appropriate machines, not performed. Consequently, 
rock cuts across the typical dichotomy [in musical aesthetics] of musical work versus its 
myriad performances.‟205 Importantly, Gracyk‟s understanding of the rock track refines 
the notion of performance, in that it introduces the concept of music as „a purely 
electronic work that is not for performance‟ [italics in original].206 
Davies, however, further refines Gracyk‟s notion of music „not for performance‟, 
contending that it is only the ontologically „thick‟ work of purely electronic music that is 
„not for performance‟. In many cases, the rock track entails a performer who, with the 
engineer, has created the recording. Thus, rather than the rock track being „not for 
performance‟, he provides the new additional designation of the rock track being for 
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„studio performance‟. He writes in response to Gracyk: 
 
I accept that, in some cases, the rock song is a purely electronic composition that is not for 
performance … More often though, it is a work for studio performance. The performer‟s skill is 
sometimes displayed in the immediacy of the present, as happens with improvised jazz, but it can 
also be exhibited in a more extended process during which his playing is being taped, 
superimposed, mixed, and modified, until a composite is produced. What happens in the rock 
studio is a mode of performance, I maintain, and the disc produced embodies a performance of a 
song.
207
 
 
 
What is of concern here, for this enquiry, is the way in which both Gracyk and Davies 
have considered rock music and classical music as occupying distinct ontological 
domains.
208
 Kania, though, takes his argument one stage further. He writes: 
 
Rock musicians primarily construct tracks. These are ontologically thick works, like classical 
electronic works, and are at the centre of rock as an art form. However, these tracks also manifest 
songs. Rock songs, like jazz songs, but unlike classical songs, tend to be very thin ontologically, 
allowing of alterations in instrumentation, lyrics, melody and even harmony. But while classical 
and jazz songs are works for performance simpliciter, rock songs are not works, nor are they for 
anything in particular. Rock tracks are not special kinds of performances of the thin songs they 
manifest, as [Stephen] Davies would have it. Rather they are studio constructions: thick works that 
manifest thin songs, without being performances of them. At the same time, a rock song may be 
instanced in a performance [Italics in original].
209
 
 
In other words, in Kania‟s account, the rock track is „its own thing‟; whilst it might 
„manifest‟ in the form of a well-known song, it is not a „performance‟ of the song 
contained within the track.
210
 He writes: 
 
A rock track might manifest a work [originally composed] for performance without being an 
instance of that work ... The concept of manifesting a work (or non-work object, such as a rock 
song) is supposed to be indeterminate between that of authentically instancing a work and that of 
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having no relation to it. A manifestation of a work represents the work, displaying its properties, 
without necessarily being an instance of it.
211
 
 
The outcome of this philosophical enterprise is a series of fine conceptual distinctions 
whereby each author seeks to establish a position in relation to rock music. As is well-
known to the performers and listeners of rock music, the style, like any musical style, 
has its own compositional and performance practices, which for philosophers raise the 
need to make fine conceptual distinctions before proceeding any further. The problem 
with this type of endeavour is that, on the one hand, it exemplifies ways in which an 
intuitive „everyday‟ understanding of what the ontological nature of the/a rock track is 
cannot be taken for granted based on an ontological understanding of classical „lieder‟. 
On the other hand, attempting to specify „once and for all‟ a different understanding, 
based upon a new „rock ontology‟, inevitably invites the need for further refinements. As 
all three authors have pointed out, rock music covers a vast range of music-making. 
Such a normative approach, however, seems to produce the very problem Kania is 
seeking to avoid when arguing for a descriptive rather than a revisionary method of 
ontology. Philosophers inevitably begin with philosophical questions in relation to a 
practice, but in attempting to understand a live practice this raises further questions due 
to the sheer inconsistencies involved. For example, as Brown writes: 
 
Kania describes the relationship between live and recorded rock as „asymmetric‟. That is, live rock 
performances „look to‟ rock tracks, but not vice versa. But ... not only do rock bands perform songs 
live in concert before they record them in the studio, they very often perform songs live in concert 
that they never perform in the studio ... the relationship between song and track is a fluid one. 
Tracks are sometimes made in the interest of songs; and songs are sometimes sung in the interest of 
tracks. Sometimes neither is the case. Why try to simplify the relationship?
212
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It is to Brown‟s critique that I will turn next to account for a practice such as clinical 
improvisation that, as we have seen, is not only multifarious in form, but questionable as 
to whether or not it can be considered in terms of a musical work. 
The Limits of Higher-Order Ontology? 
Through this case study of rock music, Kania has proposed a method of comparative 
musical ontology in relation to a specific musical practice.
213
 The method provides a 
means for examining a musical practice in relation to a different or similar musical 
practice. The effectiveness of this is clear in the way that Kania, Davies and Gracyk 
have „alighted‟ upon a „common theme‟ across varying musical practices, in this case, 
performance. In examining the relationship to musical performance, the question of what 
lies „at the centre of a specific form of music, such as rock or jazz – or perhaps classical 
music‟ is seen to emerge.214 Brown summarizes Kania‟s perspective as „The main task 
for an ontology of a popular music form ... is to explicate what might be termed the 
master concept of this or that form of music – that is, the work of rock, of jazz, etc.‟ 
However, at the heart of Brown‟s critique is the problem of assuming a „unified‟ work 
concept across musical practices, particularly improvisatory practices such as jazz. The 
mistake, from Brown‟s perspective, is a method that searches on the premise, a priori, 
that such a concept might be found, and that as such, it has application within actual 
musical practice. Formulations of jazz, for example, which actively seek to employ the 
work concept, not only „strains our use of “work”‟, he writes, but „the field of jazz is just 
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too rich for any [such] single unifying ontology‟.215 Brown makes the „assumption‟ that 
a central work-kind does lie at the „centre‟ of a given form of music, but is not 
straightforward as a principle of methodology. He writes: 
 
If the phrase „higher-order‟ ontology of F [i.e. musical form] merely denotes a collection of non-
fundamentalist ontological questions about F, including the question of whether any single kind 
does lie at the centre of F, no one could object – although much has been said here to suggest that 
we should expect a negative answer to the latter. However, in practice, higher-order ontologists 
have proceeded on the premise that some specific kind K, does lie at the centre of F – and that the 
task is to settle the question about the nature of K.
216
 
 
As indicated above, for Brown to proceed on such a premise is to produce concepts, 
such as Davies‟s „schema‟ described above (see footnote 27). Brown terms these 
concepts „mere artefacts of philosophy‟, which will not evince a knowledge of 
differences between musical practices. He concludes: 
 
The answer, I think, is the less abstract these concepts are, the less they try to cover a very 
diversified field instead of reflecting real differences in practices ... the danger of applying systems 
of any kinds – of any kind – is that they can become calcified. On the other hand, the more willing 
we are to diversify, the closer we are to converging with practice, which has no problem living 
with elaborate diversity – indeed, even with sharp conflict.217 
 
According to Brown, Kania‟s higher-ontology has failed to provide a convincing 
„template‟ for a comparative enquiry such as this, given that his methodology 
concentrates upon abstract, philosophically driven concepts, rather than concepts 
embedded within musical practice. Brown seems to be saying that such concepts are 
unlikely to facilitate a comparative understanding of musical practices if they are 
employed with the aim of „settling‟ an account of this or that practice. Given the 
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practice-based impetus for this enquiry, is there any aspect of Gracyk, Davies or Kania‟s 
account of musical ontology that is still relevant here? 
To address this methodological concern, it is worth appropriating, once again, 
Gracyk‟s particular formulation of a higher-ontological question, namely the 
determining or exploration of what „counts as a unit of significance or object of critical 
attention‟ within a musical work.218 Upon posing this question in relation to real issues 
of practice, it is clear that ultimately the aim to understand and develop a musical 
practice is what in this instance will drive the nature of the enquiry, rather than the aim 
to understand and develop a theory for its own sake. Furthermore, as will be 
demonstrated later in the chapter, some of the questions arising out of practice and posed 
by music therapists are not dissimilar to questions posed by philosophers. For example, 
Kania is concerned with the idea that to understand what „counts as a unit of 
significance‟ in a rock work is to be able to evaluate its worth. Similarly, Sandra Brown 
and Mercédès Pavlicevic are also concerned with the notion that to identify what they 
find in their research is the key issue for clinical improvisation, or in Gracyk „s terms, 
„the units of significance‟ is to understand what constitutes a good clinical 
improvisation.
219
  
Not surprisingly, given Kania‟s discussion, formulating a means of evaluation turns 
out to be a way of distinguishing clinical improvisation from what Brown and Pavlicevic 
term „music-making‟ improvisation.220 Whilst the answer Brown and Pavlicevic are 
seeking is a practical answer regarding „technique‟, which can be applied directly to 
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their clinical practice, their practice-based findings also contribute a perspective on an 
ontological account of clinical improvisation. 
This close link between the questions posed by philosophers and those posed by 
musical practitioners should not come as a surprise. In other words, if we take Kania‟s 
position that, whether or not we are „doing‟ ontology, we do have ontological intuitions 
about artworks that are rooted in practice: 
 
We think of a painting for instance, as being spatially located, made of paint and canvas, capable of 
surviving beyond its artist‟s life and then being destroyed at some later time, and capable of being 
bought and sold in its entirety ... that we have these beliefs about artworks is evident not only when 
we ask people about them, or when we are doing art ontology, but in just about any critical 
discourse, and much artistic practice.
221
 
 
So, in response to Lee B. Brown‟s critique of Kania, one reply is that if the questions 
raised by practitioners prove to be closely akin to those raised by philosophers, it may 
not matter if later they go their separate ways – philosophers to ever-refined concepts 
and practitioners towards a greater understanding of their practice; as Lee B. Brown 
emphasizes above, practice that „lives with elaborate diversity‟. Such an assumption of 
„a unit of significance or object of critical attention‟ within a musical tradition is not 
necessarily a conceptual activity enforced from outside of that tradition, in particular by 
philosophers. As I have demonstrated above, there are significant aspects of the 
methodology of Kania and Davies that will bear some of the emerging questions of 
ontology in music therapy. It is to these questions as embedded within the practice of 
music therapy that I will turn next. 
                                                 
221
 
 Kania, „The methodology of musical ontology‟, p.431. 
101 
Establishing a Definition for Clinical Improvisation 
As already discussed, when the initial experimental work of the pioneers had been 
completed, rather than establishing a uniform approach, clinical improvisation continued 
to develop in a number of different ways. This meant that when music therapists wanted 
to discuss their improvisatory practices, they found that frequently they were discussing 
different forms of music-making. This led to a need for some common terms of 
reference. During the 1980s, under the auspices of the Association of Professional Music 
Therapists (APMT), a group of music therapists met over a period of two years to define 
some of the terms and concepts that were currently in use.
222
 „Clinical improvisation‟ 
was the term most urgently in need of a specialist account. The group began, however, 
from the perspective that a broader question needed to be resolved, what is „musical‟ or 
„free‟ improvisation? Free improvisation was defined as: „Any combination of sounds 
and silence spontaneously created within a framework of beginning and ending.‟ Then, 
the definition of clinical improvisation was agreed as being „musical improvisation with 
a specific therapeutic meaning and purpose in an environment facilitating response and 
interaction‟.223 Wigram recalls in particular Priestley‟s role in that discussion: 
 
Mary Priestley, the pioneer in Analytical Music Therapy, stressed from the moment a client entered 
the music therapy room or space, any sounds they made may be intentional or unintentional forms 
of music making. She gave an example of a client who leaned back in his chair and started tapping 
his finger against the side. It seemed that the production of sound could be interpreted as musical 
and improvisational provided the context was clearly therapeutic.
224
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This brief illustration demonstrates how, on the one hand, clinical improvisation in 
musical terms might not sound that different from free improvisation. Indeed, many 
„free improvisations‟ start with small sounds on objects that happen to be to hand, rather 
than musical instruments.
225
 It also demonstrates how, on the other hand, within the 
context of therapy, these same sounds might take on a specific therapeutic meaning, in 
this case a psychoanalytic meaning. That is to say, Priestley‟s non-directive acceptance 
of her client‟s „sounds‟ illustrates the integration of psychoanalytic practice into her 
work. 
Fundamental to psychoanalytic technique is the use of free association, the talking 
out loud of the client‟s natural random train of thought; the principle being that however 
unconnected the train of thought might seem to the current moment, it is all considered 
meaningful. Psychoanalytic technique, therefore, can be seen as a means of making 
sense of our everyday daydreams.
226
Does this mean, therefore, that music therapy 
technique in the form of clinical improvisation is no different from free improvisation; is 
it simply a way of making sense of the sounds for the purpose of therapy? This is the 
dilemma that forms the very basis of the enquiry: is there a distinction to be made in the 
music of music therapy and music made elsewhere? Furthermore, as we have seen with 
Kania‟s comparison of rock music and classical music, the question is raised of whether 
this is merely a distinction of context between performance settings and therapeutic 
settings, or is there a distinction of ontology to be drawn? In the next section, I will 
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examine how and where the question arises. This dilemma may present itself most 
clearly where music therapists freely improvise together as colleagues, for example, as 
part of a session at a conference or seminar. This personal experience of such music-
making has, in part, prompted the enquiry as a whole and it is from this perspective I 
shall begin. 
Clinical Improvisation and Ontological Confusion 
For many years, I was a member of a forum for music therapists working with adult 
clients in mental health settings. We used to meet in each other‟s workplaces three or 
four times a year for a day of discussion, news exchange and clinical presentations. Most 
of the meetings included „improvisation‟ on the agenda. In retrospect, I have noticed that 
the rationale for including an improvisation session was never considered and, similarly, 
we didn‟t consider the rationale for clinical case presentations. Furthermore, we quite 
often held the improvisation session at the end of the day, and sometimes abandoned it 
altogether. However, on other occasions we would improvise as planned. 
Following an improvisation, it is quite usual within music therapy practice to reflect 
in one way or another upon the meaning of the music, but in this instance, with this 
group of colleagues, such reflection was rare. This was in contrast to the music we 
analysed in response to case presentations, where all manner of interpretations and 
understandings would be considered. Indeed, when we played, I was never quite clear 
what we were actually doing or what kind of analysis we might bring to bear upon our 
group improvisations. Possibly other members of the group had a similar experience and 
this was the unspoken reason why we sometimes didn‟t play. Specifically, it was never 
104 
clear to me what the music was; was the music-making clinical improvisation or was it 
simply improvisation? 
Why might there have been an ambiguity here, one which left me feeling confused? 
It could be that my „confusion‟ was due to the shared professional identities of a group 
of people playing together in a work setting where they usually played music with 
clients. The question might have arisen specifically in relation to the „site‟ (for example 
a hospital) of the music-making and the „roles‟ of the players involved (a group of 
people who are music therapists). 
However, the dilemma has not arisen, for example, where I have made music with 
colleagues outside of work. The string quartet in which I used to play, made up entirely 
of music therapists, did not need to discuss what we thought the music was, as this 
seemed self-evident. Our shared professional identity did not impact upon our music-
making together. Similarly, at some professional music therapy „functions‟ where music 
has been made it has been clear that we are making music for the sake of making music, 
albeit as a contribution to a particular event. The work environment or „site‟ did not raise 
a question here; there was no doubt between us as to what the music was. Both these 
examples of music-making, however, playing music in the string quartet and during a 
music therapy function, entailed the performance of autonomous musical works; music 
which is jointly understood as being made for the sake of music rather than music made 
with a definite function, in this case the function of therapy. 
This raises the question of whether my confusion was related to the fact of the 
music-making being in a form of free improvisation, which could be clinical 
improvisation or not be clinical improvisation without, on either count, it sounding 
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radically different. However, the free improvisation workshop I attended as part of a jazz 
summer school did not need any discussion; before we began to sing, the tutor simply 
told us what she wanted us to do in music terms. There was no doubt here, at least in my 
mind, what the music was. 
I am deliberately stating the dilemma in terms of what the music is, rather than what 
the music is for. This is because in the case of the forum of music therapists, the matter 
could have been easily settled by deciding what the music was for, simply by enquiring 
about the intention of the players. It would have been possible to decide, with our 
experience of clinical improvisation, whether we were going to be improvising music for 
the sake of improvising music or if we were engaging in an interpersonal group interaction 
in music for the sake of group interaction. However, as no such discussion took place, I 
am arguing here that an ambiguity arose because it was possible in the scenario described 
to take part in such an improvisation and not know what the music is. 
This ambiguity of musical understanding of what the music was, I am approaching 
here as an ontological ambiguity as it wasn‟t clear what was „driving‟ the forum 
improvisation. In other words, it wasn‟t clear what implicitly „counted as a unit of 
significance‟, to use Gracyk‟s terminology, or what constituted „the master concept‟, to 
use the terminology of Kania, in the mind of this player at the very least.
227
 In all, I am 
arguing that this ambiguity illustrates the problem of ontology that is central to this 
enquiry, namely the problem that it is not clear what the music of music therapy is. 
In the next section, I examine Brown and Pavlicevic‟s study in which they approach 
the same problem and use the observational methods of action research to make a 
                                                 
227
 
 
Gracyk, Rhythm and noise; Kania, „Making tracks‟. See discussion above in this chapter. 
106 
comparison between clinical improvisation and art or what they term „music-making 
improvisation‟. I shall demonstrate a correspondence between the questions that arise 
from their project and the questions of music and performance arising out of higher-
order ontology described earlier in this chapter. 
Towards a Distinction: Brown and Pavlicevic’s Phenomenology of Clinical Improvisation 
We have just considered the ambiguity that arose when a group of music therapists 
improvised music as part of a professional meeting. Is there a similar ambiguity regarding 
clinical improvisation where the music therapist is working with a client in a music 
therapy session? Brown and Pavlicevic posed this dilemma in the following terms, asking, 
what if a musician was referred to music therapy where „both music therapist and client ... 
[were] skilled musicians, can we be clear that in music therapy they are doing more than 
playing together? Can we be sure that they are engaged in a clinical musical relationship, 
rather than a purely musical one?‟228 Brown and Pavlicevic, both music therapists trained 
at the Nordoff-Robbins London Centre, are unique in having examined this same situation 
in the form of a small-scale action research project. The project was concerned with 
exploring „the nature of the musical event in the music therapy session‟ and „with the 
distinction between purely musical improvisation (or improvisation as art-form) and 
clinical improvisation (or improvisation as therapy), a distinction [they write] which we 
believe to be critical if we are to assert that our skills as music therapists go beyond the 
purely musical‟.229 This stance, they acknowledge, is already in contrast to the views of 
                                                 
228
 
 Brown and Pavlicevic, „Clinical improvisation in creative music therapy‟. 
229
 
 
Ibid., pp.397–398. 
107 
some of their colleagues, all of whom would have trained in the same Nordoff-Robbins 
music-centred approach. They write: „There seems to be a continuum of views [about 
clinical improvisation] ranging from “it should and must be different” to “it is the same, as 
the musical experience and processes contain all the healing.” Our own intuitions have 
been that the clinical-musical relationship is different from a purely musical one.‟230 
Their findings, based upon their own live observations, provide what is understood 
as a phenomenological mapping of clinical improvisation. In the next section, I examine 
their account in some detail as laying the foundations for the delineation of ontology 
between clinical improvisation and music-making improvisation. Crucial to Brown and 
Pavlicevic‟s stance, as implied above, is that a distinction between clinical improvisation 
and music-making improvisation lies in the actual music improvised, rather than in how 
the improvisation is heard or understood. They state: 
 
We are not suggesting that art-form or therapeutic improvisation differs only because of how we 
perceive and describe the improvisations in music therapy sessions. It is not our perception or 
descriptive language which determines the function of the improvisation, but rather, we suggest 
that the difference between music as “art” and “therapy” is intrinsic within the improvisation itself 
… We are simply attempting to clarify our own understanding that there is a structural or intrinsic 
musical difference between pure musical improvisation and clinical musical improvisation as used 
in [Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy].
231
 
 
The basis for this argument lies in the specifically clinical musical skills of the music 
therapist, „which enable the client and therapist to form and work with a dynamic 
interpersonal relationship through the music‟.232 However as they further qualify, „the 
issues of artistic skill cannot be tossed aside‟ as, on the one hand, the therapist is 
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operating not just as a therapist but as a musician also. Furthermore, on the other hand, 
both the therapist and the client may be skilled musicians, and as such (we can surmise) 
practised in making music towards artistic ends.
233
 Even if the client is not a skilled 
musician, or an active musician in any sense, such a „musical agenda‟ of music-making 
as it occurs outside of therapy will usually be present to a greater or lesser extent for the 
expectations of the client young or old. Frequently, the expectation of the adult or 
elderly client of music therapy will be of a session where they take part in music that 
they know already. Part of the task of music therapy though is to demonstrate to the 
client the creative possibilities of the music, to demonstrate the way in which making 
music can be a communicative and therefore therapeutic activity. Pavlicevic has termed 
this communicative potential the dynamic form of the music.
234
 This is not always a 
straightforward process, particularly where a client possesses a long-held belief that they 
are „not musical‟ or fear that they will be harshly judged for their lack of ability to play 
an instrument. 
For Brown and Pavlicevic, the issue of artistic skills is highlighted even more „when 
the client is also a skilled musician, where the therapist needs to monitor that aspiring to 
art form in sessions does not become a defense against clinical engagement, rather in the 
same way as intellectualizing may be a defense in verbal psychotherapy‟.235 
However, if at the centre of a concept of making art resides the idea of making 
something „beautiful‟, for Brown and Pavlicevic the same also needs to be 
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acknowledged in the context of therapy. That aesthetic enquiry has always been imbued 
of the principle that „beauty‟ resides not only within art. Brown and Pavlicevic argue 
(after Kenny) that there are aesthetic ideals to strive for in the development of the human 
being, and that there is an analogy between health and such development. Clinical 
improvisation is a complex musical activity on these terms. It is both a „therapeutic 
event‟ with a „communicative agenda‟ and an event with a „particular aesthetic quality‟. 
They summarize their position as follows: 
 
Clinical improvisation techniques, therefore, enable clients to hear themselves in sound, within the 
context of a musical relationship, and the therapist to assess and work with the clients‟ personal 
difficulties, as seen in their musical being. This relationship is a therapeutic one, rather than a 
purely musical one, although the end product might be heard as artform.
236
 
 
Empirical Research 
Taking as the premise an „intuition‟ that clinical improvisation was different to what 
they termed „music-making‟ improvisation, Brown and Pavlicevic established semi-
experimental conditions under which both types could be explored in the form of two 
different types of improvisation sessions. Central to the research was the way in which 
when organizing the improvisation sessions they identified a „variable‟ in the differing 
roles of the client and the therapist in clinical improvisation, and the roles of the two 
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improvising musicians in music-making improvisation. They write of how they decided 
to question their perception of these two roles: 
 
Our own understanding of the differences between the roles of the therapist and that of music-
maker is that the nature of any healing process suggests a necessary emphasis on the needs of the 
client rather than those of the therapist. We could see the primary aim of therapy as being to bring 
some relief to the client in terms of her or his presenting difficulties. Although the therapist is 
necessarily involved in the therapeutic process and may well be changed in some way by the 
experience, this is not the purpose of the interaction. In contrast, in a music-making improvisation 
there is an assumed equality of focus between the improvisers, with the needs of the shared music 
being the paramount factor rather than the personal needs of the improvising musicians … At this 
point, we felt that only the experience itself could clarify these thoughts and give us some actual 
data to work with, and so we decided to improvise with each other.
237
 
 
 
Brown and Pavlicevic therefore planned to examine the characteristics of the roles in 
relation to each other and separately examine the „recorded content of the sessions for 
any musical differences between them‟. They set up three experimental improvisatory 
sessions, lasting thirty minutes and taking place a week apart. In each session, they 
would take it in turn to experience one of the three roles: therapist, client and 
improvising musician. They did not discuss the sessions during the two-week period, nor 
did they listen to the recordings that were made. They made written notes immediately 
after playing to record their „immediate impressions of the music improvised and our 
personal feelings about each session‟. They describe the structure of the sessions: 
 
In the conventional Nordoff-Robbins approach, we kept verbal interaction to an absolute minimum 
during sessions. Thus once the session began, we simply played music, choosing whatever 
instrument we wanted to play ... We felt it was important at this point to try to clarify whether our 
taking on of a role actually resulted in a difference in the way the musical interaction was 
structured: in other words, is the music in the musical session structured in the same way as the 
music in the therapy session? Does the music sound similar or different? … When we put the 
players in role of therapist/client, we found that we often judged their contributions as 
therapeutically inappropriate. For example, at times the „therapist‟ musically initiated or led the 
improvisation in a dominating way, which did not take the „client‟ into account – it was as though 
the „therapist‟ was putting her own musical satisfaction as a priority and, at times, it also seemed as 
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though the „client‟ had to abandon her music idea for the sake of the „therapist‟s‟ musical idea, 
which again would not appear therapeutically appropriate.
238
 
 
In their summary of the findings, Brown and Pavlicevic compare their experience of 
clinical improvisation in relation to music-making improvisation: 
 
It can be seen that there was much mutuality in the music making improvisation; there were several 
points where our musicianship meant that we moved simultaneously into the same musical 
experience – sometimes with a sense of awe! – and other times where there was a high degree of 
interplay and musical interweaving, with foreground/background alternating very fluidly between 
us. In the therapy improvisations, two modes seemed to predominate: on the one hand, there was a 
strong emphasis on the therapist attending to, and joining the music initiated by the client; at other 
points, there would be divergence between the music of the two players (e.g. in terms of tempo, 
rhythmic pattern, dynamic, mood) where either the therapist introduced and stayed with the 
material which the client resisted joining or else, after a shared moment, when the client returned to 
what she had previously played, neither of which was necessarily appropriate in terms of shared 
music or art form.
239
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It can be seen that Brown and Pavlicevic used an empirical research method in order to 
explore some similar themes in the practice of clinical improvisation to Gracyk, Davies 
and Kania‟s philosophical research method with regard to rock music. Although the 
aims and method of each project were different – one being related to theory, the other 
to practice – both sets of researchers were seeking to establish what lay „at the centre‟ of 
the respective musical practice. For the enquiry into rock music this was to establish 
what was at the centre of an „art form‟ that, in Kania‟s terms, not only meant that it 
deserved the „honorific “work of art”‟, but also that it could be distinguished from 
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classical music.
240
 For Brown and Pavlicevic, this was done to explore what was at the 
centre of clinical improvisation that meant not only that it deserved the „honorific‟ 
therapeutic, but also could be distinguished from „art‟ or music-making improvisation. 
Both sets of researchers achieved their aims through establishing a common theme; in 
the case of rock music the type of performance was central, whereas with clinical 
improvisation the distinction was made along the lines of the roles of the players. How 
can this second distinction enable some understanding of clinical improvisation that lays 
the groundwork for further ontological enquiry? 
Brown and Pavlicevic established that musical „interaction‟ between players was a 
constant in both types of improvising. This was surely to be expected, almost to the 
point of being a truism, and certainly concurs with some of the anecdotal evidence from 
interviews with musicians from the free improvisation movement.
241
 However, in the 
different improvisation sessions undertaken as part of the project, they noticed that the 
interaction took on different forms, for example „leading‟ or „supporting‟. They noticed 
that the type of supporting or leading differed depending on the role of therapist, client 
or player each took. In music-making improvisation, they write, „“Supporting” is 
equivalent to being “in the background musically”, and “leading” is equivalent to being 
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in the foreground.‟242 In clinical improvisation, „to think of supporting as only meaning 
background is not enough. The therapeutic elements of ... [the therapist supporting] 
might require initiative, guiding, helping out – the equivalent to leading in [music-
making improvisation].‟243 Furthermore, such supporting in therapy would be almost 
exclusively the role of the therapist. Indeed, for the therapist to allow the client to 
support him or her in this way could be understood metaphorically as the equivalent of 
the therapist taking time in a psychotherapy session to talk about their own problems. 
This is an example of what in a clinical improvisation would be considered extremely 
„poor practice‟. However, should an uninformed or partially uninformed observer be 
evaluating the improvisation as though the roles of the players were the same, as if they 
were both playing as musicians, such practice would not be considered poor. It might 
even be considered as good, in that both musicians were „supporting‟ each other. 
In all, one of the key findings of the research project was the way in which, in 
clinical improvisation, the roles of the players would generally be distinct, and „there 
was a strong emphasis on the therapist attending to, and joining the music initiated by 
the client‟. However, of even further significance was the way in which it was found that 
in the course of this same „attending to‟ there were times at which the music might 
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diverge, for example „in terms of tempo, rhythmic pattern, dynamic, mood‟. This might 
occur where either „the therapist introduced and stayed with the material which the client 
resisted joining or else, after a shared moment, when the client returned to what she had 
previously played‟. Brown and Pavlicevic continue by commenting that neither of these 
musical scenarios „was necessarily appropriate in terms of shared music or artform‟.244 
They identify a scenario that could, if evaluated on the same grounds of free 
improvisation, be judged as bad or unsuccessful. 
Towards Ontology 
In this chapter, I have taken an aspect of musical ontology – higher-order ontology – 
together with a method – descriptivism – and discussed some of the problems of 
providing a cogent account of what lies „at the centre‟ of a particular musical practice. I 
have also taken „higher-order‟ musical ontology as a domain in which comparative 
theorising can occur. I have used a recent comparative discussion in musical ontology, 
which enquires into the nature of rock music (in relation to classical music), as a model 
upon which to discuss the findings of an empirical research project looking at the nature 
of the clinical improvisation event. In doing so I have found that both the group of 
philosophers and the group of music therapists (i.e. practitioners) asked similar types of 
comparative questions, finding (alighting upon) what I have called common 
denominators as a means to compare like with unlike, or as a way to determine the 
„master concept‟ of a musical tradition. The common denominators were that of 
performance (philosophers) musicians‟ role (practitioners) and evaluation (both groups). 
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Whilst the two groups have sought a different type of outcome – the philosophers to gain 
greater conceptual clarity and the practitioners to gain greater clarity about their practice 
– it would seem that there are areas of conceptual research where the questions raised 
are closely related. Indeed, Kania writes, 
 
One meta-ontological conclusion that I draw from this range of topics in musical ontology is that 
there is no sharp line between philosophical ontology and musicology (broadly construed). Just as 
there is little sense in distinguishing the more abstract scientific writing about Quantum Theory from 
the applied philosophy of science on that topic, musical ontology at higher levels shades into 
musicology. On the other hand, though we are unlikely to confuse musicology and particle physics, as 
we descend to the fundamental ontological levels, despite our talking about quark flavours in one case 
and sound structures in the other, the issues can be the very same.
245
 
 
In all, Brown and Pavlicevic have provided us with a phenomenological description of 
the clinical improvisation event in relation to the „music-making improvisation event‟. 
In doing so, they acknowledge that there are differences in opinion between their 
colleagues regarding the extent to which clinical improvisation is considered the same or 
not the same as art. However, we shall see that within the practice of music therapy at 
large, for some therapists this distinction is not meaningful at the level of improvisation 
for therapy and improvisation for art. 
In Chapter Four, taking this description as a starting point, I will examine the 
practice-based diverse ontology of musicologist Phillip Bohlman. In moving closer 
towards practice, I will begin to examine questions left open in this chapter, namely the 
relationship between improvisation and the musical work. Ultimately, I will show how 
the diversity of ontology not only exists between clinical improvisation and music-
making improvisation, but within clinical improvisation also. 
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PART II 
THE DIVERSITY OF CLINICAL 
IMPROVISATION 
117 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Clinical Improvisation as Process and Product 
Despite their differences, common to all theories and music therapy models discussed 
... is a preoccupation with “the work,” that is, the music as sound-structure. In music 
therapy, much of our analytical effort is spent on “the work” – taping our sessions, 
noting the tiniest structural variations and assigning them grand significance. While 
this may be for good reason (I would not for a moment suggest we stop!), is it possible 
we are neglecting anything in the process? 
ERINN EPP, 2008
246
 
 
In my low periods, I wondered what was the point of creating art. For whom? Are we 
animating God? Are we talking to ourselves? And what was the ultimate goal? To have 
one‟s work caged in art‟s great zoos – the Modern, the Met, the Louvre?… Robert 
[Mapplethorpe] had little patience with these introspective bouts of mine. He never 
seemed to question his artistic drives, and by his example, I understood that what 
matters is the work: the string of words propelled by God becoming a poem, the weave 
of color and graphite scrawled upon the sheet that magnifies His motion. To achieve 
within the work a perfect balance of faith and execution. From this state of mind comes 
a light, life-charged. 
PATTI SMITH, 2010
247
 
 
What is the nature of clinical improvisation? We have already seen that it emerged from 
different ideas about music and how, upon taking a closer look, clinical improvisation 
entails different musical forms, sometimes including pre-composed songs for example. 
The theme of this chapter is a discussion of clinical improvisation in terms of these 
different forms. I argue that it can be conceptualized as a diverse musical practice, a 
practice that can be understood at different times as process and product. 
In the previous chapter, I examined Andrew Kania‟s category of „higher-order‟ 
musical ontology as a method for drawing a distinction between clinical improvisation 
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and art improvisation.
248
 I discussed the application of this type of ontological enquiry to 
rock music, and made a comparison with the empirical research project undertaken by 
Brown and Pavlicevic to explore the clinical improvisation „event‟.249 However, my 
examination of „music‟ was of „music‟ in the most general of terms. This was to 
accommodate within the discussion a contrast between the ontological enquiry pursued 
in the philosophical research considered and the phenomenological enquiry pursued in 
the practice-based music therapy research. This accommodation was necessary because 
within these two enquiries two different assumptions about music can be perceived to be 
„at work‟. 
On the one hand, contained within the ontological enquiry of Kania there is an 
understanding of „music‟ as synonymous with the musical artwork or product. On the 
other hand, contained within the music therapy research project of Brown and Pavlicevic 
there is an understanding of „music‟ as synonymous with „lived-experience‟ or process. I 
will demonstrate that both these paradigms are at work within the music of music 
therapy – clinical improvisation. 
In this chapter, I consider the diverse nature of improvisation and revisit the question 
of what kind of ontological approach will elicit the kind of understanding being sought. 
To this end, I explore the music of clinical improvisation „close up‟. I do this specifically 
in relation to improvisation as a form of music-making that is both distinct from and 
linked to composition. I link the „domain‟ of the musical work with the notion of music 
as product, and the „domain‟ of improvisation with the notion of music as process. I also 
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present the idea that in music therapy and elsewhere these two musical domains may 
sometimes be merged and sometimes distinct in conception. Whilst music therapy as a 
clinical intervention is usually understood in terms of a process, I will propose the view 
that given a certain cultural specificity, a pluralistic understanding of clinical 
improvisation can be evinced whereby it functions at different times, both as a „process‟ 
and as a „product‟. I will show how these different paradigms begin to enable a 
distinction to be drawn between the two approaches of music-centred and 
psychodynamic music therapy. I begin, however, by examining these issues through a 
consideration of improvisation as a concept. We see how, in common with its essential 
characteristic, improvisation as a concept is by no means fixed. 
Improvisation: A Diverse Theory and Practice 
What is meant by the term improvisation in music? Whilst I have already clarified the 
Western perspective of this enquiry, there are places where further reflection upon the 
assumptions being made can provide context, and highlight some of the difficulties 
inherent in any discussion of musical improvisation. Phillip Bohlman, as an 
ethnomusicologist, comments about music in general, and how when we consider it we 
tend to think about it in our own terms, because „any metaphysics of music must 
perforce cordon off the rest of the world from a privileged time and place, a time and 
place thought to be one‟s own‟.250 For Bohlman, we can only think about music from the 
unique place in which we stand in the world and all our thinking is bound, at least to 
some extent, to be relative to that place. In this section, I examine aspects of this 
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relativity and establish some diverse notions of improvisation as a basis for 
understanding improvisation in music therapy. 
Time and Place 
For Bruno Nettl, to even have a concept of, or name for, improvisation as a separate 
musical activity is to indicate a certain cultural specificity. Indeed, on the one hand, he 
presents us with examples that are out of the domain of Western music, where 
improvisation, composition and performance are so merged it is difficult, possibly 
irrelevant even, to make any distinction at all.
251
 On the other hand, he suggests that in 
comparing improvisation within musical traditions „across continents‟, it will be for some 
purposes more apt to examine differing conceptions of „musical works‟, rather than 
improvisation. This is because, ironically, it is sometimes within different localised 
conceptions of „works‟ across different musical cultures that the many variants of what 
constitutes improvisation are to be found. Such examination seems to confirm that, within 
some musical traditions, improvisation is less relevant a concept than in others, and indeed 
is sometimes absent altogether.
252
 Nettl refers, for example, to the music of the American 
Indians: 
 
It is said that they do not improvise, but simply perform their songs in numerous variants arrived at 
by oral tradition. It is sometimes difficult to see why two rather different performances (without 
even the guidance of words) are regarded as variants of the same song, and why two others that 
sound practically alike are taken as separate musical items. We can only conjecture that the 
Indians‟ idea of musical entities is different from ours ... [and] we may then find the concept of 
improvisation [in this music] altogether unnecessary.
253
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An example such as this illustrates Bohlman‟s theoretical vantage point, how 
improvisation in one tradition is the „musical work‟ of another and vice versa.254 
However, this complexity is not only found in relation to our geographical place in the 
world; it is also relative to history and the development of music as an artefact. As Andy 
Hamilton writes, a distinction between improvisation and composition became 
increasingly important with the rise of the „fixed‟ musical work: 
 
The development of Western musical notation, at least until some avant-garde developments in the 
past century, has been one of increasing specification and prescription in the requirements it placed 
upon performers. This process reached its highest point during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and was associated with the increasing hegemony of the work concept. Performers who 
had once had an improvisational freedom now interpreted an essentially fixed work. The 
dichotomy between improvisation and composition lacked its present meaning, or perhaps any 
meaning at all, before this process was well advanced.
255
 
 
Indeed, a reading of the successive editions of Grove’s Dictionary of Music and Musicians 
published since the end of the nineteenth century demonstrates the extent to which 
definitions of improvisation have tended to not only be value-laden, but also varying in 
conception and musical reference points.
256
 Most strikingly, this is with regard to the type of 
musical skill required and by implication the social class of that same musician. 
For example, Maitland writes in 1904 that „extempore‟ playing is „the art of playing 
without premeditation, the conception of music and its rendering being simultaneous. 
The power of playing extempore evinces a very high degree of musical cultivation, as 
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well as the possession of great natural gifts‟.257 This definition is replaced in the editions 
of Grove published in 1927 and 1954, reading: „Extemporization or improvisation is the 
art of thinking and performing music simultaneously. It is therefore the primitive act of 
music-making, existing from the moment that the untutored individual obeys the 
impulse to relieve his feelings by bursting into song.‟258 
A recent definition in Grove, published online in 2001 and authored by Nettl 
himself, once again specifies the relationship between improvisation and the musical 
work. However, the relationship in this definition has become less parochial, and instead 
more fluid and far-reaching. He writes: 
 
[Improvisation is] the creation of a musical work, or the final form of a musical work, as it is being 
performed. It may involve the work‟s immediate composition by its performers, or the elaboration 
or adjustment of an existing framework, or anything in between. To some extent every 
performance involves elements of improvisation, although its degree varies according to period and 
place, and to some extent every improvisation rests on a series of conventions or implicit rules.
259
 
 
These definitions are useful as they further demonstrate not only the fluidity of the 
conception of improvisation, even within the relative cultural specificity of Grove, they 
also point to an underlying diversity of musical paradigm. Whilst these definitions can 
be identified here as significant both with regard to time and place, it is also possible to 
discern some additional understanding of improvisation at work with regard to the value 
in which it is held by a particular group of people or society. 
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Value 
As indicated by both Nettl and Hamilton above, composition and improvisation are 
frequently considered as distinct rather than merged activities. One example is a situation in 
which the centrality of the notated musical work gives meaning to the idea of improvisation. 
Alperson‟s discussion, referred to in Chapter Three, provides a live example of this 
perspective, in that he appears to be addressing a readership for whom improvisation is an 
„unconventional‟ and separate form of music-making, in contrast to the familiar experience 
of listening to or taking part in everyday performances of the repeatable musical work.
260
 
Another example of this „separatist‟ or „improvisation as other‟ perspective can be 
elicited from the following definition, apparently referring to a folk tradition of music. 
Improvisation is where „the untutored individual obeys the impulse to relieve his 
feelings by bursting into song‟.261 Whilst there is a political and hierarchical overtone to 
this description, as though improvisation is a primitive substitute for „real‟ music-
making from musical scores, the description here appears similar to the jazz-related 
practices of free improvisation and clinical improvisation outlined in Chapter One.
262
 It 
could be said that these two perspectives of improvisation, both of which relate closely 
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Free improvisation has also subsequently been driven by politics. For example, Ben Watson writes: 
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to the idea of the musical work, reveal attitudes that are on the one hand conservative – 
seeking to dismiss improvisation as, in Alperson‟s characterisation, a „pale imitation of 
conventional music-making‟ – but on the other hand anticipate the radical, as in Bailey‟s 
pioneering free improvisation that actively sought to disconnect improvisation from 
composition altogether.
263
 Indeed, as Hamilton writes, „the concept of improvisation, in 
its present-day sense, especially in jazz, arose precisely as a reaction to the emergence of 
works; while there is plenty of scope for „playing it again‟ in the way that jazz utilizes 
the standard songs of Tin Pan Alley‟.264 
Thus to summarise this section, improvisation is conceptualized in different times 
and places in different ways. In particular, it can be conceptualized as merged, merely 
linked to or completely separate from composition. In some places, however, it is 
important to note that it is not conceptualized at all. 
Musical Ontology and Improvisation 
How is it possible to account for and understand such a diversity of ideas about 
improvisation? In the next section, I address the question of ontology in relation to 
improvisation. I look at the limits of seeking a single musical ontology for clinical 
improvisation, particularly one that assumes a sole paradigm of musical works or 
product. In doing this, I show how this work paradigm alone, ultimately, cannot account 
for the diversity of musical practice found within clinical improvisation. Instead I 
propose that Bohlman‟s „diverse‟ account of ontologies of music can provide an account 
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of clinical improvisation, one that is embedded in its varied practice; a practice that 
entails both works/products and non-works/processes. 
Work and Non-Work 
In Chapter Two, we saw how an account of musical diversity could be seen as the 
central concern of Andrew Kania‟s project to establish questions of „higher-order 
ontology‟ as distinct from questions of „fundamental ontology‟.265 For Kania, different 
musical forms may indicate a differing musical ontology, an ontology he establishes in 
this particular instance through relating the form of music to its mode of performance: 
public performance, studio performance and „not for performance‟.266 On the other hand, 
one of the limits of „higher-order musical ontology‟ arguably lies in the fact Kania‟s 
discussion is situated firmly within the paradigm of the musical artwork or product.
267
 
As we saw previously, this ontological conception of music as synonymous with 
musical works is central to the critique of higher-order ontology by Lee B. Brown. 
Brown argues that Kania‟s approach assumes a priori that there is always such an 
„artwork‟ and „centre‟ to be found in this or that particular form of music. Taking jazz as 
a case example, Brown demonstrates the way in which on the one hand, the notion of a 
musical work might sometimes elicit an understanding of some of the many forms of 
jazz, but on the other hand, it is a concept foreign to the very way in which jazz comes 
about. Furthermore, he argues the field „is just too rich for there to be any single 
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unifying ontology‟ that will underpin our understanding of jazz performances; no one 
theory can possibly cover all types of practices.
268
 This perspective is not surprising, nor 
difficult to support. The „richness‟ Brown cites can be illustrated by a brief consideration 
of the music of two jazz musicians who have pioneered different traditions in the UK 
and the USA respectively, Keith Tippett and Dave Brubeck.  
In the free piano improvisations of Keith Tippett, what might be considered most 
pertinent is the element of complete freedom and „uniqueness‟ of the musical content of 
each performance. Here, the performance, the activity of improvising the music, is 
integral to the existence of the music that is heard. A recording that might later be 
listened back to on many occasions may subsequently add to the quality of the listener‟s 
experience, but is not a fundamentally necessary part of Tippett‟s improvisation as heard 
in situ. Whilst the recording might, through mechanical means, provide a sense of 
„work‟ or product to the improvisation, it can be argued the „nature‟ of that same 
improvisation lies in its moment-by-moment „happening‟, of its very existence being 
ephemeral.
269
 
Alternatively, the music of Dave Brubeck exists (in part) in the form of titled 
„compositions‟ (Blue Rondo à la Turk on the album Time Out, for example) that 
function to some extent as musical works. Integral to the performance of these 
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compositions, however, are the improvisations of Brubeck‟s Quartet, which intersperse 
the composed tutti sections. For this music, both the work concept, in terms of a 
performable semi-repeatable musical product, and the activity or event of that same 
music in terms of a process, are important to an understanding of the whole. 
Jazz, therefore, as the focus of many discussions in analytic aesthetics, provides a case 
example of the complexity of formulating, step-by-step, an all-encompassing ontological 
account of improvisation. How then is it possible to account for, and understand, the 
evident diversity found in improvisation? Furthermore, is it possible to generalize from 
this account to understand the diversity also inherent in clinical improvisation? As Brown 
comments, if an ontological account „struggles‟ to reflect practice, what is its purpose 
beyond that of creating „mere artefacts of philosophy‟.270 
Towards Diversity 
Brown proposes what he calls a „non-work ontology‟. He shifts the focus of consideration 
from „what is produced‟ as an improvisation, and thus what can be understood as a work, to 
the „activity‟ of improvisation. Put simply, he shifts the focus from improvisation as work to 
improvisation as process. Drawing on the work of Phillip Alperson, he writes: 
 
A competent appreciation of improvised music involves a focus, not simply upon a musical line, but 
also upon the activity of creating it. From this ... [springs] an ontology according to which what is central 
in jazz is not an abstractum that could be instantiated in multiple instances, [as per a musical work] but 
rather the specific act of creating this music, unfolding now, so to say, as one listens.
271
 [Italics in 
original] 
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I have already cited the work of Alperson, who was for some years a solitary researcher 
within analytic aesthetics into the music of improvisation. In his original article 
published in 1984, Alperson proposed a view of improvisation as an „unconventional 
form of music-making‟ operating from the „conventional‟ perspective of a work 
paradigm. Improvisation was accounted for in terms of being where „one individual, 
simultaneously composer and performer, simultaneously creates a musical work‟.272 As I 
have already noted in this chapter, this type of account is unsatisfactory in that it 
privileges a specific kind of music-making, and indeed a particular time and place. It is 
as though within Western music the performance of composed musical works constitutes 
the primary form of music-making, against which, singularly, improvisation is to be 
understood. However, as we have already seen, this assumption does not take into 
account the myriad of ways music comes into existence. Indeed, as Roger Scruton points 
out, the type of assumption being made here is that „composition is the paradigm case, 
and improvisation secondary‟. Scruton continues: „It would be truer to the history of 
music, and true to our deeper musical instincts, to see things the other way round: to see 
composition as born from the writing down of music, and from the subsequent 
transformation of the scribe from recorder to creator of the thing he writes.‟273 
In a recent article, Alperson has developed his perspective, now seeing improvisation 
as occupying a „varied terrain‟. He writes: 
 
When we think of an improvisation, we sometimes have in mind a particular kind of human 
activity: the act of improvising. We may also have in mind a particular product: that which is 
produced in the activity of improvising. So, John Coltrane improvised a performance of “My 
Favorite Things,” and that improvisation is something he produced in his improvisatory activity. 
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There are contexts in which the activity of improvisation takes centre stage and contexts where we 
wish to speak about the product. Clearly, there is an intimate connection between the two, and we 
will want to understand the connection.
274
 
 
Alperson‟s new account allows a different emphasis to emerge regarding the musical 
product and the musical process or activity. It is not a matter of conceptualizing music as 
belonging to one or another domain. Here, both the domains can be „spoken about‟ with 
reference to a performance of the single jazz standard, My Favourite Things. How 
though, as Alperson asks, is the connection between the two domains to be understood? 
Musical Ontologies: Connecting Domains 
We will now look at the work of Phillip Bohlman. He argues that „multiple ontologies of 
music exist at both the individual and local level, as well as the global level‟, meaning that 
we cannot help but be necessarily confronted with more than one ontology at once.
275
 This 
is not in the sense of the „comparative‟ higher-order ontology of Kania, whereby different 
forms of music may be found to be distinct. Instead, Bohlman approaches musical ontology 
the opposite way round. Whilst Kania‟s project entails an analysis, a „looking in‟ on the 
musical product or object in question from the outside to make a comparison with another 
musical object, for Bohlman musical ontology is „interactive‟, resulting from „human 
experience and everyday practice‟.276 We can interpret Bohlman‟s viewpoint as where 
music is already happening in relation to us as subjects, rather than being a fixed object we 
look in on. Whilst each route entails two contrasting „directions‟, (like the way the Paris 
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Metro is arranged) these directions have a dialectical quality to them; they are not set up in 
oppositional terms, but instead in terms of relation. It is along each route that ontologies of 
music are „revealed‟. Bohlman further provides a series of „metaphysical/ontological 
conditions‟ which are characteristic of each route. In particular, he cites the condition of 
music as object and music as process: 
 
The metaphysical condition of music with which we in the West are most familiar is that music is an 
object. As an object, music is bounded, and names can be applied to it that affirms its objective status. As 
an object, moreover, music can assume specific forms, which may be assigned to paper or magnetic tape, 
and language systems can assign names to music and its objective properties. By contrast, music exists in 
the conditions of a process. Because a process is always in flux, it never achieves a fully objective status; it 
is always becoming something else. As a process, music is unbounded and open. Whereas names may be 
assigned to it, they are necessarily incomplete.
277
 
 
The contrast between the „metaphysical/ontological conditions‟ of musical object and 
musical process produces a tension, and Bohlman is inviting us to incorporate the 
tension dialectically as a basis for considering a series of „metaphysical routes‟ along 
which music reveals itself. 
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My Music/Your Music 
Our Music/Their Music 
Music „Out There‟/Music in the Numbers 
Music in Nature/The Naturalness in Music 
Music as Science  
Music as Language/Music Embedded in Language 
Die Musik/Musics 
The Voice of God/The Struggle of the Everyday 
In the Notes/Outside the Notes 
In Time/Outside Time 
Vom Musikalischen Schönen [sic]/On the Unremarkable in Music 
Authentic Sound/Recorded Sound 
In the Body/Beyond the Body 
Figure 1. Bohlman’s Metaphysical Routes 278 
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Two Ontological Routes 
How does Bohlman set out this potentially vast territory of musical ontologies? Taking 
cartography as a metaphor, he „maps‟ thirteen different „metaphysical routes‟ that 
effectively can be seen as „crossing‟ the world of music (Figure 1). Two routes are of 
immediate interest for this enquiry and I shall briefly describe them here. 
Bohlman describes these routes respectively as „my music/your music‟ and „our 
music/their music‟.279 He suggests the potency of what happens to music when it 
becomes „one‟s own‟. Instances of „my music‟ might include „the music one has grown 
up with; the music that has accompanied one through a difficult or especially joyous 
time‟.280 The music that is „my music‟ takes on this particular meaning of ownership. 
For Bohlman, it can also be „my music‟ in that it might relate to others, for example „it 
may be the music ... about which one exhibits special knowledge ... or because it 
contrasts with someone else‟s, with “your music”‟.281 Bohlman demonstrates an instance 
of how „as an attribute of identity, “my music” may result from the production or 
reproduction of music‟.282 However, whilst the identity of „my music‟ is of particular 
importance where „I‟ have created it, in some instances „my music‟ becomes „my music‟ 
simply through special experience of it. This identity with music could be described as 
one premise upon which clinical improvisation is made. For if the music itself does not 
mean something to the client on a specifically personal basis, either in the experience of 
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it or the production, it becomes merely a mechanical method for therapy. This is indeed 
the case in some behavioural and educational approaches to music therapy. Furthermore, 
Bohlman states how „“my music” cannot be “your music”. To make it so would devalue 
it, negating the reasons for possessing it as “my music”.‟283 To engage with music by 
this account, therefore, is to engage with it personally as individual subject; music is not 
to be separated from the subjective experience of it, it is not an experience that can be 
shared, for example, across cultures or generations. 
Whilst a notion of my music/your music can be taken as fundamental to clinical 
improvisation, another „ontological route‟ is also of significance here, that of „our 
music/their music‟.284 Clinical improvisation draws upon the social, or the inter-
subjective, meaning and experience of music-making. This provides a contrasting 
ontology to „my music/your music. As Bohlman writes: 
 
“Our music” is not so much owned as shared and it therefore makes sense that most concepts of 
“our music” (e.g. folk music, traditional music, or national music) stress its reproducibility ... “our 
music” comes into existence within the group; the boundedness of the music accords with the 
boundedness of the group itself, and “our music” even becomes a means of communication for 
knowing and familiarity within the group itself.
285
 
 
The group experience within music therapy, whilst therapeutic, may not represent the 
total sum of individual meaning for a client. I will examine the implication of the 
ontological distinction made here by Bohlman further as part of the conclusion to this 
enquiry, as we finally identify a diverse ontology as existing within notions of 
performance in relation to clinical improvisation. 
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At this point of the enquiry it is sufficient to take an understanding of these two 
routes, „my music/your music‟ and „our music/their music‟ as an illustration of 
Bohlman‟s „routes‟ whereby musical ontology is „yielded‟ by musical practice, 
including the clinical musical practices to be found in music therapy. Both these routes, 
furthermore, raise issues of the distinction Bohlman makes between process and product. 
In the following section, I will initially explore the paradigms of musical process and 
object/product as manifested in the conception and practice of composition, 
improvisation and performance, both within and outside of music therapy practice. 
Process and Product in Clinical Improvisation 
As was described in Chapter One, music therapists in the UK have placed emphasis 
upon the process of the clinical intervention, that the value of music therapy comes from 
a shared experience of the process of live music-making as it occurs over the period of 
time in which the therapy takes place.
286
 However, the notion of process is not the only 
way in which the music of music therapy might be understood, as the musical material 
of clinical improvisation, whilst occurring within a process, can sometimes emerge in 
the form of a musical „product‟. 
In a music therapy group for elderly people suffering from depression and mild 
dementia, for example, the musical contents might typically include the singing of 
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known songs. It might be the case that many of the same songs are sung on a regular 
basis. Here, even though such songs can be described as constituting „mini works‟, that 
is to say, musical products, the experience of the songs in themselves, over time, can be 
considered part of a musical process. This is particularly important given that the 
„rendering‟ of a song in itself can be improvisational; new words, countermelodies, 
rhythms and different forms of accompaniment might all be experimented with and 
developed. This very experimenting with what otherwise might be considered as fixed 
can reflect part of a group process towards greater intimacy. Indeed, songs that gradually 
over time come to be songs sung on a regular basis become an integral part of the 
individual and shared experience of the group.
287
 Furthermore, a song might emerge out 
of a shared improvisation, either a song already known or one that is spontaneously 
„composed‟ out of the improvisation. A chord sequence or rhythm that emerges out of 
music-making that is otherwise free in form and character might accord an 
improvisation with an identity associated with a particular moment within a therapeutic 
process.
288
 Both forms of music – improvisation and composition – can equally be 
considered part of the clinical improvisation process. 
As indicated by Erinn Epp at the head of this chapter, it could be argued, furthermore, 
that in recording the music of their patients for the purpose of listening back and 
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transcribing for clinical analysis, music therapists are in a sense creating musical 
„products‟. One British-trained music therapist, Colin Lee, has taken this practice to an 
extreme, whereby in demonstrating his work he has „performed‟ his transcriptions of the 
musical contents of sessions in public, explicitly as quasi-musical works.
289
 
However, much music resulting from improvisation within music therapy can be 
said to emerge as process. An improvisation within a clinical session might have no 
sense of composition, and no formal beginning or end in terms of conventional 
harmonic/rhythmic features. It might not reflect a progression in the sense of musical 
ideas or motifs being gradually transformed, as it might simply begin and some minutes 
later end. Over time, it might remain music that simply consists of random ideas, motifs 
and gestures. For example, in work with adults who are suffering an acute psychiatric 
disturbance, the musical sounds might be very fleeting; the client might enter the therapy 
room only momentarily and briefly make sounds on the variety of instruments available. 
The therapist might not even have time to respond or take part before the client leaves. 
Alternatively, they might „mirror‟ the client‟s sounds as a way to encourage them to 
stay, or at least let them know that they have been heard. 
Revisiting the Historical Perspective 
What does this diversity mean and how can considering clinical improvisation from this 
perspective of process and product enable a deeper understanding of the two 
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approaches? In the final section of this chapter, I will revisit the historical beginnings of 
clinical improvisation in the UK and further examine the paradigms of process and 
product as existing in the music of music therapy. I demonstrate how the practice of 
each of the two approaches has tended to, but not exclusively, emphasize a music-
making that can be understood as emanating from within a paradigm of either process or 
product. I will show how the notions of musical product and process, whilst inherent 
across the music-making of both approaches, also have a special individual meaning for 
each. 
Paul Nordoff: Improvising Musical Works 
In Chapter Two, I explained the way in which Paul Nordoff‟s practice of clinical 
improvisation developed out of his work as a composer. Indeed, it is possible to discern 
the inventiveness of Nordoff‟s playing both in the recordings of his clinical work with 
Clive Robbins and from the transcriptions of teaching sessions.
290
 In keeping with any 
music of substance, no musical motif was too mundane and all musical ideas afforded 
therapeutic possibilities such as might be contained in the timbre, key and tempo of the 
music, and so on. 
In the early teaching sessions, Nordoff taught improvisation via reference to the 
classical (piano) repertoire rather than in direct reference to his own clinical material.
291
 
It would seem that the source for his technique of clinical improvisation was pre-
composed musical works. Nordoff would cite an aesthetically interesting harmonic 
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progression, gesture, phrase or texture through a series of live examples for piano and 
discuss the music in terms of the needs of the prospective child in music therapy. For 
example, upon illustrating the interval of a minor third in a succession of extracts from 
Schumann, Bach, Chopin and Ravel, he plays the opening of Davidsbündler, opus 6, 
no.9, by Schumann. Nordoff emphasizes the interval relation between B flat and C 
sharp, upon which he comments in the following terms: 
 
That was Schumann‟s starting point and you don‟t know what key you are in. Tonality has 
loosened up and we are in a completely new world of musical experience [from the previous 
illustrations] with the same two notes. This is what you are bringing the children: musical 
experience through the meaningfulness of the intervals you use; the intention with which you use 
them; the activity the intervals set up, both tonal and rhythmic; the moods that can be established 
with them.
292
 
 
Upon examining the published case studies, it is possible to see how (with the support of 
Robbins) he would transform the spontaneous sounds of a child, such as crying, 
laughing, talking, babbling or singing, into an improvisation. He would gradually work 
with whatever sound or sounds a child made, and transform them into structured musical 
ideas that could again be „returned‟ to the child and played with. Subsequently, such 
clinical material could be notated, complete with time and key signatures. For example, 
Nordoff and Robbins describe a case study of music therapy with a child called Anna. 
The transcription of the opening moments of a session demonstrates how Nordoff 
improvises upon her declaration that she is „going to go to school‟. Anna sings/cries out 
on C#
2 
and freely descends an octave via a glissando on the word „school‟. Nordoff 
vocally imitates this leap, transforming it from an octave into a major ninth. His 
experimentation with large intervals and high notes encourages her to sing higher in 
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response. Nordoff now has an overall musical conception out of which he begins to 
create a song, singing in counterpoint to Anna, all the time improvising a lilting 6/8 
metre accompaniment on the piano.
293
 
It is arguable that this way of improvising constitutes a kind of „instant composition‟. 
The compositional element, however, did not have the effect of „fixing‟ the material as 
product, or „closing down‟ the available musical possibilities. Instead, the process of 
spontaneously making the sounds into something was a way of making the music 
personal, making it belong to the child as part of an ongoing process. For example, as 
the therapy progressed, musical material from earlier sessions might be hinted at or 
reintroduced, sometimes by the child and sometimes by the therapist. 
Whilst, as we have already seen, there is a distinction to be made between 
improvisation and composition, there is also a view in relation to Western traditions of 
music that improvisation, composition and performance are inextricably linked and that 
it may be hard to determine improvisation as a standalone concept at all. The view can 
be summarised as follows: where there is composition there is, or has been, a process of 
improvisation, and at least some activity of performance. Where there is improvisation 
there is some kind of composition, for example in the performer‟s shaping and 
development of melodies/motifs, their timing and variation of musical ideas. Where 
there is a performance there is inevitably improvisation, or improvisatory music-making, 
whether or not the performance is of a work or improvisation per se. 
One version of this view has been extensively explored by the philosopher Bruce Ellis 
Benson, who argues that improvisation is integral to both performance and composition; it is 
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the „improvisatory‟ in music and music-making, rather than the fixed, that is 
foregrounded.
294
  He writes, 
 
On my view, both composition and performance are improvisatory in nature, albeit in different 
ways and to differing degrees. Composers never create ex nihilo, but instead “improvise”: 
sometimes on tunes that already exist, but more frequently and importantly on the tradition in 
which they work. Performers – even when performing music that is strictly notated – do not merely 
perform but also “improvise” upon that which they perform.295 
 
Alternatively, Benson argues improvisers, as well as composers, never create ex nihilo: 
 
Sam Rivers or Ornette Coleman [who] may push the boundaries of jazz in many ways ... [are] 
clearly ... not just playing “anything” ... Improvisation (whether in jazz or in eastern genres) is far 
more organized than it might appear. Many of these limitations come from the tradition in which 
they have arisen, in the sense that improvising is based on and can only be understood in light of 
the entire tradition of improvising that has gone on before ... For improvisation is a kind of 
“composition” in the sense of “putting together”.296 
 
In all, Benson‟s phenomenonology of music can be seen as a study of the improvisatory 
in composition, his view being that the process of composition is, in itself, inherently 
improvisatory. This is a process, as he puts it, from „Ursprung to Fassung letzter Hand’, 
that is to say, without clear beginning (when does an improvisation become a 
composition?) or completion (when, if ever, can a composition be declared „fully 
defined and finished‟?).297 On the other hand, given the improvisatory nature of 
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Ibid., pp.66–68. It could be said that the ambiguity of beginnings and ending are key to an 
understanding of the improvisational quality that in this account exists in artworks. Benson discusses 
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composition, improvisation is understood here largely as a „performer‟s‟ music-making, 
reaching across a continuum from composed musical works to free improvisation. 
This view is reflected by practising musicians and composers. For example, in an 
interview on BBC Radio 3 with the composer and free improviser Fred Frith, the 
interviewer Robert Worby opened with the statement, „Cornelius Cardew said that 
improvising was like composing at the speed of light‟. He then posed the following 
question: „Is composing like improvising at a glacial pace?‟ Frith replied, „That‟s one of 
my lines you just stole there! I always say if you are going to call improvising instant 
composition, then you might as well call composition slowed down improvisation, so I 
guess I agree with you, yes, I think increasingly the distinction between the two [forms 
of music], thankfully, is no longer being so stuck.[sic]‟298 
For composers such as Frith, improvisation lies at the heart of the process of 
composition, and as such he incorporates the performer into this same process. The 
performance itself, almost as an improvisation, can be seen as part of the process of 
composition.
299
 
This perspective from musical aesthetics and compositional practice, whereby the 
processes of improvisation and composition are conceptualised as embedded within each 
other, is integral to Nordoff‟s music therapy approach. In Nordoff‟s clinical 
improvisations it is possible to discern a form of music-making closely linked to an idea 
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of free music-making, out of which a musical work or product emerges. Furthermore, it 
can also be seen how such a conception of clinical improvisation, involving both 
composition and improvisation, engenders the pursuit of a coherent musical form in the 
music-making. It is not surprising, therefore, that contemporary music therapists who 
have trained in this music-centred approach, pioneered by Nordoff, have linked their 
work to an idea of the music in music therapy as necessarily having a particular kind of 
aesthetic value, and it is this factor in particular that is constitutive of the notion of the 
music being healing in and of itself.
300
 The music of music-centred music therapy is 
driven by such values, that at the core of the work it is music itself as an art form that, 
simply put, does the work. 
In the next section, we will discover that, from out of the form of free-improvisation 
incorporated into the psychodynamic approach, a different musical aesthetic emerged to 
that of the music-centred approach. Whereas „traditional‟ aesthetic concerns, or what 
Hamilton has called an „aesthetic of perfection‟, could be said to drive the music-making 
in the music-centred approach, we will see that the psychodynamic approach is 
concerned with a different aesthetic, roughly corresponding to Hamilton‟s 
„interpenetrating opposite‟ of an aesthetic of „imperfection‟.301 This aesthetic of 
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 Hamilton makes this distinction in his discussion of Ted Gioia‟s idea of jazz improvisation as an 
„imperfect art‟. In response to the notion of improvisation as a kind of instant composition, discussed 
above, he sets up improvisation as a distinct form of music-making, occupying a „rival‟ aesthetic 
domain to that of composition, complete with different musical aspirations and values. Hamilton asks 
„how could imperfection be an aesthetic value?‟ He takes the Latin derivations of „perfection‟ and 
„imperfection‟, writing that they have a „descriptive sense‟: „perficere means “to do thoroughly, to 
complete, to finish, to work up”; “imperfectus” means “unfinished, incomplete”‟. Hamilton comments, 
„the aesthetics of imperfection finds virtues in improvisation which transcend ... errors in form and 
execution ... these virtues arise precisely because of the „unfinished state of such performances‟. 
However, Hamilton develops the dichotomy further; whilst there are clear thematic distinctions to be 
made between the two domains, such as the distinctions between process and product that we are 
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imperfection, with its emphasis upon freedom and spontaneity over coherence of form, 
provides a useful contrast for the purpose of this discussion, and is certainly descriptive 
of this type of clinical improvisation. However, as emphasized by Hamilton, an aesthetic 
of imperfection still operates in relation to an aesthetic of „perfection‟, which is 
ultimately tied to a notion of „art‟. However, in psychodynamic music therapy, we will 
see how „art‟ is not what ultimately drives the clinical improvisation. Most importantly, 
the music-making of the psychodynamic approach has been driven by a concern with 
what I am calling „the relational‟ in music. 
Alfred Nieman and Free Improvisation 
The other composer-pioneer, Alfred Nieman, did not become a clinician. It is most 
probably for this reason that, with the exception of Mary Priestley‟s account cited in 
Chapter Two, his influence upon clinical improvisation has not been widely considered 
or documented.
302
 Whilst the content of his classes entailed the improvisation of titled 
„pieces‟, for example „fear‟, „going into the forest‟, „the street where I live‟, „ice cream‟ 
and so on, the music was expected to be free from tonal harmonic conventions such as 
cadences and intervals of thirds, fifths or octaves. These improvisations in themselves 
might also be said to have turned out like „instant compositions‟, a sense possibly 
engendered by the added element of the class taking place in a small concert hall and the 
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improvisations gaining the feel of a performance through the presence of listeners and 
the use of a tape recorder. 
However, whilst Nieman was dogmatic in his direction of students with regard to the 
use of atonality, he was equally emphatic about the freedom of the improvisations, the 
exploration through spontaneous music-making of what was truly authentic to each 
individual player in the moment. The musical content was expected to be led by the 
feelings of the player, rather than by a compositional sense of making a musical work. 
Despite Nieman‟s own emphasis upon free improvisation as intrinsically connected 
to art and not just a „function of therapy‟, the influence that he had upon clinical 
improvisation was in the instilling of a musical aesthetic driven by interpersonal 
concerns, rather than necessarily musical ones.
303
 Whereas Nordoff was concerned with 
the tonality and musical forms of the European soundworld of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Nieman‟s teaching of improvisation was firmly rooted in the 
soundworld and values of the twentieth-century musical avant-garde, together with other 
areas of improvisational activity. 
A link is frequently observed between Freud‟s clinical method of free association and 
the procedures and theories of free improvisation in composition, jazz and other art forms 
– in particular the procedures of surrealism and abstract expressionism pioneered in 
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painting and automatic writing.
304
 As Matthew Sansom writes, „the emerging aesthetic 
emphasized the artist‟s capacity for self expression and rejected the supremacy of the 
intellect, carrying forward the well-established ideal that maximum spontaneity would 
express the deepest levels of being‟.305 Indeed, in a way similar to Freud‟s method for the 
recalling and free association of dream material, Nieman encouraged music that flowed 
spontaneously wherever the musical idea „wanted to be taken‟.306 This description echoes 
another definition from the composer Lukas Foss, who writes: 
 
Improvisation is not composition. It relates to composition much in the way a sketch relates to the 
finished work of art. But is not the very element of incompleteness, of the merely intimated, the 
momentarily beheld, the barely experienced what attracts us in the sketch? It is work in progress … 
It is performers‟ music.307 
 
This type of freedom and spontaneity can be understood, therefore, in the context of a 
particular soundworld, that of twentieth-century atonality and the free improvisation 
practices already mentioned. This soundworld was integral to Nieman‟s approach. 
Furthermore, as we have already seen in earlier chapters, whilst he worked alongside 
both Juliette Alvin and the team of Paul Nordoff and Clive Robbins, his musical 
approach was taken up by Mary Priestley. Priestley truly began to develop this form of 
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music-making „into‟ clinical improvisation, where the music came to be understood as 
synonymous with a deep expression of the unconscious self. The task of the music 
therapist was to make music in relation to whatever sounds the client made. One of her 
many vivid case examples can illustrate this: 
 
I saw a 46-year-old widow with three children, Mrs G., who had a history of depression. She spoke 
curiously cheerfully about the rather gloomy facts of her life and I had the feeling that the words 
were like a dry crust covering something else ... Mrs G sat in front of the chime bars and a tray of 
white sand beside a bowl of shells while I sat by the xylophone and cymbal. Immediately out came 
the chaotic, aggressive inner music. She viciously hit a chime bar, I replied on the cymbal while 
she stabbed the sand with a shell. She played two more notes, banging in between two chime bars, 
and then hit the existing shell in placing another near to it while I replied on the xylophone ... [this] 
clearly revealed the hidden layer of savage music which was only connected to her conscious life 
through the depression, otherwise she was not in touch with it at all.
308
 
 
One can only imagine the type of sounds that emanated from this painful moment of 
musical self-disclosure in therapy. From Priestley‟s description, the music-making can 
be understood in terms of a free improvisation that is entirely focussed upon the 
relationship with the patient. The music therapist responds not to form the music into a 
coherent improvisation that might be of aesthetic interest, but instead she follows the 
musical expression of the client wherever it goes. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored many issues inherent in conceptualizing improvisation in 
general, in terms of the musical paradigms of product or process. I have shown that to 
approach improvisation, including clinical improvisation, in terms of its relationship to a 
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musical product or work, is in some instances to undermine, culturally appropriate or 
misunderstand the meaning of its improvised nature. For Brown, the very ephemeral and 
multifarious nature of improvisation creates a problem in formulating a single ontology 
that specifies what „kind of thing this music centrally is‟.309 Furthermore, taking jazz as 
an example, ultimately the primary focus of improvisation can be said to reside in its 
performance, and as such arguably in the lived process of music-making, rather than the 
fixed product. On the other hand, we have also seen in this chapter how there are 
plentiful examples of improvisation (including jazz) that tend towards a fixed product, 
even where aspects of its „repeatability‟ might be in question. 
We have seen in Benson‟s account how it is possible to conceptualize composed 
music on a continuum and in relation to improvisation. For Benson, with the exception 
of electronic music that is pre-recorded in a studio, the notion of the improvisatory is to 
be found in even the most fixed work and its attendant processes.
310
 On the other hand, 
we have seen how for some performers and composers, particularly from the tradition of 
free improvisation that I have outlined, improvisation is a form of music-making, the 
sole purpose of which is for it not to be repeatable in the sense of composition. 
The conception I have presented of clinical improvisation can be seen as 
encompassing this multifarious tradition of music, and I have shown how this diversity 
can be initially understood through revisiting the work of Paul Nordoff and Alfred 
Nieman. Through an examination of their approaches a new distinction can be made, as 
clinical improvisation emanating from Nordoff‟s approach can be understood in the 
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sense of improvisation, which „tends towards‟ the idea of a musical work. This is 
improvisation that either arises out of, or forms the basis of, what may be identified as, 
or repeated as, a „musical work‟. On the other hand, I have also indicated how clinical 
improvisation emanating from Nieman‟s approach might be completely free and follow 
both the musical and interpersonal/emotional intuitiveness of the therapist‟s 
understanding of the client, or group of clients. 
Given the issues inherent in establishing a musical ontology/higher-order ontology 
outlined by Brown, together with his notion of improvisation in terms of a non-work 
ontology that emphasises the activity of the music-making, what kind of ontology will 
encompass clinical improvisation as a single concept? 
In this chapter, I have shown the need for an account that can also incorporate a 
consideration of improvisation that tends towards a musical work or product, together 
with one that emphasizes process. I have also identified a further complexity in the need 
for clinical improvisation to be considered as a process in itself, whether or not the 
actual music is pre-composed or improvised. To this end, I have cited Bohlman‟s 
multiple ontologies as a basis from which to describe and understand the musical 
diversity to be found within music therapy, where in Bohlman‟s account the paradigms 
of process and product are incorporated as „conditions‟ of the metaphysical/ontological 
routes he describes (Figure 1). That is to say, music does not exist singularly as process 
or product. Instead, as has been the overriding theme of this chapter, within the same 
music, in this case clinical improvisation, both paradigms may provide a perspective. 
In Chapter Five, I will explore clinical improvisation in more detail, and in taking 
the model of Bohlman‟s route we will find there is an ontological distinction to be made 
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within the music of music therapy itself. We will begin to establish that clinical 
improvisation is not one form of music for which there can be a single ontological 
understanding. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Two Approaches: The ‘Aesthetic’ and the ‘Relational’ in 
Clinical Improvisation 
 
Music assumes many different ontologies when it becomes one‟s own. 
PHILLIP BOHLMAN, 1999
311
 
 
 
What is the difference between the two clinical improvisation approaches, 
psychodynamic and music-centred? We have now established an understanding of 
clinical improvisation as a diverse musical activity encompassing paradigms of process 
and product. We saw how this diversity of paradigm was common to both approaches. 
In the previous two chapters, the nature of clinical improvisation was thus explored 
and considered in relation to art improvisation and as a phenomenon in its own right, 
together with some of the issues inherent in that exploration. 
In the previous chapter, I revisited the historical beginnings of clinical improvisation 
and saw how a diverse musical aesthetic has developed in the music-making of 
contemporary music therapists, meaning the impetus that drives the „direction‟ of the 
musical clinical decision-making is different in each approach. In one, the direction of 
the therapist‟s musical clinical decision-making can be seen as „leading towards‟ the 
notion of composition or „aesthetic wholeness‟ (music-centred), and in the other the 
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direction can be seen as leading towards the notion of freedom and spontaneity or 
„relationship‟ (psychodynamic). I use the metaphor of „leading towards‟ and the notion 
of „musical direction‟ to account for the performative improvisational nature of the 
music of both approaches, music that may or may not sound radically different as 
dependent upon the two approaches. In this chapter, I move away from a specific 
consideration of the music in terms of influences and soundworld towards an 
examination of what the music therapist does and how they consider that same musicIt 
will be seen that these two approaches are not simply two different perspectives of 
therapeutic practice in general, but that the music-making arising out of each approach 
occupies what can be seen as distinct ontological domains. What questions are necessary 
to gain access to these domains and how will the distinction be made? To this end, I 
revisit the work of Kania and Bohlman and demonstrate how, despite their different 
theories, their work enables us to pose questions of comparative ontology. Ultimately, in 
this chapter I reframe the central question posed by Kania and ask, „what is at the centre 
of each approach to clinical improvisation?‟ 
Linking Two Accounts of Ontology 
Thus far in this enquiry we have considered two different accounts of music ontology, 
those by Andrew Kania and Phillip Bohlman respectively.
312
 There is a sense in which 
each account originates from different theoretical traditions and disciplines, and in some 
respects they might be considered irreconcilable. However, as we have seen, both 
theorists provide important methodological perspectives on which to draw and as a way 
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to frame the central arguments of this enquiry. I shall briefly examine here the 
differences between these two theories of musical ontology and present the way in 
which they will be employed in the second half of the enquiry. 
Kania‟s „higher-order ontology‟ addresses the diversity to be found between 
different traditions of music-making and the „growing interest‟ within analytical 
aesthetics to understand music outside of the Western musical canon.
313
 He is 
concerned with establishing the ontology of specific traditions of music, put simply, on 
the grounds that different traditions of music raise different issues. 
Bohlman‟s starting point is that there is no single ontological position to argue for 
from which a tradition of music might be understood. His aim is not to establish „the‟ 
ontology of this or that „music‟, as is the case with Kania‟s approach; instead he seeks to 
realize an account that metaphorically „maps‟ some of the many „routes‟ of meaning, 
routes that we may (or may not) be confronted with as we encounter, in his terms, the 
lived experience of music.
314
 
However, these two accounts not only assume different points of departure, they 
perform different functions. Kania‟s concern lies with the making of ontological 
distinctions, in particular in the service of providing a basis upon which to make 
appropriate value judgements. Bohlman is not concerned with making comparisons 
between different traditions of music; he is concerned with how „the everyday 
experiences of music yield ontologies of music‟.315 Rather than being concerned with 
how ontology might deepen our understanding of music, as Kania presents his project, 
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Bohlman‟s perspective can be expressed the other way round; he is concerned with how 
musical practice deepens an understanding of ontology.
316
 Both, however, provide a 
kind of thematic analysis from which to view and investigate this or that musical form. 
To summarize, therefore, both theorists ask different types of questions, both of 
which will serve to illuminate the core question of this enquiry, namely, what is the 
music of music therapy? Kania poses the question of what is at the centre of a form of 
music, or, after Theodore Gracyk, „what is the primary focus of critical attention?‟317 
Bohlman poses the broader question of where does the ontology of, in this instance, 
clinical improvisation arise?
318
 
We can now reframe these two questions as follows: First, what, is at the centre of 
one approach to clinical improvisation to distinguish it from another approach? Second, 
where does this ontological distinction arise? 
For the remainder of this chapter, I explore the first question: what is at the centre of 
clinical improvisation? I examine how this „centre‟ varies across the two different 
approaches through a consideration of the musical forms and structures of clinical 
improvisation (Figure 2). In Part Three of the enquiry, I show how distinct ontological 
domains emerge in the music therapy literature, initially through a consideration of 
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emotion and meaning in clinical improvisation (Chapter Six) and finally, through a 
consideration of musical performance (Chapter Seven). 
155 
 
 
Figure 2: A Continuum of Musical Forms and Structures 
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A Continuum of Musical Forms and Structures 
I now move away from thinking in terms of specific soundworlds and musical influences 
and towards the type of clinical musical decisions therapists make in their clinical work. 
This is because in recent years the diversity of approach is not necessarily accounted for 
by specific soundworlds. Indeed, to make a broad statement, as music has inevitably 
changed since the 1960s–1970s and the requirement that music therapists have a 
classical training has been relinquished, together with an increase in the digital 
availability and influences of non-Western music, so has the soundworld changed in 
music therapy. Within an individual music therapy session, the clinical improvisation 
might take many different characteristics. In the way that Bailey describes free 
improvisation in Chapter Two, the musical forms of clinical improvisation can be 
thought of as encompassing as many styles and influences as there are therapists.
319
 
There is no single music therapy sound. Instead, it can be best represented not in terms 
of a particular musical form, style or soundworld, but as a continuum (Figure 2) ranging 
from tightly defined musical structures to complete free improvisation. 
As I have written about elsewhere, such a continuum indicates the potential contents 
of any single session or series of sessions with a group or individual.
320
 It is possible, for 
example, to work with a group and for some members to wish to sing or play pre-
composed music, such as a „rock‟ song, and others to improvise playing percussion 
instruments freely. The role of the therapist is to make decisions regarding what music 
might be played in any one moment. This is not simply a matter of musical choice, it is 
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also a therapeutic choice. Whilst the therapist effectively decides which musical 
direction to take in any one moment, the decision is also based upon the felt relationship 
with the client. In a group setting, the therapist will be making a combination of 
musical/interpersonal decisions instantaneously when deciding for instance whose music 
to follow. They might follow the (tonal) harmonious singing of one client, or the chaotic 
piano playing of another, and at the same time find a way to play so to make sense of 
both. Furthermore, the continuum (Figure 2) provides a way of considering the variety 
of musical forms within a music therapy session by placing an emphasis upon musical 
structure. Some clients at any one time might have a greater or lesser need for musical 
„help‟. This can be reflected through the amount of structure the therapist decides to give 
to the music. The continuum (Figure 2) may also chart some examples of therapeutic 
process; for some clients, gradually becoming able to „tolerate‟ a musical freedom where 
they take the major portion of responsibility for the musical ideas might indicate one 
kind of progress towards health. On the other hand, for another client to be able to 
tolerate the structured music-making or singing/playing a known song, where previously 
they were unable to take part except in a chaotic and highly individual way, indicates 
another kind of progress. 
In all, the continuum (Figure 2) can be seen to represent the musical territory of 
clinical improvisation that is indeed valid for both approaches. I will now examine the 
type of thinking within psychodynamic music therapy practice that I am specifying in 
terms of „the relational‟. This will begin to establish a basis for making an ontological 
distinction between the two approaches, a distinction that will continue into the 
following section of this chapter where I will examine the idea of „aesthetic wholeness‟ 
158 
as being „at the centre‟ of music-centred music therapy. 
The ‘Relational’ in Psychodynamic Clinical Improvisation: The Thinking of the 
Therapist 
How each music therapist thinks about the musical dilemmas that arise in clinical work 
can indicate much about their individual approach. I have written elsewhere about the 
dilemmas music therapists sometimes face where a client‟s preferred music is composed 
music they already know.
321
 For such clients, free improvisation can seem like a strange 
activity, more like making noise than making music. However, in contrast, to make 
familiar music in a session is not necessarily a positive experience. To make music that is 
already known, usually in the form of a song, can sometimes feel restrictive. For example, 
the sense of the music being „right‟ or „wrong‟ can creep in, and indeed sometimes clients 
can express concern about their perceived lack of „musical skill‟. The therapist, as 
suggested above, has to make „dynamic‟ decisions in relation to individual and/or group 
members as to the extent of musical structure (or known musical product) and the extent 
of musical freedom. Within a music therapy session, there are two parallel forms of 
improvisation taking place. On the one hand, there is the musical activity, which may be to 
a greater or lesser extent improvised and free. On the other hand, there is the improvisation 
that takes place in the music and in the thinking of the therapist. 
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The Psychodynamic Approach and ‘Unconscious Relating’ 
The Jungian analyst and music therapist Averil Williams has described clinical 
improvisation in terms of a kind of „acoustic dreaming‟, the „dreaming‟ that in 
psychoanalytic terms is understood as derived from our unconscious whether we are 
awake or asleep.
322
 Taking this understanding further, like our ordinary dreaming, the 
improvised music in therapy often finds its own form over the course of a session. By 
definition, the content, outcome or length of an improvisation cannot be predicted; it 
may end gradually or suddenly, it may feel full of life and feeling or it may feel empty 
and flat. To each individual the music may feel „expressive‟ and full of meaning, and 
some clients may want to talk about it. Alternatively, they may feel disconnected from it, 
or may they want to disconnect from it, preferring to forget about it altogether. The task 
of the therapist, then, is to facilitate this „acoustic dreaming‟ in such a way that feels 
meaningful and safe for the client. Such an understanding as outlined here suggests a 
psychodynamic approach to the work, whereby this highly intuitive aspect of the 
therapist‟s skill necessitates a particular „attunement‟ in the therapist to their own 
unconscious world, and to the unconscious inter-subjective relating that is taking place 
between them and their clients. In psychoanalysis, this relating is understood in terms of 
transference and countertransference. 
Transference is „the process by which a patient displaces on to his analyst feelings, 
ideas ... which derive from previous figures in his life ... by which he relates to his 
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analyst as though he were some former [significant person] in his life‟.323 The concept 
originally developed out of Freud‟s realization that his patients were „resistant‟ to the 
interpretations he made of their thoughts and feelings. However motivated or intelligent 
his patients were, they seemed to develop an attitude towards him which could only be 
likened to falling in love (erotic transference) or the converse, a „hostile‟ withholding of 
themselves (negative transference). Freud realised that such feelings constituted „a 
repetition‟ of an earlier relationship and as such were the „best tool, by whose help the 
most secret compartments of mental life ... [could] be opened‟.324 
Countertransference refers to the analyst‟s „emotional attitude towards (the) 
patient‟.325 The concept, whilst known to Freud, is generally regarded as being first 
formulated by Paula Heimann, who described it as „an instrument of research into the 
patient‟s unconscious‟ and explicitly used the term to „cover all the feelings which the 
analyst experiences towards his patient‟.326 Heimann stressed that [psychoanalysis] „is a 
relationship between two persons‟ and for this reason the therapist‟s own analysis was 
crucial. [Italics in original]
327
 She qualified this statement by explaining that „the aim of 
the analyst‟s own analysis, from this point of view, is not to turn him into a mechanical 
brain which can produce interpretations on the basis of a purely intellectual procedure, 
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but to enable him to sustain the feelings which are stirred in him, as opposed to 
discharging them (as does the patient), in order to subordinate them to the analytic task 
in which he functions as the patient‟s mirror reflection‟. [Italics in original]328 To 
achieve this, for Heimann, the analyst needed „a freely aroused emotional sensibility so 
as to follow the patient‟s emotional movements and unconscious phantasies‟.329 It was 
not enough to listen freely to the patient to gain access to their unconscious world; the 
analyst had also to engage on an emotional level, to be able to use their experience of 
feelings in relation to the patient. The analyst‟s feelings are understood here as a 
significant pointer to the patient‟s unconscious processes and as a guide towards a fuller 
understanding of the psychodynamics of the therapeutic relationship. 
Psychodynamic music therapy has absorbed the concept of transference and 
countertransference to the extent that as unconscious processes of relating they can be 
said to manifest in music also. Helen Odell-Miller writes of the intense experience of 
„here and now‟ provided in a music therapy session where „interactions are played out 
often within improvisations‟. Her definition of musical countertransference is where: 
 
As the therapist you realise that you are playing in a certain way in response to the patient, which 
previously you had been unaware (or unconscious) of. You then are able subsequently to make use 
of this musical experience. This would be by consciously altering your musical style; and/or after 
the music has finished, making a verbal interpretation during discussion. This interpretation helps 
the patient understand how they may have influenced your response.
330
 
 
Elaine Streeter provides a detailed musical analysis of two improvisations with a patient 
as a way of analysing the emerging process of the transference. Of one improvisation 
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she writes the following: „By the time the therapist pianist realized she had taken the 
lead ... the client‟s input had become a shadow in the background, then the music 
stopped. An obstacle appeared to have been put in the way of the life of this music. It 
had lost direction. There was an awkward pause.‟331 For the therapist, the question arises 
here of what is the felt quality of this shared music-making? Such a question is based 
upon an understanding, expressed in the work of both Streeter and Odell-Miller, that 
manifested through the experience of making the music are the interpersonal dynamics 
of conscious and unconscious between client and therapist. 
Not surprisingly, similarly to the psychoanalytic traditions of verbal psychotherapy, 
within psychodynamic music therapy the music therapist is also required to undergo 
their own therapy to learn about their own emotional life as experienced within 
therapeutic work through the phenomena of transference and countertransference.
332
 
Furthermore, as indicated within psychoanalysis, it is not enough simply to listen and 
respond to the client in the music-making. There needs to be an emotional reciprocity on 
the part of the therapist also. 
The musical decision-making that I am describing as central to the task of clinical 
improvisation in the psychodynamic approach, therefore, entails an emotional 
involvement with the client through the joint processes of the music and emotional 
thinking of the therapist. This process, I want to emphasize, is also a type of 
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improvisation, albeit a non-musical improvisation. The music therapist and client(s) may 
begin a music therapy session from week to week without knowing what music will be 
played, or the extent to which it will be improvised or not improvised. They may not 
know whether they will be freely making sounds, creating songs or playing/singing 
composed musical material that has been heard and/or played before, or a mixture of all 
of these. 
We have now seen that at the „centre‟ of the psychodynamic approach is the notion 
of unconscious relating in music. This notion of relating is what drives the aesthetic 
direction of the music-making involving the therapist‟s thinking, listening and their 
emotional experience of the client in the room. Therefore, decisions about the direction 
the music-making takes, for example to vary a motif or not to vary a motif, are informed 
by relational concerns. For example, the therapist might play very quietly without 
variation, and for long periods, in response to a silent client. The moment when the 
therapist decides that it is time for the music to stop is not determined by an intuitive 
sense of musical balance, for example, but by the needs of the client. That is to say, the 
therapist foregrounds in the improvisation the relational concerns of the therapy rather 
than the aesthetic concerns of the therapist as musician. In the next section of the 
chapter, I am going to contrast the notion of the relational as being at the centre of 
clinical improvisation in the psychodynamic approach with the notion of „aesthetic 
wholeness‟ as being at the centre of clinical improvisation in the music-centred 
approach. 
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The Music-Centred Approach and ‘Aesthetic Wholeness’ 
The core question of this enquiry, as we have already seen, is ontological in nature. Of 
key importance is the distinction to be made between the two approaches, a distinction 
that can illuminate many aspects of ontology. Throughout the enquiry, I consider this 
distinction in terms of the way the „nature‟ of music appears to be understood within the 
context of the practice of music therapy. In Chapter Three, I described the problem at the 
heart of this enquiry, that the nature of clinical improvisation was ambiguous. I then 
outlined what I described as a pre-theoretical intuition based upon experiences of 
improvising with professional music therapy colleagues. This intuition contained the 
notion that there was a distinction to be made between clinical improvisation and art 
improvisation. In Brown and Pavlicevic, we saw that amongst their own music therapy 
colleagues there was a „continuum of views‟ about clinical improvisation, ranging from 
the clinical-musical relationship considered as different to a purely musical one, to it 
being the same.
333
 
In this section, I will examine some of the ways in which it is apparent that the music 
of music-centred music therapy, as manifested in clinical improvisation, is understood as 
no different to the music of other forms of music-making; that is to say, art 
improvisation. We will see how this idea transpires in the work of Gary Ansdell, and 
then how a technique for musical analysis, in the work of Colin Lee, raises the question 
of how can we understand the music of therapy simply through considering it as music? 
I will then refer to the work of the American music therapist Kenneth Aigen, whose 
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notion of there being „continuity‟ between clinical improvisation in music therapy and 
improvisation in art elucidates the perspective of a unified concept of music. Finally, I 
will consider the work of therapists for whom „aesthetic wholeness‟ is at the centre of a 
music-centred approach to clinical improvisation. This prepares the way for Chapter Six, 
where we will see the way in which the distinction between the aesthetic and the 
relational can be further examined through Hanslick‟s formalist theory of music and 
emotion. 
Music as a Unified Concept in Music-Centred Music Therapy 
Whilst there is a constant search within music therapy for a theory that will make sense 
of music-making as a therapeutic activity, whether it be a form of music-centred or 
psychodynamic practice, it is striking from a consideration of the music therapy 
literature how little enquiry there is that is specifically concerned with the nature of the 
music itself.
334
 This is exemplified throughout the literature of music therapy, not only in 
the UK but also worldwide, as practitioners have sought to develop accounts of the 
work, accounts that tend to emphasize either the therapeutic relationship as being of 
central importance or the music itself as a medium.
335
 
Leslie Bunt presents this distinction as existing along a continuum whereby „each 
therapist‟s position … is influenced by training, personal philosophy, and therapeutic 
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orientation‟.336 However, significantly, Bunt‟s continuum can be seen as based upon the 
assumption of a single understanding of the nature of music at work within the practice 
of clinical improvisation. Is this because, unlike, say, fine artists, who constantly 
question the nature of their practice, music therapists tend to be musicians for whom the 
nature of the music itself is not considered important, and can be taken as read? 
Indeed, music therapist Brynjulf Stige demonstrates how the notion of „music‟ tends 
to lie unexamined. Discussing the work of Gary Ansdell, Stige comments, „when ... 
[Ansdell] uses concepts such as “the fact of the musical experience”, and argues that 
music therapy works the way music works [sic] ... [Ansdell] seems to presuppose that 
music is one thing‟.337 
Stige is identifying an assumption within the literature whereby it is taken as read 
that, in itself, „the music‟ is self-explanatory; no further investigation is needed. Instead, 
however, there is a different type of exploration of the music in music therapy prevalent 
within the literature. This exploration is concerned with the perceived neglect of the 
consideration of „the music‟ as an art form in clinical practice, the specifically musical 
product or process as opposed to the specifically therapeutic concerns of, for instance, a 
particular case study. 
To some extent, this view is at the heart of a critique of music-centred approaches of 
psychodynamic thinking in the music therapy relationship. Where can such a belief be seen 
to operate? I will now look at the work of two authors, Gary Ansdell and Colin Lee, as both 
have considered the music of music therapy from the perspective of musicology. 
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Musicology: Putting Music at the Centre of Clinical Improvisation 
Ansdell questions the absence of musicology in the music therapy literature. He writes: 
 
I ... find it odd (and possibly worrying) that one can search in vain through much of the music 
therapy literature for reference to (let alone use of) the latest ideas and theories of musicologists. 
Equally, in music therapists‟ presentations it is rare that speakers include any critical thought about 
music itself as part of their theoretical elaborations of clinical work ... What if speech therapists 
were to exclude linguistics, or physiotherapists anatomy, from their list of foundational or 
interdisciplinary fields? [Italics in original]
338
 
 
Ansdell‟s rhetorical question suggests that knowledge of music therapy can be grounded 
in the literature of „musicology‟ in the way that physiotherapy or speech therapy can be 
grounded respectively in anatomy or linguistics. In keeping with this analogy, it might 
be more accurate to say that musicology can deepen knowledge of the medium of 
treatment in music therapy rather than the body of knowledge that is concerned with 
what is being treated. For example, in relation to music as a therapeutic treatment, music 
psychology would seem to be a more fundamental discipline than musicology, and 
developmental psychology and abnormal psychopathology still more fundamental. 
On the one hand, whilst speech therapy treats communication, and physiotherapy 
treats movement, the question is raised of whether music therapy treats music. This 
almost sounds nonsensical, but later in this chapter this very idea will be seen to have 
been incorporated into the project of some recent music-centred music therapists.
339
 On 
the other hand, Ansdell‟s analogy with physiotherapy and speech therapy demonstrates 
his own position with regard to the role of specific musical knowledge as fundamental to 
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the practically orientated discipline of music therapy. 
What does Ansdell mean by his well-known assertion, cited by Stige, that „music 
therapy works in the way music itself works, and “its results” are essentially of the 
same kind as music achieves for all of us‟?340 Here, Ansdell is building an account of 
music-centred music therapy. In keeping with Stige‟s analysis, for Ansdell there is in 
relation to music therapy one kind of music. Whilst Ansdell does not discuss this in 
terms of an ontological position, he does provide some clarification. He writes that 
„most therapists would rather have ... [clinical improvisation] seen as a special form of 
music-making than a musical form of clinical therapy, answerable to another 
system‟.341 The music in therapy, which Ansdell refers to, is the same music without 
any distinction, ontological or otherwise, which occurs outside of music therapy. This 
music, furthermore, is the same as us, [as human beings] as „like to like‟.342 Ansdell 
explains: „We make and experience music because we have bodies which have pulses 
and tone, tensions and resolutions, phrasing of actions, bursts of intensity, repetitions 
and developments.‟343 
This concept of music as derived from the bodily self is illustrated in a case study. 
He describes a „drop-in‟ group, which took place as part of a counselling service in the 
crypt of a church in central London, and explains how he carried out his work: 
 
I gave a simple instruction to the whole group every time a new person joined – that listening was 
as, if not more important than playing, and that you did not need to play all the time. I also said that 
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we were building the music together – that it was less a chance for „self-expression‟ in the way we 
tend to think of this, but to imagine that music was almost playing us. [Italics added]
344
 
 
Ansdell‟s focus in this work is the music itself, never an interpretation of musical 
meaning. Any discussion about the improvisations within these sessions was directed to 
the features of the music that emerged.
345
 This illustrates how for Ansdell the music 
itself is healing, as the act of a group listening to each other in the creation of an 
improvisation in itself enables a sense of feeling accepted and valued. 
The Problem of Musical Analysis as Therapeutic Analysis 
The work of Colin Lee, who like Ansdell trained with Clive Robbins, provides another 
example from the perspective of musicology as a „unified concept of music‟ emerging 
from his consideration of clinical improvisation. In this instance, Lee has examined the 
possibilities afforded by the transcription and musical analysis of clinical improvisation. 
He compares, for example, „the musical and therapeutic elements of a composition by 
Lutoslawski with a piece of therapeutic improvisation by a client from the London 
Lighthouse‟. He writes: „Many questions came to the fore, not least the realisation that if 
through this small study so many questions could be raised about both music and 
therapy, then there must be that much more to be learnt from studies of, say, a late 
Beethoven string quartet or a Mozart symphony.‟346 
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Whilst Lee does not specify what he means in his reference to the „therapeutic 
elements of a composition by Lutoslawski‟, his supposition that there is „much more to 
be learnt‟ about clinical improvisation from the music, for instance, of Mozart or 
Beethoven, is pivotal to this enquiry as a whole. The question is raised, however, of on 
what basis is it possible to learn about the music of music therapy from the autonomous 
nature of Western art music? 
The assumption of a unified concept of music that is central to this section of the 
chapter can be identified here. To understand Lee‟s question is to realize that his 
conception of the music of music therapy is that it is no different to art music. To use 
Bohlman‟s metaphor, Lee is working from an assumption that the two kinds of music-
making, „musical‟ and „therapeutic‟, are on the same ontological routes, traversing the 
same territory. 
From the musical scores of Beethoven or Mozart, therefore, it is possible to learn 
about the „compositional‟ processes that emerge in music therapy, in the same way that a 
composer might learn through musical analysis. For Lee, therefore, there is no 
separation to be made between the therapeutic process of music therapy and the 
compositional process of art music; they are one and the same. 
A further question is raised, however, namely what has it been possible for Lee to 
learn about (using his terms) „therapeutic composition‟ from a study of „musical 
composition?‟ On one level, the matter is simply one of expanding the tonal range and 
soundworld of his personal method of clinical improvisation. Lee writes about how he 
undertook this as he might as a composer: 
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The large majority of [Nordoff-Robbins] music therapy improvisation is tonally based ... I [have] 
tackled this by applying the techniques of acquiring musical resources suggested by Nordoff and 
Robbins ... to present-day composers. In adapting this approach to the music of such composers as 
Boulez and Birtwistle, and through practice and experience in sessions, my feeling for a balance 
between tonality and atonality began to develop.
347
 
 
 
Lee takes this perspective further through his development of a procedure for the 
transcription and analysis of the musical contents of sessions.
348
 He justifies his 
approach in the following terms: 
 
The justification for such a partial analysis of the work with the same individual was that it 
permitted me to compare two strongly contrasting improvisations from different sessions ... While 
it is not my intention to draw in depth [sic] subjective conclusions or parallels, many value 
judgements with regard to the growth of therapeutic process through analysis, were deduced.
349
 
 
 
Lee‟s analysis of this piece of clinical work as evidenced here is detailed and 
meticulous. However, it is hard to draw the meaning from it that Lee intends, beyond 
that of a useful description of the musical contents of a session. For example, he 
comments upon a particular passage from a session: 
 
In examining the rhythmic interplay we see subtle nuances with regard to the musical dialogue. In 
bar 49 S [the client] again takes the accompanying role but in bar 50 he imposes a definite triplet 
rhythmic motive, regardless of the therapist‟s musical content which remains in duple time. This 
shows an advanced stage in the therapeutic relationship where both parties are able to be mutually 
responsive whilst strongly defending their own musical predispositions.
350
 
 
 
Whilst Lee is commenting upon the specifically musical material from this moment in a 
session, it is not possible to learn anything new about the therapy from the analytic 
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procedure employed. The musical analysis, whilst highlighting occurrences and the 
repeats of those occurrences, in and of itself demands interpretation from the perspective 
of the therapeutic context for meaning to be construed. Indeed, even where Lee is most 
technical, for example in his pitch analysis of another section of improvisation through 
„integer notation‟, beyond a detailed description his conclusion is made through an 
interpretation of the therapeutic parallels to be found in the music rather than building 
specific musical meaning. However, he is obviously aware of this issue, writing that „it 
could be argued that this form of analysis is too detailed to be effective in identifying 
therapeutic parallels. What it does elucidate is the complex, possibly subconscious, 
musical correlations of tones that in essence go into the construction and timbre of a 
particular juncture within the improvisation.‟351 
 There is a further problem with Lee‟s approach. This is with regard to the intention 
of the client in improvising to make a „piece‟ of music that is musically coherent in the 
same way as a composer will presumably intend a piece of composed music to be, 
specifically the type of Western classical music Lee refers to. If Lee finds correlations 
between pitches, for example, the question is raised of whether it is meaningful to 
understand such a correlation as part of an intended musical „scheme‟ as though it was 
intentionally crafted by a composer. An improviser might repeat a motive, for example, 
consciously or unconsciously, but is it relevant to give musical meaning to such 
repetition in the way this might be understood when, for example, analysing the musical 
score of chamber work? Indeed, it is interesting the way in which Lee, in transcribing 
sessions, is also creating a score, complete with bar lines and indeed bar numbers. The 
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process of such transcription could be viewed as analogous to a type of wresting of 
„music‟ out of „nature‟. 
Bohlman writes of the way in which music can become a metaphor for nature, „when 
bird-song is perceived as naturally melodic, and then is represented by a singer or 
composer (such as Olivier Messiaen in his Catalogue d’Oiseaux) as a melody itself ... 
the naturalness in music, originally raw, becomes cooked, for its substance is altered to 
situate it human society‟.352 If a clinical improvisation can be considered as „natural‟, 
then it is as though the „raw‟ improvisation has been „cooked‟ and transformed into a 
musical „product‟, altogether different it can be presumed from its origin as spontaneous 
music-making.
353
 
Lee is evidently prepared for such an observation, and he concludes this particular 
study by commenting that the elemental content of the clinical improvisation may 
resemble the content of composed music: 
 
Analysis of musical content within therapeutic improvisation demonstrates that the improvised 
moment, however chaotic it may at first appear, can have a consonant structure in exactly the same 
way as a premeditated composition. An improvisation survives and exists for as long as it occurs, 
whereas a composed piece of music has been crafted and designed to a preconceived level by its 
creator. Perhaps the differences are not so great as they would at first appear; both have an 
underlying unity of conception. ...  A music therapist may have no wish to pose as a composer and 
vice versa, but if what both are creating can be shown to be subject to the same structural 
considerations and inner relationships, then such analytic insights as these should be fundamental 
in the furtherance of music therapy.
354
 
 
                                                 
352
 
 Bohlman, „Ontologies of music‟, pp.23–24. Bohlman is citing this rich concept of „raw and cooked‟ 
from Claude Lévi-Strauss. 
353
 
 
Ibid., p.24. 
354
 
 Lee, „Structural analysis of post-tonal therapeutic improvisatory music‟, p.11. It is important to note 
that Lee‟s presentation of musical scores in publications and at conferences has always been from the 
perspective of an ongoing exploration of some of the questions raised here with regard to the 
transcription and musical analysis of clinical improvisation. See C. Lee, „Lonely waters‟, in C. Lee 
(ed.), Proceedings of the International Conference Music Therapy in Palliative Care (Oxford: Sobell 
Publications, 1994), pp.201–238. 
174 
 
For Lee, therefore, because the music of music therapy, clinical improvisation and the 
music of art improvisation and composition share common elements, such as pitches, 
rhythms, harmony and motivic structure, clinical improvisation can be subject to the 
same kind of analysis as art improvisation.
355
 
However, it is not ultimately clear what musical insights are possible through this 
method beyond insights gained from description, such as literally being able to see the 
client‟s musical material in relation to the therapist‟s set out on paper. Indeed, this method 
can be seen as tending to foreground the musical object away from the context within 
which it has arisen, For example, as Epp writes, „emotional content in music cannot be 
satisfactorily derived by studying the music in isolation – the isolated musical structure or 
[furthermore] the isolated space of the music therapy room‟. [Italics in original]356 It can 
be argued, however, that elements of description that are relevant to composed music, for 
example the harmonic relationships within a piece, may not be relevant to freely 
improvised music to the extent that Lee is claiming. There is a distinction to be made 
between analysing music that is intended by a composer to be in a certain form, and music 
that simply emerges „as such‟ spontaneously within the context of therapy. This returns us 
to the distinction, made in Chapter Four, between music as product or musical work, and 
music as a process or activity. Through transcription, however, in capturing the 
performative origin of a clinical improvisation in this way Lee is exploring the idea of a 
clinical improvisation as precursory to a musical work. Furthermore, this is a clinical 
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improvisation that not only can be returned to for analysis (and listened back to via 
recording), but, as we saw in Chapter Three, can subsequently be „arranged‟ and 
performed in public.
357
 Indeed, in an earlier article he writes of how analysis is „a 
method enabling musicians the opportunity to investigate improvised music both as a 
product of therapeutic growth and also as a piece of art in its own right‟.358 
Most importantly for Lee, and indeed for Ansdell, there is no distinction to be made 
between the processes involved in the clinical improvisation in music therapy and the 
processes involved in improvisation/composition for its own sake. 
Diverse Intuitions 
In this section, I have shown how Ansdell and Lee place emphasis upon the music as an 
isolated phenomenon within the therapy. For these two music therapists the musical object 
arising out of clinical improvisation is of prime importance over and above an 
interpretation of the client and therapist‟s experience of that same music. On the one hand, 
therefore, within the psychodynamic approach described earlier in this chapter it could be 
seen that the therapist‟s understanding of the relational experience of the music was at the 
centre of clinical improvisation; it was the relational experience that drove the therapist‟s 
clinical musical decision-making. On the other hand, for the music-centred approach, it is 
now clear that the musical aesthetic object is at the centre of, and drives, clinical 
improvisation. 
I have also shown in this section how the emphasis placed upon the musical aesthetic 
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object of clinical improvisation arises out of an intuition that is contrary to the intuition 
that forms the basis for this enquiry. Whilst my own pre-theoretical intuition, as 
researcher, contains the notion that there is a distinction to be made between clinical 
improvisation and art improvisation, the music-centred approach, as expressed in the 
work of Ansdell and Lee, is based upon the intuition that there is no distinction to be 
made. In this section, I have highlighted one problem with assuming this notion of the 
nature of the music of music therapy when undertaking a purely musical analysis of 
clinical improvisation. However, whilst a musical analysis can describe and analyse the 
purely musical elements of a clinical improvisation, it is not clear from Lee‟s account if 
there is any further understanding to be gained regarding the therapeutic elements. 
How is it possible to understand this intuition that there is no distinction to be made 
between clinical improvisation and art improvisation? Furthermore, how is it possible to 
understand the notion of „aesthetic wholeness‟ as being at the centre of music-centred 
music therapy? I will now turn to these two questions question through an examination 
of the work of Aigen. 
Ken Aigen and the Notion of Continuity 
Ken Aigen, writing from a music-centred perspective and in common with Ansdell and 
Lee, asserts the notion that there is no distinction to be made between clinical 
improvisation and art. He writes extensively of his „belief that rests on the... fundamental 
notion that musical experiences in clinical contexts can be continuous with non-clinical 
musical experiences‟.359 In stating this position, Aigen refers to a wider debate within the 
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aesthetics of music regarding a distinction between the „fine and useful arts‟.360 In 
particular, he grounds his perspective in the theory developed by American pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey, in his work Art as Experience.
361
 Aigen demonstrates how 
Dewey sets out to critique theories of art that „start from a readymade 
compartmentalization, or from a conception of art that “spiritualizes” it out of connection 
with the objects of concrete experience‟.362 That is to say, the notion of art for art‟s sake is 
based upon an assumption that the artwork is separate from „common experience‟. Put 
simply, for Dewey, the experience of art is synonymous with the artwork itself, and he 
„discusses not the form of the work of art but the form of the experience‟.363 This is to the 
extent that „Dewey has no need to account for the art-object, because the end of art is 
fulfilment in experience, not the production of ad hoc objects‟.364 Aigen links Dewey‟s 
project to his own theoretical project as a music therapist, which is to understand „the 
connection between aesthetic experience‟ and what he sees as „the common goals of 
therapy‟.365 Aigen writes: „In setting out to create an aesthetic theory ... [Dewey] has 
formulated his purpose in remarkably similar terms: “This task is to restore continuity 
between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the 
everyday events, doings, and sufferings that ... constitute experience.”‟366 This notion of 
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„continuity‟ is the basis upon which Aigen argues for a unified concept of music in clinical 
improvisation. In doing this, he is arguing for the centrality of aesthetic considerations in 
the music of music therapy, both in terms of what makes a good clinical improvisation and 
the client‟s experience of the music per se. Aigen is addressing approaches to music 
therapy for which, as we have already seen, considerations of aesthetics may be less 
important. He writes: „Some traditional clinical theories maintain that music is a “mere” 
de facto means, by not addressing their aesthetic component.‟367 Indeed, he distinguishes 
his own approach from an approach whereby „aesthetic considerations are at best tolerated 
and at worst thought to be counter to the clinical value of such musical-emotional 
expressions because artistic goals are considered to be fundamentally different from 
clinical goals‟.368 Instead, for Aigen, artistic and therapeutic goals are one. How is this 
version of music-centred music therapy conceived? Aigen incorporates Dewey‟s notion of 
art being a unity of „means and end‟ rather than either for a purpose or not for a purpose. 
He writes: 
 
In music therapy, we can see this unity of means and ends when we adopt a dynamic conception of 
the purpose of clinical process. Client outcome is not a static state of being achieved at the end of 
therapy, but is instead something that unfolds within the clinical process itself ... music therapy 
treatment, unlike medication or other medical procedure, is not something offered or engaged in as 
a means towards some completely autonomous end. Instead, facilitating the ability of clients to live 
in the music is simultaneously the means and goal of ... [Nordoff-Robbins] Music Therapy. [Italics 
in original]
369
 
 
How does this view manifest in music therapy practice? Aigen makes a link between 
aesthetic values in art and the kinds of needs that clients bring to therapy: 
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Consider how music therapists strive to establish greater personality integration for clients, provide 
a sense of meaning and wholeness in their lives, and seek to create a sense of unity in therapy 
groups to facilitate personal expression and group process. In all of these ways, we can see how 
aesthetic experience is a vehicle for providing what is often lacking in the lives of clients.
370
 
 
Aigen identifies a parallel between aesthetic values of integration, wholeness and unity, 
and the need people have for therapy where these values are damaged or lacking in their 
lives, and conceptually integrates the two. In doing this, he also makes a link with the 
aesthetic in nature, or „the beautiful‟ in a human being. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the two music therapy approaches can be compared 
through distinguishing between the „direction‟ of the improvisation. I have characterized 
these two contrasting directions as „tending towards‟ the „aesthetic‟ and the „relational‟. To 
demonstrate the multifarious and fluid nature of clinical improvisation, one that moves 
between paradigms of process and product, I have encapsulated the musical forms of clinical 
improvisation on a continuum (Figure 2), which emphasizes the pre-composed structure, or 
absence of structure, present in the music at any one time. 
We can now see that a distinction can be made between psychodynamic music 
therapy and music-centred music therapy in terms of, on the one hand, the relational 
direction taken by psychodynamic music therapists and, on the other hand, the aesthetic 
direction towards „aesthetic wholeness‟ taken by music-centred music therapists. 
Furthermore, we have seen how the musical direction taken by psychodynamic music 
therapists presupposes that the music of music therapy constitutes a distinct ontology of 
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improvisation. As we saw in Chapter Four, the music-making in a music therapy session 
might move away from the aesthetic concerns to be found in music-centred music-
making and towards relational concerns, sometimes at the expense of a conventional 
aesthetic of perfection and more in keeping with an aesthetic of imperfection, as 
described by Hamilton.
371
 Indeed, at one extreme, there is the possibility that the music 
of music therapy, through the therapist‟s focus solely upon the „relational‟, may not 
seem „musical‟ at all. To illustrate the interpersonal nature of „the relational‟ in clinical 
improvisation, I have outlined the therapist‟s emotional thinking in terms of 
psychodynamics, namely the psychoanalytic concepts of transference and 
countertransference. 
I have also considered the music-centred approach in relation to the presupposition 
that between clinical improvisation and art improvisation there is a unified concept of 
music. There is no distinction to be made between the music of music therapy and music 
made elsewhere; music is one thing, or constitutes a single ontology. 
A fundamental distinction between the two approaches, therefore, can be seen to lie 
first in what I have called „the direction‟ of the therapist‟s music, and second in the 
implied conceptual understanding of the music as either „the same‟ or „different‟ to art 
music. Where do these distinctions arise? I will address this question in the final part of 
the enquiry and explore two areas as a way to highlight an ontological distinction to be 
made between the clinical improvisation practice of the two approaches. First, in 
Chapter Six, I explore a distinction between the two approaches whereby the  musical 
therapeutic effect is deemed to occur in the relationship between therapist and client, or 
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alternatively deemed to occur through the music itself. Second, in Chapters Seven and 
Eight, I explore how this distinction arises through a consideration of the role of   
musical performance within clinical practice. 
182 
PART III 
THE ONTOLOGY OF CLINICAL 
IMPROVISATION 
183 
CHAPTER SIX 
Hanslick, Music and Emotion 
For the psychotic patient, in my view, music therapy can be seen as an experience 
orientated rather than an insight orientated form of therapy, the aim of which is to 
help the individual manage their internal world in such a way as to develop ego-
strength ... The focus is the relating and its meaning. The relating goes on whether 
there is playing or not, and the clue to the meaning is not hidden somewhere in the 
music but in the shared experience of the therapist and patient. 
DAVID JOHN, 1995
372
 
 
In music therapy emotional creativity is sounded through the musical act; music and 
emotion are „fused‟, so to speak. The one presents the other. And yet each of these 
has its own, separate system of thought. It is my view that, as music therapists, we 
need to be clear about this pivotal interface between the two if we are to escape 
confusion in research. 
MERCÉDÈS PAVLICEVIC, 1995 [EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL]
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This Enquiry is concerned with the making of an ontological distinction between two 
forms of music-making. art improvisation and clinical improvisation. It is also concerned 
with an ontological distinction to be made between the two approaches, psychodynamic 
and music-centered clinical improvisation. Where do these distinctions manifest 
themselves or to use the terminology of Bohlman, where are they yielded? 
374
 In the final 
part of the enquiry, I explore two such places; first, the question of location of the 
therapeutic effect of clinical improvisation and second, through an examination of the role 
of performance in music therapy. 
In the previous chapter, I formulated a comparative ontology across the two 
approaches to clinical improvisation. I demonstrated how on the one hand, the musical 
soundworld of both approaches to clinical improvisation is varied, and traverses 
composed and improvised music-making (Figure 2). On the other hand, following 
Andrew Kania‟s question of higher-order ontology, I examined the question of what is at 
the centre of clinical improvisation. I identified two contrasting „centres‟ of clinical 
improvisation: first, „the relational‟ in the psychodynamic approach, and second, „the 
aesthetic‟ in the music-centred approach. 
In this chapter, I explore two distinct ways of understanding the location of the 
therapeutic effect. Whereas in the previous chapter I explored a distinction between the 
two approaches in terms of the direction of the music-making, now we will see, not 
surprisingly, that the location of the therapeutic effect can be distinguished in a similar 
way. Whilst the therapeutic effect of the music-centred approach can be seen to occur 
through the active making of a musical aesthetic object, in the psychodynamic approach 
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the therapeutic effect can be seen to occur through the client‟s relational experience of 
that same music. 
This distinction can be understood in parallel with another question frequently posed 
from within musicology, psychology and aesthetics regarding the location of emotion in 
music. This is because the question of emotion in music also entails considering its 
location in the experiencing subject or musical aesthetic object. 
To this end, in this chapter I describe an aspect of the debate that took place during 
1999 in the pages of the British Journal of Music Therapy. As indicated in the opening 
chapter of the enquiry, the theme of this debate can be taken as the question of what 
constitutes „best practice‟ in music therapy. In part, this can also be seen as a debate 
questioning where the therapy takes place; is it in the music or in the therapeutic 
relationship? I examine Elaine Streeter‟s critique of the work of Ansdell and Lee, which 
illuminates what can be seen as a major discrepancy of belief between the two 
approaches. Next, I examine some of the themes arising out of the musical aesthetics of 
Eduard Hanslick, and show how he accounts for the ubiquitous connection between 
music and emotion through his theory of music and motion.
375
  I briefly explain how this 
theory is given some further consideration through philosopher Nick Zangwill‟s 
contemporary interpretation of Hanslick‟s ideas.376 Zangwill‟s interpretation is important 
for the link it is possible to make between Hanslick‟s theory of music and motion and 
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Pavlicevic‟s theory of „dynamic form‟ in music therapy.377 
I indicate how Pavlicevic‟s theory of „dynamic form‟ provides an understanding of 
the way in which the communicative mechanisms of music are put to work in therapy. 
However, it is outside the remit of dynamic form to investigate the nature of the music 
itself, even though some substantial understanding is theorised by Pavlicevic concerning 
the phenomenon of emotion as part of the music therapy clinical improvisation event. 
Streeter’s Critique 
In the previous chapter, we saw how, within the music-centred approach developed by 
Lee, the musical developments that occurred in clinical improvisation were the primary 
concern of the therapist, and foregrounded in his consideration of an individual client‟s 
progress. I argued that Lee‟s research, whereby he has developed a form of musical 
analysis of clinical improvisation, demonstrates one way in which music therapists 
consider the joint music-making between client and therapist not only as therapeutic, but 
also as a musical aesthetic object in itself. We also saw a similar emphasis upon the 
music in a case example by Gary Ansdell, which described a drop-in music therapy 
group for adults. Here, Ansdell describes how he developed a way of working whereby 
he directed the focus of discussion that followed each improvisation upon the music 
itself, rather than the feelings of the players. Furthermore, Ansdell‟s approach within 
sessions was to emphasize the music as a shared group experience rather than individual 
self-expression; the shared making of music can be seen as the „product‟ of sessions, 
rather than a meaningful experience for individuals. 
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Elaine Streeter sets out a critique of case material described by Lee and Ansdell.
378
 
Her overall concern with their approach lies with the absence of a theoretical 
understanding of the emotional life of the client, and the feelings evoked from within the 
therapeutic relationship. Of particular significance for Streeter, from an explicitly 
psychoanalytic perspective, is the development of the individual meaning of the client‟s 
way of relating, manifested in the therapist‟s inter-subjective experience, namely the 
countertransference phenomena. She advocates that „music therapy theory needs to 
derive as much from psychological thinking as it does from musical awareness and, 
indeed, from an understanding of the connections between the two ... [and she believes 
that] it is necessary to challenge the basis on which some writers rely; i.e. that 
improvised music alone is the therapeutic relationship‟.379 
What can psychological thinking bring to music therapy? It is interesting to note 
that, in contrast to the work of Lee and Ansdell, in her description of her own clinical 
work Streeter separates the musical contents of music therapy from the interpersonal 
contents, and does not assume that the felt relationship between client and therapist, and 
therefore the therapy, takes place in the music alone. She writes: 
 
The interpersonal relationship between client and music therapist results in a wide variety of 
communications, whether conscious or unconscious, emotionally felt, verbally expressed or 
musically experienced. Therefore, music therapy can never be confined to the music alone 
(however many similarities there are between the ways in which co-improvisation evolves and the 
ways in which people relate). Indeed, the interpersonal relationship is as vital a part of the 
therapeutic engagement as any other, whether identified within music or outside music ... 
Psychological thinking is an essential part of providing the necessary boundaries within which the 
interpersonal relationship between client and therapist can safely develop.
380
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At the heart of Streeter‟s critique, and in keeping with the findings of Brown and 
Pavlicevic discussed in Chapter Three, is the notion that implied in the concept of 
clinical improvisation is some definition of the roles of therapist and client, most 
importantly, both in and outside of the music-making.
381
 This understanding of the 
therapist‟s role can be derived from a theory and practice of therapeutic relating, such 
as we have already seen in Chapter Five, as developed within psychoanalysis. The 
notion of the therapist‟s role relates to the practice of therapeutic boundaries, with the 
therapist maintaining the boundaries of the time of the session and the room in which 
it takes place. These are not concrete arrangements of time and place, but where 
maintained come to denote the therapist‟s emotional „holding‟ and reliability.382 
Without the therapist‟s active creation of therapeutic boundaries, Streeter advocates 
that an unconscious „merging‟ can begin to occur, as opposed to preserving „the 
therapeutic relationship as different or separate from a personalised relationship‟.383 
This stress upon the need for therapeutic boundaries is coupled with a need for a 
consideration of the client‟s history that can deepen both the client‟s and therapist‟s 
process of shared understanding of the contents of sessions. The context provided by 
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the client‟s history further strengthens the therapeutic boundaries and, for Streeter, the 
opportunities for change.
384
 
Streeter discusses two examples from the published case studies of Ansdell and Lee 
where she believes the role of the music therapist was compromised through a lack of 
consideration of therapeutic boundaries. In one case, this is illustrated through the 
„intimacy‟ of a verbal exchange between the client and therapist, and in the other by the 
therapist explicitly ending the course of therapy and changing his role with the client to 
one of „friendship‟.385 
In response to both cases, Streeter is critical of the lack of „thinking‟ about the 
therapeutic meaning of the clients‟ music and actions, and asserts how it is „essential that 
therapists are able to think about the strength of feeling they may at times have for their 
clients, and analyse this in relation to their client‟s histories and difficulties‟.386 
What is of significance here, in addition to her ethical concerns regarding practice, is 
how Streeter‟s critique illustrates a distinction to be made, on the one hand, between the 
location of the therapy in the emotional experience of the music-making and, on the 
other hand, the location of the therapy in the activity of making the musical object itself. 
For Lee and Ansdell, the meaning of the therapeutic work lies in the musical object, 
namely the clinical improvisations in their work. Alternatively, it is possible to surmise 
that for Streeter, the meaning of the therapeutic work lies in the musical emotional 
experience. It is this dichotomy that I will now begin to explore as part of a general 
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discussion of the idea of emotion in music. 
The Role of Emotion in the Music of Music Therapy 
In music therapy practice, the relationship between music and emotion is generally 
assumed to be self-evident. Indeed, whilst music therapy has developed for a wide 
variety of different purposes, of primary concern is the emotional life of the client. Upon 
what grounds is it possible to „interpret‟ the feeling state of a client from the music they 
make within a music therapy session? 
It is interesting that even within the experimental literature of music psychology 
there are currently no clear answers. Indeed, as noted above, there is some ongoing 
debate as to the „formal object of musical emotion‟, a debate that seeks to establish, 
„where is the emotion ... is it located in the music or in the listener or both?‟387 Patrik 
Juslin and John Sloboda comment upon this, writing how, „indeed in our view, many 
researchers continue to confound these processes, causing confusion‟.388 
However, within the experiential domain of music therapy practice, this relationship 
is frequently taken for granted.
389
 At the level of everyday practice, an assumed 
connection between music and emotion is often a point of departure for the work. This is 
an intuition generally accepted by clients, therapists and other professionals alike. 
For example, in elderly care settings such as a nursing home, the offer of live music 
is frequently welcomed on the grounds that a musical event will usually evoke some 
kind of positive emotional response. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the ward 
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manager in an acute psychiatric setting to welcome without question a music therapist, 
on the grounds that by freely improvising or singing a song, a patient will be „expressing 
their feelings‟ in a contained and positive way. 
On the other hand, the provision of music therapy from within a medical culture 
tends to necessitate the need for „conclusive‟ meanings, as though it were conclusively 
possible for the therapist to make a link between the expression perceived in a client‟s 
music and how they appear to be feeling. Indeed, the specialised context of a hospital 
ward can sharpen this question of music and emotion in an interesting way. The problem 
arises when the music therapist provides a report of a client‟s progress (or, as we have 
seen previously, process) to a multidisciplinary team. It can be difficult to do this in such 
a way that doesn‟t simply present music therapy in terms of the sustaining of an activity 
(for example, „she stayed for the whole session‟), which in itself might indeed be an 
important indication of the patient‟s progress in therapy. It can be problematic to talk 
about the client in music therapy in terms of the musical content of sessions, so what is it 
that can be said about the music in these circumstances?
390
 
Eduard Hanslick‟s essay Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (hereafter referred to in 
translation as On the Musically Beautiful), first published in 1854, is widely used as a 
pivotal point for discussion on music and emotion.
391
 As noted in recent music therapy 
literature, Hanslick‟s formalist „doctrine‟ of the „musically beautiful‟ appears at first 
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sight to propose a theory of music that discounts a consideration of feelings.
392  
Hanslick 
writes, „the primary object of aesthetical investigation is the beautiful object [the music] 
not the feelings of the [percipient] subject‟.393 However, within the same essay, Hanslick 
actually makes use of music therapy to refine his ideas further. Whilst retaining his 
original stand, he does not deny that music has an effect upon the feelings of the listener. 
Indeed, most importantly, the essay argues for a distinction to be made between the 
music as aesthetic object and the listener as „percipient‟ subject. That is to say, a 
„listener‟ with feelings in dynamic relation to the music. 
Formalism and Clinical Improvisation 
Hanslick‟s formalist „doctrine‟ of the „musically beautiful‟ provides what at first might 
appear a contentious starting point for developing an understanding of clinical 
improvisation in music therapy. Indeed, within the music therapy literature Hanslick‟s 
wider concern with the application of music, including music therapy, has not, hitherto, 
been considered. In fact, Hanslick might well be critical of applying music as therapy. 
This is because, from his perspective, it would necessitate the loss of the „autonomy‟ of 
the music that he considered as central to the beauty and, therefore, value of the musical 
object. This was certainly his perspective in relation to the musical form of recitative, 
whereby the music becomes a means to convey the meaning of the words, rather than 
being of value in itself. He writes, „even the most relentless fitting of music to feeling… 
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generally succeeds in inverse proportion to the autonomous beauty of the music‟.394 
Indeed, the employment of music in recitative inevitably results in poorer rather than 
richer music per se. He writes: 
 
Recitative … being that type of music which most directly fits its own declamatory expression to 
the accentuation of individual words, attempting no more than to be a faithful imitation of specific, 
usually rapidly changing states of mind. This must, as the true embodiment of the feeling-theory, 
be the noblest and most perfect music. In fact, however in recitative, music is reduced to the status 
of handmaiden and loses its autonomous significance.
395
 
 
With regard to the use of music as therapy, Hanslick might have asked, does the therapy 
have the propensity to „take over‟, rendering the „beauty‟ of the music irrelevant? 
I propose that Hanslick can speak to the question of the location of the therapeutic 
effect in music therapy for a number of reasons. What is so significant about his writing 
is possibly that whilst he is uncompromising in his stand whereby the content of music is 
not emotion, he is also committed to articulating an understanding of how music and 
emotion might yet be theorized. In summary, in Hanslick‟s theory of „the musically 
beautiful‟ we find an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the musical object 
and the listening/performing subject. This analysis has in turn stimulated the question 
raised by the two music therapy approaches: is the location of the therapeutic effect in 
the music (music-centred approach) or in the relational experience of the music 
(psychodynamic approach). 
I shall now explore two areas that connect both directly and indirectly to music 
therapy. First, I will provide some context to Hanslick‟s theory of music and emotion 
through a brief exploration of the areas of his argument that relate to contemporary 
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questions of research into music and emotion. Second, I will take Hanslick‟s idea of 
emotion and motion in music and relate it to Pavlicevic‟s theory of dynamic form. 
Motion and Emotion 
Hanslick identifies some of the noteworthy problematic questions of contemporary 
research into music and emotion. He is concerned throughout the essay to promote a 
scientific methodology in his approach to music, and possibly it is this interest that 
means he is able to identify the important questions, some of which preoccupy music 
psychology today. He can see the gaps in knowledge in the absence of a modern 
experimental psychology, which means it is difficult to understand the effect of music 
on the neural processes of the brain. For example, he questions the way in which music 
stimulates memories or makes us want to dance: 
 
What it would be most important to know and what remains unexplained is the neural process 
through which the sensation of tone becomes feeling or mood … what is psychological about... 
[music], namely awakened memories and the well-known pleasure of dancing, is not lacking in 
explanation, but the explanation is not at all adequate. It is not because it is dance music that it lifts 
the foot; rather it is because it lifts the foot that it is dance music.
396
 
 
Hanslick will probably have welcomed the recent growth since the mid-1980s of the 
research discipline of music psychology.
397
 Furthermore, some of his precise questions 
about „feeling and mood‟ have been central to a large body of research into areas such as 
musical memory, which appears to be „spared‟ where elsewhere there is cognitive decline, 
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for example in syndromes associated with dementia.
398
 Hanslick‟s anticipation of these 
empirical questions, from the standpoint of a musical theorist, would certainly warrant 
further research. However, there are further links to be made within this chapter with 
empirical research with regards contemporary research into musical communicativeness. 
In his discussion of musical expression, Hanslick provides an important account of 
the relationship between music and feeling, the structure of which having a resonance 
with current research into musicality as a fundamental component of mother-infant 
communication. Hanslick argues that feelings cannot be expressed by music; feelings 
can only be experienced by people in relation to the music. It is possible to hear sadness 
in the music, for example in the opening theme of Brahms‟ Symphony No.4, but for 
Hanslick this sadness is in us, as the listening subject, not the music itself. He writes 
that: 
 
In order to get on firm ground, we must first relentlessly get rid of such tired clichés. Whispering? 
Yes, but not the yearning of love. Violence? Of course, but certainly not the conflict. Music can, in 
fact, whisper, rage and rustle. But love and anger occur only within our hearts.
399
 
 
On the other hand, it is as though for Hanslick the subjectivity of „the subject‟ stops 
when they reach the music. The composer is not able to transfer their feelings into the 
music that he or she writes. Hanslick states: 
 
It is not the actual feeling of the composer, as a merely subjective emotional state, that evokes the 
corresponding feeling in the hearer ... In a strictly aesthetical sense, we can say of any theme at all 
that it sounds noble or sad or whatever. We cannot say, however, that it is an expression of the 
noble or sad feelings of the composer.
400
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The question raised then is how is emotion linked so consistently with music if, it would 
seem, there is no emotion in the music? Instead, for Hanslick the relation between music 
and feeling lies in the physical similarity between music and what he terms „motion‟. He 
links such motion to feeling or the physical components of feeling: 
 
What, then, from the feelings, can music present if not their content? ... It can reproduce the motion 
of a physical process according to the prevailing momentum: fast, slow, strong, weak, rising, 
falling ... it can depict not love but only such motion as can occur in connection with love or any 
other affect, which however is merely incidental to that effect ... Motion is the ingredient which 
music has in common with emotional states and which it is able shape creatively in a thousand 
shades and contrasts.
401
 
Motion in Music as a Theory for Music Therapy 
Mercédès Pavlicevic, in her working concept of „dynamic form‟, introduced into the 
music therapy literature a description of the interface between human emotion and 
clinical improvisation.
402
 This theory is based upon the observational and theoretical 
research of Daniel Stern and developed by Colwyn Trevarthen and Stephen Malloch.
403
 
At the centre of Pavlicevic‟s work is the notion that „the significance of clinical 
improvisation is that it is an inter-personal event rather than being only a musically 
interactive event‟. [Italics in original]404 Pavlicevic describes how feelings can be 
„signalled‟ through the qualities of our expressive acts, and how through clinical 
improvisation in music therapy this happens in a musical way. As human beings, we 
                                                 
401
 
 
Ibid., p.11. 
402
  Pavlicevic, „Dynamic interplay in clinical improvisation‟; Pavlicevic, Music therapy in context. 
403
  C. Trevarthen and S. Malloch, „The dance of wellbeing: Defining the music therapeutic effect‟, Nordic 
Journal of Music Therapy 9, No.2 (2000), pp.3–17; D. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant 
(New York: Basic Books, 1985), cited in Pavlicevic, Music therapy in context. 
404
  Pavlicevic, Music therapy in context, p.121. 
197 
express ourselves in many different ways or modalities, for example through tone of 
voice, gesture and facial expression. 
In a discussion of the problem of music and expression, the philosopher Nick 
Zangwill writes in support of Hanslick‟s account, „that it is not possible for music itself 
to have emotions‟.405 He explores a „category‟ of „arational action‟ as a model for 
considering one way in which music can be said to express emotion. He writes: 
 
The only remaining hope I can see for expression theories is to appeal to the sense in which one 
might „express‟ an emotion when one acts arationally on it ... an example would be when one 
throws a cup at a wall out of anger at a pay-cut. That act is fully intentional, but it is not fully 
rational, for smashing the mug is hardly thought of as a means of restoring one‟s wages. Perhaps 
music expresses emotion in the sense in which smashing the mug expresses my anger ... for it 
seems that my anger is somehow manifest in the smashing of the mug. [Italics in original]
406
 
 
Zangwill‟s example of a smashed mug can be further understood in terms of acts that 
have „cross modal‟ meaning. Anyone in the room with the thrower of the mug would be 
able to „read‟ and so understand from the quality of the thrower‟s action and the sound 
of the cup against the wall how the thrower was feeling.
407
 „Dynamic form‟ in 
Pavlicevic‟s terms refers to the abstracted meaning, in this case anger, which we make 
of the emotional signals contained in these modalities of expression. For Pavlicevic, 
within the live, free music-making of music therapy the same process is mobilized. The 
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 However, Zangwill comments that the problem with „arational‟ expression as a model for an 
expression theory of music is the loss of control entailed in throwing the cup. The creation of music 
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therapist and patient experience the expressive quality of, for example, the tempo, 
dynamics or modulations of timbre or pitch in the music, and understand the sounds as 
emotional or relational.
408
 
Hanslick‟s contribution to music therapy lies, on the one hand, in the making of a 
distinction between an idea of musical expression as causal (as though the music came 
readymade with the name of the projected feeling pinned to it), and on the other hand the 
meaning to be found in our engagement with the quality, or in Hanslick‟s terms, the 
motion of music as we experience it. In doing so, he makes the crucial distinction 
between music as object and the experience of the percipient subject. An analysis of this 
distinction provides a model for looking at a parallel distinction between psychodynamic 
music therapy and music-centred music therapy respectively. 
So how does Hanslick account for feeling in relation to music and how is this 
relevant to contemporary music therapy practice? First, he clarifies that the composer is 
not expressing their feelings in music; rather they are crafting tonal forms in pursuit of 
the beautiful. Although the process of composing music is, of itself, emotional, and may 
be the „cause and inauguration of many an artwork … that [same] emotion never 
becomes the subject of the work‟.409 He makes the distinction that it is „an inner singing, 
not a mere inner feeling [that] induces the musically gifted person to construct a musical 
artwork‟.410 In Hanslick‟s view, it is the notion of an artwork that is the impetus for a 
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composer to start composing, rather than a matter of putting feelings to music.  
Second, he argues that it is the performer who can „outpour their feelings through 
their playing‟, and it is these feelings that have an effect on the listener.411 
 
To the performer it is granted to release directly the feeling which possesses him, through his 
instrument, and breathe into his performance the wild storms, the passionate fervour, the serene 
power and joy of his inwardness. The bodily ardour that through my fingertips suddenly presses 
the soulful vibrato upon the string, or pulls the bow, or indeed makes itself audible in song, in 
actual fact makes possible the most personal outpouring of feeling in music-making … The 
musical artwork is formed; the performance we experience.
412
 
 
This leads Hanslick to the conclusion that in free improvisation both performer and 
creator come together in the highest degree of musical immediacy, and I think it can be 
surmised that for Hanslick it is here that music and emotion have some meeting: 
 
The highest degree of immediacy in the musical revelation of mental states occurs where creation and 
performance coincide in a single act. This happens in free improvisation. Where this proceeds not 
with formally artistic but with predominantly subjective intent … the expression which the player 
wheedles out of the keyboard can become a kind of genuine speaking. Whoever has experienced at 
first hand this uncensored discourse, this reckless abandonment of the self to the grip of a powerful 
spell, will already know how love, jealously, rapture, and grief come roaring, undisguised yet 
unbidden, out of their night, to celebrate their feasts, sing their sagas, clash in battle, until their master 
the player recalls them, quietened, disquieting.
413
 
 
What is of interest here is the way in which Hanslick refers to an expressive form of free 
music-making, separate from the composed musical work that is the topic of this essay. 
It is as though he envisages a kind of „pre-music‟, music that is as yet unformed, and so 
led by the emotions of the musician improviser rather than the formal requirements of 
the music in itself. 
Third, Hanslick has, overall, made a distinction between the musical object and the 
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listening subject, and has ultimately concluded that emotion exists in the composer prior 
to the act of composition, in the performer and the listening subject, rather than residing 
in the musical work in itself. However, Hanslick also demonstrates the way emotion is 
understood in what Pavlicevic has called the „dynamic form‟ or motion of the musical 
object. For Hanslick, therefore, emotion does not exist in the formed musical work as 
such; instead, it exists in the experience of the listener/performer and in the dynamic 
quality of its motion. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered Eduard Hanslick‟s theory of „the musically beautiful‟ in 
relation to the location of therapy within the two approaches. Not surprisingly, this 
consideration has enabled a perspective of the psychodynamic approach where the 
location of therapy could be said to reside in the shared experience of the music, and the 
sense that is made of that experience by client and therapist. Alternatively, in music-
centred music therapy, I have shown how the location of the therapy can be seen to reside 
in the musical object itself. I have explored some ethical concerns in relation to this 
second idea from music-centred music therapy where, in Streeter‟s account, the therapy is 
implicitly assumed to take place in the music, without consideration of the way in which it 
might also take place in the relationship. I have shown how Pavlicevic‟s theory of 
dynamic form provides a contemporary version of Hanslick‟s theory of music and motion, 
and as such makes a case for emotion residing across both domains of the musical object 
and listening/performing subject. As such, Pavlicevic‟s research informs the 
201 
communicative functions of music in the theory of both music therapy approaches. Where 
then does this leave Streeter‟s critique in relation to a distinction between the two? 
Streeter acknowledges Pavlicevic‟s theory of dynamic form, but she is concerned 
that it „does not offer much solid ground on which to base therapeutic practice‟ and 
doesn‟t appear to „enable us to define between music improvised in music therapy as in 
any way distinguishable from music improvised in performance‟.414 Alternatively, what 
is central to Streeter‟s critique is her identification of the problems that can arise where 
there is no concept of difference between the roles of the client and therapist in the 
music. For Streeter, merging in music, improvising in such a way that it is not clear who 
is playing what role, can be contra-indicative to „good‟ therapy. Where the therapist is 
intentionally working without a theory that distinguishes between the roles of client and 
therapist in the music, this leads to the idea that there is no distinction to be made 
between their respective roles outside of the music either. The point that Streeter is 
arguing here has in turn been critiqued within the literature of community music therapy. 
Within this therapy, basing an understanding of the work upon such a differentiation 
between the roles of client and therapist has been considered a negative experience for 
some clients in terms of self-actualization, and as such contra-indicative to „good‟ 
therapy.
415
 
However, Streeter is raising an important theme; this is the tendency towards a 
„merging‟ to be found in the ideas of music-centred music therapy in general. We have 
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already encountered this in the previous chapter in the idea of „continuity‟, where a 
single concept of music was at work in the music of music-centred music therapy. In the 
final two chapters, we examine the topic of performance. Here we will find this theme 
re-emerging as notions of continuity and discontinuity arise, which are characteristic of 
the music-centred and psychodynamic approaches respectively. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Clinical Improvisation and Performance 
A better understanding of performance can not only increase our theoretical 
understanding of music. It reveals something of the character and condition of 
human experience more generally. 
ARNOLD  BERLEANT, 2004
416
 
 
Our laughter is always the laughter of a group ... However spontaneous it seems, 
laughter always implies a kind of secret freemasonry, or even complicity, with other 
laughers, real or imaginary. 
HENRI BERGSON, 1911
417
 
 
 
Can the music of music therapy be performed? What might it mean to perform the same 
music, as made in the music therapy session, in a public performance situation? What 
questions can the relationship between clinical improvisation and its performance, in 
each of the two approaches, music-centred and psychodynamic, raise in this study of 
ontology? 
These are the questions that will occupy the final two chapters of this enquiry. As 
with the preceding chapters, I will show that not only is there a distinction to be made 
between clinical improvisation and art improvisation, but there is also an ontological 
distinction to be made between the clinical improvisation of the two approaches to music 
therapy practice. I will show how this distinction resides both in the theoretical ideas 
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driving the two approaches and in the clinical improvisation that is manifested. 
In Chapter Six, I cited the question of the location of therapy as being indicative of 
an ontological distinction to be made between the two approaches. My aim in this 
chapter is to show once again areas where such a distinction arises or, to use Bohlman‟s 
terminology again, is „yielded‟.418 
How might a discussion of musical performance yield further ontological 
understanding? In Chapter Three, I discussed the way in which a concept of 
„performance‟ has been used as a thematic „common denominator‟ for comparing 
diverse „higher-order‟ ontologies across different forms of music. I made a broadly 
conceived distinction between the nature of performance entailed in the respective 
practices of classical music and rock music, and distinguished these different kinds of 
performance further as music „for performance‟ and music „not for performance‟.419 In 
this chapter, I will adopt the same principle, whereby a distinct ontology of music 
emerges through an exploration of music „for performance‟ and music „not for 
performance‟. Whilst, on the one hand, the musical practices discussed by Davies, Kania 
and Gracyk largely referred to the „composed music‟ of rock, I shall show how their 
explication of diverse ontologies also, on the other hand, relates to improvised music.
420
 
I show how this diversity emerges through Ansdell‟s critique of the psychodynamic 
approach to music therapy.
421
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‘Playing’ Music and ‘Performing’ Music 
I have already indicated the notion of different types of music as being „for‟ different 
types of performance, namely „works‟ (or improvisation) for live performance, for 
studio performance or „not for performance‟.422 However, this particular discussion 
within the philosophical literature, whilst on the one hand diversifying between different 
types of performance, on the other hand, seems to presuppose a unified overall concept 
of „performance‟, using the term in the sense of a formal musical event as though there 
was only one kind of music-making. 
This is not necessarily the case though. Within Western music at least, performance 
can be considered in at least two ways; first in a broad sense, as the sum of all musical 
activity.
423
 Second, performance can be considered in a narrow sense, in terms of a 
„ritualised‟ event, such as the stage performances that take place at a folk festival. 
Performance in the narrow sense can be considered as the specialised outcome of other 
kinds of music-making, such as private practice or a group rehearsal. 
Performance specified in the broader sense sometimes emphasizes the performative 
„nature‟ of music. For example, music-making per se can be conceptualised as 
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performance, and in this sense includes all types of music-making.
424
 This broad 
consideration includes both the formal public concert event and private musical activity 
that might occur spontaneously, without preparation, such as singing to a baby. It can 
even include the „everyday‟ private „momentary performances‟, such as humming a 
fragment of a tune, not to mention the types of public performances, such as those 
undertaken by a professional symphony orchestra in a concert hall.
425
 
On the other hand, musical performance in the narrow sense can be considered in a 
specific way that reflects the ritualised performer’s practices in Western music. Here, 
musical performance is considered as an activity distinct from other forms of music-
making, such as rehearsing or sight-reading a written score, and is closely related in 
conception to the presence of an audience.
426
 Ironically, it is the broader idea of music as 
performance that has in recent years contributed to the study of the „creative processes‟ 
that make up the ritualised musical performance in the narrow sense. For example, in 
some empirical research the „rehearsal‟ has become an event of interest alongside, but 
distinct from, the performance, as part of an overall creative process of making music.
427
 
                                                 
424
 
 N. Cook, „Between process and product: Music and/as performance‟, Music Theory Online 7, No.2 
(2001), pp.1–31. 
425
 
 See: N. Hassan, „Singing to your self? Momentary musical performing and the articulation of identity‟, in N. 
Hassan and H. Tessler (eds.), Sounds of the overground: Selected papers from a postgraduate colloquium 
on ubiquitous music and music in everyday life (Turku, Finland: International Institute for Popular Culture, 
2010). For a broad perspective of music see this account in Grove: J. Dunsby, „Performance‟, Grove Music 
Online. Available at: http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/43819. Accessed 
14 December 2011.  
426
 
 S. Godlovitch, „The integrity of musical performance‟, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 
(1993), pp.573–587. 
427
 
 A. Bayley and M. Clarke, „Analytical representations of creative processes in Michael Finnissy‟s second 
string quartet‟, Journal of Interdisciplinary Music Studies 3 (2009), pp.139–157. Bayley and Clarke cite 
the work of Nicholas Cook (see fn.424 above in this chapter) as responsible for opening up new areas for 
the study of performance. In this paper, they describe two interlinked projects using an ethnographic 
approach. The first project is an exploration of the process of bringing a new string quartet to first 
performance, and comparing subsequent performances. The second project comprises the development of 
207 
In practice, musicians, players of many Western-based genres of music, may concur 
with this second, more specialised idea of performance as an activity that can be 
distinguished from other types of playing mentioned above, such as rehearsing. For 
example, the idea of the „garage band‟ is not just to stay in the garage, but to get out and 
perform in the local venue. A classical musical ensemble might play through music 
within the process of a rehearsal as a precursor to a performance. This might be a sight-
reading or near sight-reading exercise during the rehearsal process, or a trial run or a run 
through, or even just „a run‟ in the case of music that isn‟t scored. 
The reason why it might be possible to make a simple distinction between playing 
(including rehearsing) and performing (including during a rehearsal) is that usually 
embedded in a performance is the notion that there are people to perform to, even if it is 
a private performance for the „performers‟ only. Even the most private performance of 
„one‟ could be considered as such, whereby the solo player, having worked upon a solo 
piece, „performs it‟, as though there were an audience, to hear what it „sounds like‟ 
under self-imposed performance conditions.
428
 
It is the narrow sense of „performance‟, such as the formal concert event, which is 
the starting point for the theme of this chapter. In Chapter Eight, I will consider the 
meaning of performance in music therapy through a consideration of it in its broader 
sense, which will be seen to incorporate the notion of the „self‟ as a performance. 
                                                 
specialist software with which to analyze the data. For example, it enables a close comparison between 
video recordings of performances, from which detailed observations can be made and inferences drawn. 
428
 
 
Al Alvarez writes vividly of sessions listening to his friend and neighbour, the concert pianist Alfred 
Brendel, „run through‟ a programme before a recital: „It probably helps that I love music but cannot 
read a score, though even if I could, comment is not what he is after. Brendel disdains gush and he 
assuredly doesn‟t need my praise. What I assume he wants is a sounding-board, a sympathetic and 
attentive presence in the room, not for vanity or reassurance, but simply to complete the artistic circle.‟ 
A. Alvarez, Where did it all go right? (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), p.345. 
208 
The Practice of Performance in Clinical Work 
In information leaflets frequently produced by music therapists working in settingssuch 
as care homes, schools or hospitals, performance has sometimes been cited as what 
music therapy is not for. This is intended to convey that the making of music in a music 
therapy session is not a kind of rehearsal for which the music therapist is looking for 
„participants‟. Nor is it usually facilitated as a kind of private performance or music 
lesson even. However, this is an example of the kind of „category mistake‟ sometimes 
innocently made by colleagues from other disciplines. For example, it is not uncommon 
for a client to leave a music therapy session to be asked „how did you get on?‟, as though 
there was some kind of „performance‟ to be measured. 
It can be seen that types of music-making that are „performances‟ or become 
performances certainly occur within music therapy. For example, particularly within 
group therapy, the freedom and spontaneity of the music-making sometimes means that 
a client starts to sing or play in such a way that it becomes evident that a „performance‟ 
has begun. Sometimes the group will respond as though they are accompanying a 
„soloist‟ or sometimes they will remain silent, simply allowing the client to „take the 
floor‟. The expression „take the floor‟ is used here deliberately to describe a change of 
dynamic; the group has moved from shared clinical improvisation into the different 
domain of listener and performer. Similarly, the dynamic may change where somebody 
enters the therapy room unexpectedly or wishes just to observe the improvising. Both 
these instances can create the feeling that the music has become a performance, whereas 
before it was a shared and private improvisation. 
Stating that music therapy is not about performing music has been one way to 
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distinguish music therapy from music-making for other purposes, such as education or 
community work. It has sometimes been defined in this way to clarify for other 
professionals that there won‟t be an outcome to sessions, such as a concert, or to try to 
reassure potential clients that they won‟t be being judged on the proficiency of their 
playing or their ability to perform in front of others. 
However, in recent years, as clinical practice has developed, performance has begun 
to be cited as an important theme, and music therapists have started to question why it 
was gradually dropped by therapists as part of their work. 
Kenneth Aigen describes how a move towards explicit performance-based music 
therapy practice has a „congruence‟ with the early work of Nordoff and Robbins, who, 
for example, arranged public and private performances of their specially composed 
working games or „miniature dramatic pieces‟ and play songs.429 Aigen continues, 
„additionally, the Nordoff-Robbins approach is a music-centred one in the sense that the 
client‟s desire to create music is the prime motivational force drawn upon by the 
therapist. Furthermore, the desire to create music calls for a public performance as its 
natural consummation.‟430 This kind of appeal to the „nature‟ of music is a common 
stance amongst music therapists who have incorporated performance into their work. 
Musical performance, it is reasoned, is a „natural mode of musicing‟ [sic] and that 
„performing ourselves in the world is natural and necessary‟.431 
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This type of reasoning begins to indicate a distinction between the two approaches. 
The way in which performance is advocated here seems to assume the unified concept of 
music as discussed in Chapters Five and Six. For example, there is no distinction made 
between the nature of the music that takes place within the confidential therapy setting 
and the music that is in public. Given the relational emphasis of the psychodynamic 
approach, it can be seen that the idea of arranging public performances of music with 
clients who are engaged in a confidential or private process of therapy could be seen to 
be counterintuitive, given that the musical contents of sessions could be understood as 
analogous to private conversations in an environment of trust. Surely, clients would not 
want to come to music therapy to perform their musical relationships in public? On the 
other hand, as we have seen in previous chapters, if the location of the therapy was in the 
joint making of a musical aesthetic object, as with the music-centred approach, this 
emphasis creates a different perspective in relation to the possibility of performance 
being part of music therapy. 
Performance as the Tool Music Therapists Forgot? 
The work of Gary Ansdell is key to this enquiry because, as indicated in Chapter One, 
his project in developing community music therapy within the UK could be understood 
specifically as the development of a non-psychodynamic approach. As such, he has 
considered many of the topics that define a distinction between the two approaches. This 
includes his perspective on musical performance, and in particular the journal article, 
Being who you aren’t; doing what you can’t: Community music therapy and the 
211 
paradoxes of performance (2005).
432
 For the remainder of this chapter I will consider 
aspects of this article in some detail. 
Ansdell presents a perspective of performance, not as a „ubiquitous good for all 
music therapy… rather as a possible resource for music therapy, which can promote 
powerful experiences for individuals groups and places‟.433 However, he asks if our 
patients/clients/co-collaborators benefit from performing music, why has it been absent 
in the music therapy literature in recent years? His answer is that music therapy practice 
has developed away from performance as a part of the process, or at least as part of 
music therapy practice that is written and theorized about: 
 
The institutionalization of music therapy practice [during this time] has been legitimated by a 
theoretical consensus constructing music therapy as a paramedical/psychological intervention, 
along with its normative conventions (what I call the „consensus model‟ in Ansdell 2002). This led 
to an increasing „privatization‟ of its occasions. Individuals or closed group sessions have become 
the norm, and several pioneers … have expressed their relief that the professional expectation is no 
longer that they manage the musical life of a hospital or school as well as their individual therapy 
case-load.
434
 
 
Ansdell also makes the point that whilst during the „early professional‟ stages of the 
profession, for example in the work of Mary Priestley and Nordoff and Robbins, there 
was „clearly explicit performance work incorporated into music therapy‟, but that it is 
„seldom discussed‟ in integrated terms.435 From Ansdell‟s perspective, whilst music 
therapists might incorporate concert performances into their everyday work in a hospital, 
for example as part of a celebration, this has rarely been considered in the music therapy 
literature in an integrated way as music therapy 
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Challenging the ‘Mainstream’: The Consensus Approach 
Ansdell‟s epitome of the mainstream music therapy practice in the UK as the „consensus 
model‟ in the main refers to the „practices, theory and assumptions of music 
psychotherapy‟, or what has been described in this enquiry as the psychodynamic 
approach.
436
 Ansdell uses the term „consensus‟ as a „thinking tool to contrast the practices, 
theory and assumptions of ... [the psychodynamic approach] with the newer practices and 
ideas of COMT [community music therapy]‟.437 Most importantly, it is possible to 
understand the choice of the term „consensus‟ as emphasizing that it is by no means self-
evident that this is the music therapy that must be used, it merely happens to be the model 
music therapists have „consented‟ to undertake. The problem with such „consensus‟, 
Ansdell states, is that it has tended to become the way to do music therapy, „one size fits 
all‟.438 
Ansdell lists some imagined objections to performance that he anticipates a 
psychodynamic music therapist would raise.
439
 He specifies, for instance, how the 
arranging of performances as part of clinical work might be antithetical to considerations 
of „confidentiality‟, „privacy‟ and other boundaries of therapy. Furthermore, Ansdell 
raises the possibility that it could be „professionally confusing‟ and therefore „possibly 
dangerous‟. However, significantly, the tone in which these imagined objections are 
proposed expresses scorn on Ansdell‟s part. Indeed, he prepares the reader for this in 
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advance, stating that his summary is „perhaps to caricature – but only a bit!‟440 
What is the relevance of this hypothetical disagreement between the two 
approaches? In this next section, I show how through humour the two different 
meanings of the term performance are deliberately played with. I propose that „the joke‟ 
being made is not only a means for Ansdell to split the two approaches, but that through 
an analysis of the humour a hint of the underlying musical ontology emerges. 
Towards Ontology Through Humour 
What I am presenting as a joke is expressed by Ansdell in the following way: „Within 
the consensus model “putting on a performance” (“acting out”, being “inauthentic”, 
hiding behind a “persona”) is what therapy is trying to treat not encourage!‟ [Italics in 
original]
441
 
In part, the joke works through a play on the two different meanings of the term 
„performance‟, as already discussed earlier in this chapter. Ansdell is treating the notion 
of a „concert performance‟ as though it were the same as the wider notion of a lived 
performance as a way of being in the world. However, the aim of the psychodynamic 
approach is indeed to treat the „lived performance‟ of being in the world where it is 
damaged. This is not to discourage that performance, but to develop some understanding 
of its psychic function. Indeed, within psychodynamic work, the concept of „putting on a 
performance‟ in the humorous way that it is expressed here could be understood as a 
defensive performance, in the sense that Winnicott writes about in his notion of the true 
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and false self.
442
 Whilst there could be a link between an individual performing 
defensively in everyday life and performing on stage, this is not to say that the two 
different modes entail the same kind of performance.
443
 However, Ansdell‟s witty 
rhetoric is political in intent; it can be seen as an attempt by „one party‟ to make „the 
other party‟ appear faintly ridiculous. The joke has the effect of dividing those who are 
„in‟ from those who are „out‟. Simon Critchley writes about the context specificity of 
humour, how it is a form of cultural „insider knowledge‟ incorporating the notion of 
„foreigners as funny‟ and without a sense of humour.444 
In this situation, the psychodynamic music therapist will understand the joke because 
they are part of the same music therapy culture. Indeed, the joke is designed not only to 
be recognisable by „the other party‟, but for the other party also to realize that they are 
on the „wrong side‟. Whilst the joke is funny for those on the „right side‟, in the sense of 
making fun of another group of practitioners, for those on the „wrong side‟, 
notwithstanding the feeling of being made fun of, the joke is not funny; it merely makes 
fun of what indeed is the case. 
What is significant about this joke? In Chapter Five, we saw how the music of 
music-centred music therapy was considered by the advocates of the approach as 
„continuous‟ with the music outside of music therapy.445 The concept of music was 
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uniform, whether it was being played as clinical improvisation or art improvisation. By 
implication, the „joke‟ similarly assumes a common premise regarding the music; 
Ansdell‟s sense of „putting on a performance‟ in therapy, what might be described as the 
performative, is conflated with the notion of putting on an art performance outside of 
therapy. This is consistent with the music-centred approach, which, as we have seen 
above, advocates musical performance as part of therapy. On the other hand, the notion 
of performance within therapy in a psychodynamic approach is of performance in the 
narrow sense. In this approach, where the client experienced „putting on a performance‟ 
in the narrow sense, this type of performance would be considered of a different order to 
that of an art performance. It would be understood as part of what was happening in the 
therapeutic space, rather than an event in its own right. Indeed, it might be understood as 
part of a system of the client‟s unconscious defences and therefore to be related to with 
great care. 
It can be seen, therefore, through a consideration of performance how the „witty 
rhetoric‟ of Ansdell illustrates the caesura between the two approaches. First, there is 
implied a narrow notion of performance as referring to concert performances that are 
separate to therapeutic work (psychodynamic approach). Second, there is implied a 
broader notion of performance that encompasses all kinds of activity, musical or 
otherwise (music-centred approach). Furthermore, to be on the „right side‟ of the joke is 
to accept an implied premise of a unified notion of performance, and by implication a 
unified concept of the music of music therapy, whereby both the music and the 
performance are the same in and out of the therapy setting. Alternatively, if the reader 
does not accept the premise of a unified concept of performance, the joke makes no 
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impact at all. For such readers it simply is the case that the work of therapy is different 
to the work of art in that it is seeking to engage with people‟s (client‟s) need to perform 
in the sense of hiding a more vulnerable self. 
In all, and through rhetoric, Ansdell promotes his idea of performance as though 
clinical improvisation in the music-centred approach was the same as the 
psychodynamic approach. I have argued here that it is through this very assumption that, 
as part of a joke, the ontological distinction between the two approaches arises. This 
complex distinction between notions of performance in relation to the distinction 
between the two approaches will be explored further in Chapter Eight. 
For the remainder of this chapter I am going to consider the question of whether or 
not it is possible to perform the music of clinical improvisation. I describe a case study 
where the client and therapist moved their music-making from a confidential therapy 
setting to a public performance setting, and I consider the implications of this. 
Performing Clinical Improvisation 
Alan Turry, a music therapist based at the New York Nordoff-Robbins Clinic, and Maria 
Logis, who suffers from a form of cancer, non-Hodgkins lymphoma, have talked 
extensively about their work together in public from their individual perspectives of 
client and therapist.
446
 In recounting her motivation to begin therapy, Logis explains that 
when faced with the crisis of cancer „she turned to God for help‟ and from this came the 
idea that she should sing. This led her to find Alan Turry‟s music therapy practice and to 
begin sessions. The pair were subsequently interviewed by Aigen, who writes: 
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The form of their sessions together emerged in a way that Maria would begin vocalizing about a 
variety of topics and Alan would accompany her on piano. At times these improvised compositions 
would begin by describing the weather – they also covered the most personal and difficult of issues 
concerning Maria‟s fears regarding her illness, her struggles with food, and any and all therapeutic 
issues that might be expected to come up in a course of psychotherapy.
447
 
 
Logis describes her wish to sing, and how she realized that she was not receiving singing 
lessons in music therapy. This led her to approach a „vocal instructor‟ who listened to some 
of the recordings from her music therapy sessions. The instructor commented that there were 
some songs „in there‟ and that she should perform them.448 Logis comments that in music 
therapy sessions „we didn‟t identify... [the improvisations] as songs. We‟re just doing our 
work. We were making music.‟449 To create songs out of clinical improvisation had not 
occurred to Logis, but she decided to pursue the idea in the light of the uncertainty her 
illness was giving her life. She never realized how healing the experience of singing about 
her life would be. The healing experience within music therapy prompted her to seek out 
performing opportunities and she began to appear on television and recorded a CD of her 
songs.
450
 Turry supported her in this endeavour and continued to accompany her on the 
piano both in therapy and in concert performances throughout this process of development. 
In interview, reflecting upon the unusual nature of the case study, Aigen asks Turry 
to reflect on whether it is „contradictory ... [for a music therapist to be] either working on 
songs or ... working on musical self-expression ... is there some level of the aesthetic in 
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the self-expressive?‟451 
Turry, in reply, concedes that the two are „not mutually exclusive‟.452 Significantly, 
he emphasizes the continuity between the therapy sessions and the performances, 
making a link between the „personal‟ and „the artistic‟: 
 
How can you separate the aesthetic from the psychological, the personal from the artistic? It‟s all 
related ... I think that those aesthetic qualities [of Logis‟ songs] that we can look at reflect personal 
changes, psychological changes. I would say I am more accepting when Maria says “look, I really 
want to create a melody today.” I think, “fine, let‟s do it” [rather than improvise]. There‟s something 
of value to that... I see it within what we‟re doing ... [Furthermore] performance was so much a part 
of the therapy process. The process of reflecting upon what songs to choose and not to choose ... all 
those things are part of the therapy process.
453
 
 
So for Turry, as depicted in the music-centred approach, contained within a conception 
of clinical improvisation is a notion of „the aesthetic‟ in music as in itself healing; 
simply put, the healing through music and the performing of music are one and the 
same. How is it possible to understand this particular idea of continuity? 
Making Music, Making Artworks 
The case study of Turry and Logis provides an example of an organic music therapy 
process that began with a client‟s need for help and wish to sing at a critical moment in 
her life. Music therapy not only enabled Logis to sing, however, it enabled a process of 
self-reflection and new self-understanding through singing about her life as it happened 
within a supportive therapeutic relationship. However, the transformation did not stop 
                                                 
451
 
 
Ibid., p.208. 
452
 
 
Ibid. 
453
 
 
Ibid., pp.208–209. 
219 
there. Logis‟ desire to sing led her to a vocal instructor who recognized a process of 
creating something for its own sake that was taking place within sessions. 
The creating of something in moments of great importance in life is of course a common 
occurrence. Poets, writers, painters and composers do this all the time from their personal 
experience, and so generously share something of themselves in the public domain. An 
example of such work, outside of the domain of therapy, is found in the work of Marisa 
Marchetto and her cartoon series depicting her life during illness as a „Cancer Vixen‟.454 
It would seem that this impetus to create an „art object‟ out of adversity is the same 
impetus to create that Logis experienced because of music therapy. In Chapter Five, I 
examined Aigen‟s belief that musical experience in clinical contexts can be continuous 
with non-clinical musical experiences.
455
 This notion, he proposes, in keeping with the 
original work of Nordoff and Robbins, means that the music inside the confidential 
therapeutic setting can become the music outside of that setting, and indeed part of a 
performance. Furthermore, for Aigen it is the engagement with an aesthetic experience 
that is the medium of therapy; to play music is to engage in an aesthetic experience and 
to engage in an aesthetic experience is to engage in a personal emotional experience. 
Quoting the work of Carolyn Kenny, he writes: „“Through aesthetic experience it is 
possible for each person to find her own frame of reference for the universe. Through 
valuing beauty, one can find ways of gathering strength from the world in which one 
lives.”‟456  
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 The music therapy process in this instance was one of expressive improvised 
singing for the purpose of therapy, which was subsequently developed for the purpose of 
performance. This means the music-making of Turry and Logis was continuous from 
private individual music therapy to public performance. The work encapsulates a 
process of concern with the musical aesthetic object within the context of the music 
therapy session, through to a concern with the musical aesthetic object as part of 
performance. 
Making Music, Making Relationships 
However, what about the music of music therapy that begins and remains in the 
relational? Is this also suitable to perform outside of the session? Mary Priestley writes: 
 
The therapist‟s music meets the inner pain of the patient with healing gentleness, or it rages against 
the world and fate with her in a duet of blinding bitterness. But it is always in tune with the point of 
greatest sensitivity. In music the therapist says, “Yes, I understand, I feel what you feel at this 
moment” and yet he must not be overcome by these feelings nor locked in alone with them as the 
patient was. As the therapist plays, the patient is relieved by the sharing of his emotion. The 
empathy is a fact which can be heard and experienced and received into the patient‟s empty places 
inside.
457
 
 
The emphasis in the work Priestley is describing is based upon an inter-subjective 
relating formed through clinical improvisation. The music-making here requires privacy 
for it to develop and provide a basis from which, for example, the patient can come to 
find a greater acceptance of themselves and their personal difficulties. Whereas in the 
work with Turry and Logis this could be seen as an initial phase, a stepping stone, as 
part of an organic process of taking the same music outside of the clinical site. In 
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Priestley‟s work, the relationship with the therapist in music is the work, and no further 
artefact is relevant. In Chapter Eight, I will explore this notion of psychodynamic 
clinical improvisation as complete in itself with no further process, such as performance 
or an artefact such as an art object in the form of a recorded CD, being necessary. It is 
this very notion of a psychodynamic clinical improvisation as being complete in itself 
that implies a discontinuity with art improvisation. The making of this distinction lies at 
the heart of this enquiry and these themes of continuity and discontinuity will be finally 
addressed in the next and final chapter, Chapter Eight. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored how the diverse ontology of clinical improvisation arises 
through a consideration of performance in music therapy, together with a consideration 
of a joke about performance in music therapy. We saw how Ansdell‟s critique of the 
psychodynamic approach („consensus model‟) highlighted important areas in which the 
two approaches differ. I argued that Ansdell‟s joke „yielded‟ the distinct ontology 
underlying the two approaches. Furthermore, we saw how through distinguishing 
between two different concepts of musical performance, it was possible to distinguish 
between concepts of performance inherent in the two approaches. I posed the question of 
whether it was possible to perform clinical improvisation, and examined a case study 
whereby the music made within music therapy sessions was performed outside of the 
sessions. We saw how this reflected Aigen‟s notion of musical continuity between the 
music made within and outside of sessions, and how both the conceptual unity of 
performance in music therapy, and continuity of music, demonstrated a distinction 
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between the music-centred approaches of Ansdell, Turry and Aigen and the 
psychodynamic approach of Priestley. It was noted from the work of Priestley that in 
comparison to the work of Turry and Logis, this work was complete in itself. It was not 
a performance; instead, it could be considered as music-making in the general, non-
performance sense of the word. Furthermore, an attempt to „perform‟ it, for example 
outside of the session, would be to undermine its „relational‟ purpose. 
In Chapter Three, we saw how ontological distinctions were made between works 
for performance, works not for performance and works for studio performance. It can be 
concluded here that the nature of the clinical improvisation of the psychodynamic 
approach is music-making that is „not for performance‟.458 Therefore, inherent in the 
relational direction of the music-making – the purpose of the clinical improvisation – is 
the notion of the music being for the performers. However, when Lukas Foss, as a 
composer and free improviser, makes this same statement he does not mean that the 
music is only for performers; it is rather music for performers and audience. In the 
clinical improvisation of the psychodynamic approach, however, the music can be 
understood as being for performers but not for performances. This contrasts with the 
clinical improvisation of the music-centred approach, as described in the case study 
above. The nature of the music-centred approach lies in its continuity outside of the 
session, and in that it can seen as „for performance‟. 
What does it mean for the clinical improvisation of psychodynamic music therapy to 
be „not for performance‟? In the final chapter, I will examine the way in which this form 
of clinical improvisation can be likened to site-specific art. This will provide the final 
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distinction with the improvisation of music-centred music therapy, the nature of which I 
will claim corresponds to that of art improvisation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Music of Music Therapy as Art 
 
But the theatre [in this production] is often dire. An ode to water from an actor 
pretending to have a learning disability; a guy speaking foreign, shuffling around; the 
actors playing on a roundabout; clowning that is just screaming: not so much a 
performance as a failure of inhibition. 
KIERON QUIRKE, 2012
459
 
 
 
Watching football in an empty stadium is like watching the dress rehearsal of a play: 
it‟s not entertainment, it‟s merely business. Everyone wants to get their lines right but 
there is no one to laugh at the jokes. No one to applaud at the interval. It‟s a one way 
conversation. 
TIM MANSEL, 2011
460
 
 
 
The background to this enquiry has been a concern with the question of „what is the 
music of music therapy?‟ Of central importance has been a demonstration of the way in 
which this is an ontological question, the examination of which „shows up‟ a diversity 
between the clinical music that is made in music therapy (clinical improvisation) and the 
music made outside of music therapy (art improvisation). Furthermore, the discussion 
has led to the identification of a diverse ontology of music between the two different 
approaches to clinical improvisation. 
In this final chapter, I examine the recent practice of public performance by clients 
                                                 
459
 
 K. Quirke, „Opera Review of Bow Down/Harrison Birtwistle‟, The Evening Standard (14 June 2012), 
p.48. 
460
 
 „Tim Mansel looks at the intimate relationship between football and politics in Turkey‟, From Our 
Own Correspondent, (BBC Radio 4, 24 September 11, transcription from BBC iPlayer). 
225 
as part of music therapy, and continue to establish an ontological distinction between 
music made within the private music therapy setting and music made within a 
performance setting, including music therapy performance settings. I will outline some 
of the context to this distinction in terms of the recent history of music therapy in the UK 
and Europe, in particular the development of community music therapy. I will examine a 
version of the idea of the self-in-performance as a rationale for therapeutic performance 
in music therapy. Through reference to Judith Butler‟s distinction between the real and 
imaginary, I seek to develop a distinction between the music that takes place within a 
clinical session and music performed in a public setting. As a way to explore this idea 
further, I pose the question, „can the music that is made within a clinical session be 
understood as a kind of site-specific art?‟ 
Performing the Self 
As described in the previous chapter, a key starting point for any consideration of the 
role of performance as part of music therapy practice is Ansdell‟s discussion article 
„Being who you aren‟t; doing what you can‟t: Community music therapy and the 
paradoxes of performance‟.461 I will now examine aspects of this article once again but 
from a different viewpoint. 
Ansdell vigorously questions the apparent disappearance of performances within 
music therapy practice and provides a kaleidoscopic case for their therapeutic benefit. 
He writes: 
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With the beginnings of modern professional practice, “musician therapists” played to, but also 
increasingly with patients. In the initially broad work of the many music therapy pioneers … there 
was a fluid movement between private and public musical events, psychological and social aims, 
entertainment and therapy. Musical performance is certainly one element of what was understood 
as “music therapy” at this time.[Italics in original]462 
 
Ansdell seeks, therefore, to integrate performance into mainstream music therapy, in 
contrast to clinical practice in which performances might be considered as an extra-
curricular activity. That is to say, the performances a music therapist might facilitate 
should be considered as much a part of therapy as clinical improvisation. 
Ansdell poses the question, „why is performance so good?‟ He incorporates the ideas 
of research psychologist David Aldridge to address once again the hypothetical criticism 
of performance in music therapy practice. For psychodynamic practitioners, to introduce 
performance into therapy is to focus upon a musical product rather than the process of 
therapy. Aldridge emphasises the process of performing through linking the activity of 
performing music with a notion of the self as performance. Ansdell writes: 
 
At a basic level our “performance” is fundamentally physical (our immune system for example or 
our motor coordination) – something we see clearly when such performance „fails‟ when acute or 
chronic illness restricts performance. Aldridge suggests that from this physiological level through 
to the social, we are continually improvising the performance which is our self. He calls it “living 
as jazz”. Both our identity and health are therefore also a performance, and when patients play in 
music therapy they “perform their lives before us” – their health and illness; who they are and who 
they can be [Italics in original].
463
 
 
We have already seen in Chapter Seven how an understanding of performance can be 
linked to Winnicott‟s notion of the „true and false self‟.464 The idea of the „self in 
performance‟ can also be linked to the theory of „acts‟, as developed by Judith Butler in 
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her extensive work on gender and performance, and the self as „becoming‟. If what we 
do is constitutive of who we are, for Butler this conception is in opposition to the notion 
that we are gendered selves that act; instead, we become ourselves through acting. She 
writes: 
 
My suggestion is that the body becomes its gender through a series of acts which are renewed, 
revised and consolidated through time. From a feminist point of view, one might try to reconceive 
the gendered body as the legacy of gendered acts rather than as a predetermined or foreclosed 
structure, essence or fact, whether natural or cultural, or linguistic.
465
 
 
For Aldridge, similarly, we are continually „performing ourselves‟ but from a „health‟ 
perspective; in sickness, this „performance‟ can become damaged and the role of the 
music therapist is to enable repair. Music as a performative medium can be seen to have 
a special role here, both in relation to physical and mental illness.
466
 Ansdell (as we saw 
in Chapter Seven) conflates two meanings of performance together; the „performance‟ 
that is the performance of music and the performative, that is the enactment of the self in 
that same musical performance. 
Performance thus becomes meaningful in music therapy not just through the benefits 
felt in the achievement and cooperation of rehearsing music through to a conclusion. 
Additionally, it is the performative nature of music-making itself that is linked here to 
the performance of becoming ourselves. We become ourselves through performing in 
and out of music. 
Ansdell comments upon a music project he observed that was facilitated by a music 
therapist and whose members were working towards a performance: 
                                                 
465
 
 J. Butler, „Performative acts and gender constitutions: An essay in phenomenonology and feminist 
theory‟, Theatre Journal 40 (1988), p.523. 
466
 
 Ansdell, „Being who you aren‟t; doing what you can‟t‟, p.12/20. 
228 
 
Most members of this group have experienced how acute and chronic mental illness disrupts their 
„self performance‟ – their identity, social relationships and work lives. And yet they also seem to 
be able to mobilize (with Sarah‟s help) [music therapist] a form of „self-repair‟ through musical 
performance … They perform themselves and their lives how they are – with their illness and 
health mixed together. But they also creatively perform how they can be; their hopes and 
aspirations, the achievement of personal and social connection. Perhaps this is why the experience 
feels so good to them. [Italics in original]
467
 
 
A Distinction from Theatre: The Actor on the Stage and the Actor on the Bus 
Butler writes that „philosophers rarely think about acting in the theatrical sense but do 
have a discourse of “acts” that maintains associative semantic meanings with theories of 
performance and acting‟.468 She distinguishes between the actor/transvestite on the stage 
and the transvestite on the bus: 
 
Although the links between a theatrical and a social role are complex and the distinctions not easily 
drawn ... the sight of a transvestite onstage can compel pleasure and applause while the sight of the 
same transvestite on the seat next to us on the bus can compel fear, rage, even violence. The 
conventions which mediate proximity and identification in these two instances are clearly quite 
different. I want to make two different kinds of claims regarding this tentative distinction. In the 
theatre, one can say, „this is just an act,‟ and de-realize the act, make acting into something quite 
distinct from what is real. Because of this distinction, one can maintain one‟s sense of reality in the 
face of this temporary challenge to our existing ontological assumptions about gender 
arrangements; the various conventions which announce that „this is only a play‟ allows strict lines 
to be drawn between performance and life.
469
 
 
Butler‟s distinction between the actor/transvestite performance on stage (imaginary) and 
the actor/transvestite performance on the bus (real) turns on the role of the transvestite as 
an outsider in society and, in the psychoanalytic sense, recipient of a multitude of 
unconscious projections (we might say in the form of fears and rage). 
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It is not immediately possible to draw parallels here between a performance of 
instrumental music and the kind of performance described by Butler. It could be said 
that a musical performance is in a different „category‟ to a theatrical performance as the 
musician performer enters a domain that is, in itself, neither real nor imaginary. In the 
case of instrumental music, the difference between the music made on stage and music 
made in the privacy of the performer‟s rehearsal studio is not one of „reality‟. We might 
say, however, that the musician as a performer becomes a different person on stage, for 
example as a way of managing nerves or as part of the expressivity of the music in the 
performance. This persona as musical performer, however, will generally remain in the 
domain of the real rather than the imaginary. 
Alternatively, in the case of music with words, particularly from within the singer-
songwriter tradition, there is a closer parallel to theatre. For example, when we see in an 
archive recording Cleo Laine sing Unlucky Woman, a song about lost love, and then 
dance in time to John Dankworth‟s improvisation on clarinet, we are confronted with the 
question of whether it is possible for us to believe that she actually means the words of 
the song she is singing – „I don‟t want no more lovin‟, I want to live on my own‟ – in the 
sense of the „real‟.470 However, nothing in the way she expresses herself would lead the 
audience to imagine her performance as a real-life cry for help. 
Here is a theatrical use of music, where normally we are asked to suspend the off-
stage reality as the performers allow us to enter and believe the imaginary world of the 
song. However, in this instance, such suspension of belief is virtually impossible, and 
possibly because of this the meaning of the song in terms of the lyrics takes second place 
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to the personalities of the performers. Whilst it would be possible for unknown 
musicians to perform this song and engage their audience in the domain of the 
imaginary, it would seem that this is not intended here by the Dankworths; their musical 
performance has taken place firmly in the domain of the real. 
To return to Butler‟s theatrical example, in contrast to Ansdell‟s conflation of 
performance with the performed self, it is possible to see the way in which the music in 
a music therapy session can be construed as ontologically akin to the transvestite on the 
bus rather than on the stage. It is this sense in which the music of clinical improvisation 
can be considered performative of self, rather than performed. 
Sites in Music Therapy 
The dualist notion of imaginary and real domains links to the topic of sites or therapeutic 
space in music therapy. What sort of space is relevant for the music therapy session; does 
it have to be entirely private or could a group session, for example, take place in a 
community lounge? Making such a decision reflects the type of therapeutic domain in 
which the clinical work might take place. Is it to be a space where the „imaginary‟ in the 
sense of play can occur and be explored? Alternatively, is the domain to be one where 
concrete relations between people are built through a process of music-making, that is to 
say „the real‟? 
The topic of sites for music therapy has been one of the key areas of exploration to 
emerge from the community music therapy literature. Most of the music therapists 
whose clinical work is described in the key text Community Music Therapy, have 
explored the question of which site is appropriate for what kind of work, and indeed 
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much of the work described here takes place outside of what might be called a 
traditional therapy room.
471
 
By implication, this means that in such instances the work is no longer private, 
although of course it might take on a different notion of privacy, such as the group 
privacy rendered within a ward setting or community centre. Stige writes about what he 
terms „the arena‟ for community music therapy: 
 
Conventional modern music therapy is carried out in a specifically designed setting, a music 
therapy room in a clinic for instance. In Community Music Therapy an important element is to 
assess what different accessible arenas may afford of new possibilities for action, experience, and 
acknowledgement. One example may be the use of public and semi-public areas of performance. 
This has not been so common in conventional modern music therapy, but may often be relevant in 
Community Music Therapy, especially if inclusive and communicative arenas may be 
established.
472
 
 
Wood, Verney and Atkinson provide a vivid description of a music therapy project 
where sites range, as part of an organic therapeutic process, from an inpatient medical 
setting to a community workshop setting.
473
 The process also includes the therapists‟ 
experimentation, following the needs or expressed wishes of the clients, in arranging 
musical events or making links with community organizations. Furthermore, part of the 
process of healing in this work is the development of the clients‟ relationship to music 
per se. The idea is that clients become motivated by music for its own sake. They begin 
by working individually with a music therapist before, when they feel ready, joining a 
music therapy group. Eventually, in time, they might also take part in a music workshop, 
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receive instrumental lessons or go out to concerts. The idea is that gradually they move 
outside of the care setting and into a community music facility; their new-found musical 
skills and confidence to play music within groups has enabled them to find new facets of 
themselves, meet new people and take part in their local community in a way that was 
not possible before. 
These authors believe that what is of key importance in music therapy are those very 
skills that ultimately are not dependent upon a therapist and care setting to exercise and 
benefit from. They write: 
 
Traditionally, music therapy in the UK is a confidential activity in which individuals or groups 
develop a therapeutic music relationship by making music together, usually through improvisation 
… The music made in sessions is regarded as confidential therapeutic material and is seldom 
shared with other staff unless it is used in case reviews or presentations. While in many cases this 
status quo makes sense, we were dissatisfied with its restrictions. We regretted the lack of 
opportunity for music therapy clients to pursue their new interest and ability in music once they 
had left their treatment institution. Often, the outcome of music therapy is as much in musical and 
social skills as it is in a personal process … we believed that the beneficial effects of music therapy 
could be extended past a person‟s discharge into long-term recovery.474 
 
 
Whilst the series of projects described are indeed impressive in terms of the innovative 
approach and positive outcome contained within the „clinical stories‟, it is of importance 
in terms of this enquiry that the process of therapy is described in terms of a single 
trajectory. Furthermore, whilst as part of their description of the work the authors are 
careful to include the personal issues their clients are bringing to therapy, it is clear that 
the aim of this music-centred approach lies in the development of the musical and social 
skills that can be transferred out of the music therapy session. It would seem, therefore, 
that within individual music therapy the musical experience the clients participate in is 
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not to be differentiated, necessarily, from the musical experiences in the group and 
community stages of the therapy. The clients engage in a process from what can be 
termed music-making for therapy‟s sake towards music-making for its own sake, and all 
that is attendant with such experiences. 
As we saw in previous chapters, Aigen has explored this idea of „continuity‟ 
between the music of music therapy and music made elsewhere. In the case example of 
Wood et al., the notion of continuity is not merely an abstract idea, nor is it a feature of 
the work that has emerged. Instead, continuity is the aim of the therapy, as „musical 
experiences in clinical contexts can be continuous with non clinical musical 
experiences‟.475 As we have seen, what Aigen means by this is that the musical 
experience within music therapy is synonymous with the musical experience outside of 
music therapy; the two are one and the same. 
If indeed it is the case that in some instances the music-making within music therapy 
can be perceived as synonymous with music-making outside of therapy, this raises the 
question posed by Brown and Pavlicevic: „If therapist and client are skilled musicians ... 
can we be sure that they are engaged in a clinical musical relationship, rather than a purely 
musical one?‟476 It is clear that for one group of music therapists at least, whose work I 
have cited as music-centred, this question is not an issue. Indeed, it can be seen that their 
project in developing community music therapy is to understand and work with the music 
of music therapy in a „continuous‟ way, promoting the „artwork‟ nature of clinical 
improvisation. Furthermore, we have seen how it is this very artwork nature that is 
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considered to be therapeutic, not just in terms of the emotional resonance of music as a 
medium for communication, but also in the very activity of making it. In this enquiry as a 
whole, therefore, in addressing the core question we have seen that in the music-centred 
approach not only are considerations of „aesthetic perfection‟ foregrounded in the activity 
of the music-making, the project here is to develop a music therapy based upon a notion of 
music that is one and the same as „art music‟. It is through the making of „art music‟ that 
the therapy occurs, and here clinical improvisation and art improvisation are the same. 
Is this the same for the psychodynamic approach; is it the same music as clinical 
improvisation in the music-centred approach? This is the question we have been 
concerned with throughout the enquiry. In this final section of the chapter, I propose an 
alternative understanding of the nature of clinical improvisation in relation to 
performance, one that indicates that there is more than one form of clinical 
improvisation. 
We have already seen from varied case examples the way in which the music of 
music therapy can be regarded as a single, integrated concept with art music. I am going 
to finish by proposing a notion of the music of the psychodynamic approach as 
discontinuous with, and different to, music outside of music therapy. We saw how in the 
work of Mary Priestley the music of the psychodynamic approach can be defined by the 
„relational‟, which I have described as being at the centre of the music-making, and as 
such „not for performance‟. In this concluding section, I develop this idea further and 
show that the music of psychodynamic music therapy can be understood not only as 
separate but as a distinct form of music-making defined by its therapeutic purpose. In 
all, I suggest that this form of clinical improvisation functions as a kind of site-specific 
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art. 
Site-Specific Art 
Site-specific art is a broad and generic term that describes many types of art-making 
activities. In particular (but not exclusively), it refers to art with origins that can be 
traced to the 1960s.
477
 Whilst clinical improvisation also emerged during this time, the 
link to be made in this chapter with site-specific art is conceptual in emphasis rather than 
historical, although this is not to ignore the historical ramifications of making such a 
link. The understanding taken here is of a site-specific art is that is deliberately not 
autonomous in conception, in that it takes its meaning from the site in which it exists 
rather than existing independently of sites. Kwon writes: 
 
The space of art was no longer perceived as a blank slate, a tabula rasa, but a real place. The art 
object or event in this context was to be singularly and multiply experienced in the here and now 
through the bodily presence of each viewing subject, in a sensory immediacy of spatial extension 
and temporal duration ... rather than instantaneously perceived in a visual epiphany by a 
disembodied eye. Site-specific work in its earliest formation, then, focused on establishing an 
inextricable, indivisible relationship between the work and its site, and demanded the physical 
presence of the viewer for the work‟s completion.478 
 
It might be the very temporal dimension of some site-specific art works, where, in 
Jason Gaiger‟s words, emphasis is placed upon the „circumstances of display, stressing 
the inseparability of the work from the temporal and spatial conditions under which it is 
encountered‟ that allow for a comparison to be made with music.479 For example, the 
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British artist Richard Long makes artworks in landscape both through „walks‟ (such as 
„straight hundred mile walks in different landscapes around the world‟) and collecting 
natural materials such as stones, mud and water.
480
 Sometimes the materials are 
arranged in the landscape or sometimes indoors as part of a gallery exhibition. Long 
has spoken of how his work „is really a self portrait, in all ways. It is my own physical 
engagement with the world, whether walking across or moving stones around.‟481 He 
also creates transient works that last. When asked to comment upon his „idea of 
duration and eternity‟ he said: „On a beach in Cornwall in 1970 I made a spiral of 
seaweed below the tideline. I liked the idea that my work lasting only a tide, was 
interposed between past and future patterns of seaweed of infinite variation, made by 
natural and lunar forces, repeating for millions of years.‟482 
 
Psychodynamic Music Therapy as Site-Specific Art 
I am going now to make a link between the sites in site-specific art and sites in music 
therapy. To do this, I will make a distinction between the music-centred approach of 
Wood et al., in which their clinical work occurs across a variety of sites, and the 
psychodynamic approach, where the clinical work generally takes place in a private 
setting only. Of crucial importance is the relationship between the music therapy room, the 
participants and the music-making; the meaning of the music for participants in a clinical 
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improvisation and the therapy room or „space‟ are intrinsically linked. There is a tradition 
within psychoanalysis of the consulting room being more than just the four walls of a 
particular building. The act of being in the space itself takes on meaning.
483
 Connected to 
the idea of „space‟ is the notion of time, and the reliability, presence and memory of the 
therapist. However, within music therapy this is also a musical presence and reliability. 
Whereas Wood et al. emphasize a continuity between individual music therapy (private), 
group music therapy (semi private) and community music, I am now going to present an 
alternative scenario of discontinuity. This scenario entails an idea derived from 
psychotherapy of the therapy site being the frame for an experience whereby, through the 
development of an interpersonal relationship, new personal meaning emerges for the 
client. The music being made is made in the relationship between the client and therapist. 
This music, as with all the contents of the therapy, is particular to the individuals taking 
part. It is not a music-making that can be transferred outside of the music therapy room, as 
described by Wood et al., into a public space, as this would be to transform the experience 
and the music into something different. Of prime importance is that this music does not 
require an audience; the presence of outside listeners to the music, as indicated previously, 
changes its very nature. 
In psychoanalysis, the room in which sessions occur is given a metaphorical 
meaning, sometimes known as the „analytical space‟. This refers not just to the physical 
bricks and mortar of the building but also to the conscious and unconscious experience 
of being in that space. Psychoanalyst Thomas Ogden explains how the analytic space 
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can be viewed „as an inter-subjective state, generated by patient and therapist, in which 
meanings can be played with, considered, understood‟.484 Winnicott influenced this type 
of thinking through his concept of „potential space‟.485 Potential space is the space in 
which play can occur. This is play in the sense that a child tries something out as part of 
play, as if it were real. The point is that in psychotherapy, the play and the transference 
relationship, at least in part, is not literally real, it is a „space‟ in which play can occur. 
This notion of as if is the sense in which a disconnection takes place between what 
happens between people in the therapy room or site and what happens outside. Why 
though can this play not occur outside of the therapy room? 
We have already seen how music-making in music therapy cannot sustain an audience 
without it becoming a performance and therefore, on these terms, something other than 
clinical improvisation. There is a sense, therefore, that the product of clinical 
improvisation, the music, is the sole concern of the participants and has no meaning 
beyond that of the participants. This relates to another principle, that the room is an 
uninterrupted physical space that in itself relates to the reliability of the therapist and the 
building and maintaining of trust with the client. The physical location of the room can 
take on a special significance for the client and therapist depending on the way it is laid 
out and whether it is available at a particular time of day. The room itself gradually 
becomes the site for therapy. It is this establishing of the physical site that creates the 
opportunities for what in psychoanalytic psychotherapy is sometimes termed the analytic 
space, which provides the opportunity for potential space in which „play‟ takes place. The 
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meaning of the music is its meaning in this specific space or site at a particular time, 
which includes the therapist and individual client or group. Clinical improvisation in the 
psychodynamic approach, therefore, is defined by its site specificity; it is inseparable not 
only from its performers, as in free improvisation, but also from its „potential space‟ of 
therapy. 
Conclusion 
This enquiry has covered a broad territory, from the historical considerations of the 
early chapters, the methodological and philosophical considerations of musical ontology 
and improvisation that are addressed in the middle, through to the theoretical 
considerations of music therapy practice that comprise the final chapters. At its core, I 
pose the question of what is the music of music therapy. In carrying out the research, I 
have accrued an account of clinical improvisation and within this account identified a 
diverse ontology of music to be found in the music making of the two distinct 
approaches that I describe. In short, the enquiry examines three themes of context, 
diversity and ontology. I began by asking a question about the nature of the music of 
music therapy, what kind of music making takes place in therapy and is it any different 
from music made elsewhere? As was immediately evident, this question is intrinsically 
philosophical and for this reason the enquiry as a whole has been concerned with some 
varying methodologies of musical ontology. Indeed the topic of ontology underpins the 
developing discussion of the enquiry as a whole.  
However the enquiry is fore mostly concerned with music therapy as a practice. 
Unlike many other musical practices, such as the performances undertaken by a 
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contemporary Western symphony orchestra, whose music is of prime concern in the 
literature of analytic aesthetics, the practice of music therapy cannot be taken for 
granted. For this reason, following the introductory Chapter One, in Chapter Two, I 
introduced music therapy and the practice of clinical improvisation in the UK, initially 
through describing some of its precedents and influences. I traced the musical and 
theoretical development of clinical improvisation since 1958, showing how it had 
become a hybrid musical practice with many influences including free jazz, aleatoric 
music and music of chance. I showed how the particular skills of the respective pioneer 
practitioners, together with the theoretical beliefs they held, ensured the emergence of 
two approaches to the clinical work. 
Having established the subject matter of the enquiry, in Chapter Three I 
approached the ontological nature of the core question. As indicated above, I examined 
the notion of a comparative ontology as providing the way forward in this respect. I 
explored Andrew Kania‟s project to designate the comparative questions in ontology 
as being „higher-order‟, rather than fundamental, in nature.486 I demonstrated how this 
manifested in the central concerns of the present enquiry, making distinctions of 
ontology within clinical improvisation and in relation to music-making outside of 
clinical practice. I showed how the enquiry could be carried out methodologically in 
parallel with Kania‟s examination of rock music in relation to classical music, and 
examined his discussion of this theme with Davies and Gracyk.
487
 As we saw, these 
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three philosophers have considered the ontology of rock music and identified 
performance as constituting a common theme at the centre of the rock music work and 
a place from which to examine what is distinct about rock music in relation to other 
forms of music. Musical performance was also to become pivotal to this present 
enquiry in that upon examination of this theme, a key difference between the two 
music therapy approaches emerged. This difference was seen to be in part one of 
preference: recently musical performance has developed as integral to the practice of 
therapists working in a music-centred or community music therapy approach. 
However, as discussed, this is not to say that musical performances do not occur in 
some form or other within the clinical sessions of a psychodynamic music therapy 
practice. In a more complex way however, musical performance, an activity so often 
taken for granted as a given, in this enquiry comes to denote more than one kind of 
activity and thereto, as is a central theme of the enquiry, more than one ontology. This 
is not just in terms of the being of the music itself, but also, as I discuss in the final 
chapter in relation to psychoanalysis, in terms of the being of the performer.  
In Part Two, clinical improvisation was explored as a diverse musical practice. In 
Chapter Four, I explored the paradigms of process and product in relation to clinical 
improvisation and demonstrated how both paradigms were relevant to the clinical 
improvisation of both approaches. On the one hand, following this theme of 
convergence, I indicated how the musical forms of clinical improvisation vary across 
both approaches, and that no one form defines each approach. On the other hand, I 
established that, following Kania‟s question of where is the art-work in this or that form 
of music, I introduced the terms „aesthetic wholeness‟ (music-centred approach) and 
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„relationship‟ (psychodynamic approach) to indicate the distinctive ontological theme at 
the centre of each of the two approaches. In addition, I presented the continuum of 
musical forms (Figure 2) and discussed the way in which the music-making in the 
psychodynamic approach tends towards the unconscious relationship, or what I term „the 
relational‟. 
In Chapter Five, I continued the exploration of the two approaches and examined the 
way in which the music-making in the music-centred approach tends towards the notion 
of „aesthetic wholeness‟ or what I termed „the aesthetic‟. I showed how some music-
centred music therapists, including Ansdell and Lee, have incorporated practices of 
musicology into their thinking about the therapy, and how this affects their approach to 
clinical improvisation. In particular, the work of the American music therapist Kenneth 
Aigen was discussed with regard to his stance that musical experiences in clinical 
contexts can be „continuous with non-clinical musical experiences‟.488 For Aigen, it was 
shown how the consideration of aesthetic experience is integral to music therapy 
practice, as there is a link to be made between „the beautiful‟ in music and the sense of 
personal „wholeness‟ that might be integral to a successful therapeutic outcome. Indeed, 
he critiques music therapy approaches that do not consider beauty as a significant factor 
in therapy, and crucially, it was argued that this stance assumes a single ontology of 
music in relation to the approaches he considers. I contrasted this with some further 
consideration of the psychodynamic approach and claimed that in this approach, there is 
a separate form of clinical improvisation to art improvisation. It is indeed the case that 
practicing music therapists might well veer between approaches and consider the music 
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of music therapy from differing perspectives depending, not only upon their original 
music therapy training, but also the needs of the client they are working with. However I 
showed how theorists of clinical improvisation have quite distinct ontological notions of 
the nature of the music, and furthermore the nature of the music in relation to music 
outside of therapy. It was seen therefore that there are distinct ideas about musical 
ontology within music therapy which may not have been hitherto expressed in these 
specific technical terms but are manifested in the theories discussed and descriptions of 
case material.  
At the conclusion of Part II, The distinct ideas could now be seen from two 
perspectives in relation to the two approaches. First from a music-centred perspective, 
the theories of clinical practice was found to be explicated upon the assumption of a 
single ontology whereby the music of music therapy and music that is made outside of 
the clinical setting are conceptually one and the same. Second, from a psychodynamic 
perspective, there was found to be less concern with the conceptualising of musical 
ontology. This was possibly because a dual ontology of music is assumed to be at work, 
and speculatively therefore, less need amongst practitioners to defend and promote the 
use of music as primarily an art form .  
In Part Three, I showed how this distinction is manifested. Following Bohlman, I 
demonstrated how an examination of the music-making of music therapy „yielded‟ an 
ontology that was found to be distinct between the two approaches.
489
 In Chapter Six, 
the parallel questions of where emotion lies and where therapy takes place in music was 
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explored in relation to Streeter‟s critique of the music-centred approach and Hanslick‟s 
aesthetic theory of music and emotion.
490
 In Chapter Seven, I posed the question: Is it 
possible to perform clinical improvisation? As a starting point, I made a distinction 
between performance in the „narrow‟ sense of concert performances and performance in 
the broader sense, which includes all types of musical activity. I considered Gary 
Ansdell‟s position, in which performance was considered appropriate to therapy as it is a 
„natural and necessary part of standard musical practice‟.491 I showed how through 
humour Ansdell revealed a subtle distinction between music therapy approaches, and 
that psychodynamic clinical improvisation was considered by him as a form of music-
making that is „not for performance‟.492 
Finally, I synthesized the arguments from the previous chapters to show how clinical 
improvisation relates to art improvisation practice. I put forward the practice of site-
specific art as a synthesizing feature of a psychodynamic approach to clinical 
improvisation, and in doing so I established the ontological nature of this kind of clinical 
improvisation as being „not-for-performance‟. In conclusion, clinical improvisation was 
considered a diverse practice, both in terms of therapeutic approach and underlying 
musical ontology.  
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Beyond the research: towards a notion of clinical improvisation as music for a purpose 
 
What is the future of this enquiry and where can the findings now be said to 
reside as regards the contemporary practices of music therapy? As already referred to in 
other parts of the enquiry, the philosophical emphasis of the research has necessitated in 
delineating between the two approaches in a way far more radical than would ordinarily 
be found in clinical practice. However by means of a short coda, I shall once more take a 
step back and consider both approaches as one clinical improvisation, considering it in 
relation to music outside of the clinical setting.  
During the process of the research, upon exploring the wider practices of music-
making in general, it became evident that clinical improvisation can be placed alongside 
other forms of music-making where the aesthetic is closely related to its purpose. It can 
be seen that whilst the dual notions of „interestedness‟ and disinterestedness‟ are 
historically key concerns within philosophical aesthetics, a consideration of purpose 
with regard to specific art forms is under-explored in the contemporary literature of 
analytic aesthetics. Indeed the considerations of ontology discussed in this enquiry by 
writers who would identify themselves as professional philosophers, exclusively refer to 
forms of music that is (arguably) made for no purpose beyond itself such as jazz and 
rock music. 
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Why might this be significant as regards clinical improvisation? Music made 
specifically for an external purpose is not limited to therapy, it is of course ubiquitous. 
Andrew Gregory
493
 describes the main traditional uses of music which „are common to 
nearly all societies‟: lullabies, the games of children, storytelling, work songs, dancing, 
music used in religious ceremonies, in festivals, in war, as a personal symbol, 
salesmanship, to promote ethnic or group identity, as communication within language 
itself, for personal enjoyment, in healing and in trance. What is striking about many of 
Gregory‟s examples is the way in which both the use and function of the music can be 
seen as imbued in the aesthetic features of that music. For example, he writes: „Most 
Central African vernacular languages have no words for pure music, nor for the concepts 
of melody or rhythm. Melody is only thought of as representing the words it conveys, 
and then becomes song. Rhythm is thought of as the stimulus for the bodily movement 
to which it gives rise, and is given the name of the dance.‟494 However Gregory makes a 
distinction between societies where music is „an independent art form to be enjoyed for 
its own sake‟ and those societies where „it is an integral part of culture.‟495 For example, 
he writes (citing the work of Bebey) how in the music of black Africa, „African 
musicians do not seek to combine sounds in a manner pleasing to the ear. Their aim is 
simply to express life in all its aspects through the medium of sound ... [although] to 
understand African music it must be studied within the context of African life.‟496  
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Whilst undertaking the enquiry, through conducting informal interviews with 
practitioners, together with attending exhibitions, workshops and performances, I 
considered other forms of music and art that are made specifically for a purpose. In 
historical terms, the oldest of these was the practice of improvisation by organists as 
integral to the liturgical rituals of the Christian mass in Europe, a practice which reaches 
at least as far back to the ninth century.
497
 Other practices which I considered included 
„outsider art‟, a term which refers to a practice of art making specifically by those 
without training and associated with the expression of emotional pain.
498
 I also 
considered the practice of improvisation as an accompaniment to dance and the recent 
revival of live improvised performances for silent film.
499
  
What unified these improvisational and art-making practices with clinical 
improvisation was the way in which the „products‟ relied upon a certain purposive 
context in order that the „art-work‟, could be aesthetically apprehended, imbibed with 
meaning and evaluated. What is of significance is that outside of the special context the 
improvisation or painting is liable to loose its meaning.
500
 For example even though the 
work of some of the cited original „outsider‟ artists are exhibited in European public art 
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galleries of renown, their work is often curated  in relation to „outsider art‟ with all the 
ramifications of „self expression‟ that this brings. Evidently the label „outsider artist‟ is 
deemed to be necessary in order that the viewer will view the art-work „appropriately‟, 
with the right context in mind. Without such an explanation the viewer might dismiss the 
painting as unformed or lacking in technique. The listener who heard a recording of an 
improviser playing for a dance class might similarly judge the music as repetitive and 
predictable.   
  Indeed, this non „portability‟ of art made for a specific purpose out of its 
specialized context was the basis for the conclusion I drew in making a comparison 
between psychodynamic clinical improvisation and site specific art. I argued how this 
approach to clinical improvisation produces a music-making that cannot be transferred 
outside of the clinical setting and, crucially, cannot be performed as such to an audience 
without losing its personal and aesthetic meaning. Indeed as argued previously, most 
music therapists offering a psychodynamic approach would not consider such a 
performance to be a suitable outcome or adjunct to therapy. Putting aside the 
distinctiveness of approach, the ethical ramifications of this last statement leads me to 
one final observation: all these forms of art made for a purpose, as cited above, explicitly 
take as the driving aesthetic, some concern with the condition of being human. This is 
the case whether the art/music is concerned with body (dance), mind (outsider art) or 
spirit (religion); or body, mind and spirit (film).  
The music of music therapy as this enquiry demonstrates, adds to this list of 
forms of art and music-making created for a purpose. In addition to its context and 
preferred approach, first and fore mostly, therefore clinical improvisation is essentially a 
249 
form of music for a purpose, whereby a specialized „human-centred‟ musical aesthetic is 
entailed to greater or lesser extent in its realization. 
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